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1.1 Setting the Stage 
Childcare organizations have a very important and responsible task in a 
tremendously complex environment. In a relatively short period the childcare 
sector in the Netherlands has developed from a marginal phenomenon to a 
significant industry. Childcare organizations bear the responsibility of providing 
an essential task: the care and guidance of young children (0-12 years) in a 
safe and sound environment, while at the same time contributing to their 
well-being and development (Van Dijke & Terpstra, 2001; Hol & Veas, 2012; 
Tavecchio, 2001). Even though this task is complex in itself, these organizations 
also need to operate in a very complex environment, rife with strong norms, 
values and beliefs concerning what is ‘good’ and ‘responsible’ childcare which 
is subsequently subject to strict regulatory pressures concerning children’s 
safety, health and well-being. Moreover, inherent to the vulnerable nature of this 
service and the key importance of trust, the childcare sector is very sensitive to 
anything that could possibly go wrong and media scrutiny diffuses widely after 
incidents occur in this field (Roberts, 2011). 
Many different beliefs exist about how childcare should be provided, by 
whom, and how much and what kind of care is “good enough” (Hochschild, 
1995: 333). Traditionally, caring for young children was predominantly a task for 
mothers who stayed at home to look after their offspring. However, as beliefs 
and norms about role patterns, parenthood and childrearing have been shifting 
and previously taken-for-granted family practices have been replaced by others, 
this situation has changed (e.g., Hochschild, 1989; 2003; Kremer, 2007; Macionis 
& Plummer, 2002; Zelizer, 1981). Nowadays, the ideal of the full-time mother 
who stays at home no longer prevails, and the proportion of mothers in the 
labor market has grown significantly over the past few decades (OECD, 2011). 
Nonetheless, when full-time motherhood is no longer a cultural given, than one 
might ask who is trustworthy and competent enough to assume this important 
task? And then again, in what manner should childcare contribute to children’s 
upbringing: should children be educated, socialized, cherished or simply looked 
after (Kremer, 2007: 71)?
The answers to such questions are not straightforward and may vary across 
different constituents. Consequently, childcare organizations face multiple 
institutional demands. In this, we refer to the plethora of pressures (which 
can be regulative, normative or more cognitive in nature) that prescribe what 
constitutes ‘appropriate’ organizational conduct; pressures which are imposed 
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on organizations by a variety of constituents (Scott, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Despite the interdependence of an organization on the social support of its 
constituents (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), the demands 
from those constituents are not necessarily aligned and even one constituent 
may generate conflicting demands over time, creating a situation of institutional 
complexity (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011; Heimer, 
1999). To take an example, for governments, childcare policies often entail 
competition between different logics, and underlying values (e.g., Lewis, 2008: 
499). In the first place, the issue of government intervention in childcare is in 
itself a subject of debate, let alone which form childcare policies should take 
(e.g., Knijn & Saraceno, 2010; Lewis, 2008; Lewis, Knijn, Martin & Ostner, 2008; 
Kremer, 2007; Bleijenbergh, 2004; Bussemaker, 1998; Knijn & Kremer, 1997). 
Secondly, another contested issue concerns the commercialization of childcare 
and the tensions which often arise when markets take over the functions 
previously performed by families (Zelizer; 1978; 1981; 2005; Hochschild, 2003; 
Turco, 2012). Economic activities and emotional relations are often presented 
as ‘hostile worlds’ and the commercialization of personal settings, such as 
‘earning a profit from caring for children’, may trigger public discomfort or 
outright resistance (Zelizer, 1981; 2005; Turco, 2012). What is more, what parents 
may believe is good for their children may not be in sync with the professional 
norms concerning what responsible care and guidance of children entails 
(Quirke, forthcoming). 
Childcare organizations, which find themselves on this battlefield of 
multiple and conflicting institutional demands, must run and sustain their 
businesses. Yet, faced with multiple prescriptions concerning ‘the proper thing 
to do’, organizations are likely to experience tension, conflict or confusion, 
subsequently creating circumstances for heterogeneous responses (Oliver, 
1991; Seo & Creed, 2002; Pache & Santos, 2010). Childcare decision makers 
face the challenging task of interpreting and assessing multiple institutional 
demands, and issuing an organizational response while at the same time they 
face the tradeoff between securing the legitimacy from different sources (Ruef 
& Scott, 1998; Heimer, 1999). However, we lack a theoretical understanding 
of the ways in which individual actors make everyday decisions and decide 
on organizational responses in complex institutional environments with 
incompatible institutional demands (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Lok, 2010; 
Lepoutre & Valente, 2012; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Fraught with strong normative 
associations, strict rules and regulations, and emotionally charged societal and 
political debates, we believe the Dutch childcare field constitutes a valuable 
14
research setting in which the relationship between institutional complexity and 
heterogeneous organizational responses and the key role played by decision 
makers in this process can be examined. This dissertation revolves around the 
following research question: 
How do Dutch childcare organizations respond to situations of institutional 
complexity and which micro-level factors explain variation in organizations’ 
responses? 
1.2 An Institutional Perspective 
Organizational scholars have long recognized that organizations are embedded 
in a wider social environment that influences organizational behavior (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Institutional theory, in particular, 
offers a rich account of the manner in which organizations are influenced by 
the wider set of institutional pressures stemming from their social environment 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Friedland 
& Alford, 1991). In response to the overly instrumental and rational views on 
organizational life that dominated much organizational thinking in the late 
1970s, early institutional scholars emphasized the importance of institutions. 
Even though a single agreed upon definition is lacking (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin 
& Suddaby, 2008) most definitions of institutions refer to shared norms, values, 
cultural expectations, routines, or rules which produce more or less stable 
and recurring patterns of behavior (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Friedland & Alford, 
1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). Institutions are typically widely 
accepted or taken-for-granted, and consequently relatively resistant to change 
(Jepperson, 1991; Zucker 1977). Hence, institutions exist all around us and may 
govern social, organizational and individual life (Scott, 2008a; Greenwood et al., 
2008). 
According to an institutional perspective, organizations cannot be fully 
understood as ‘mere devices for enhanced coordination and control’ (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977), but organizational practices, structures and procedures reflect 
the historical development of institutions as well: 
 “After all, the building blocks for organizations come to be littered 
around the societal landscape; it takes only a little entrepreneurial 
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energy to assemble them into a structure. And because these building 
blocks are considered proper, adequate, rational, and necessary, 
organizations must incorporate them to avoid illegitimacy” (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977: 345).
A key assumption in institutional theory has been that organizations are 
largely homogenous in their responses to institutional pressures; in an attempt 
to secure legitimacy and social support of critical constituents organizations 
will comply with the regulative, normative and cognitive pressures in their 
environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Who these critical constituents are, may vary from time to time and place 
to place, but professional or trade organizations, agents of the state, consumers, 
and the public at large are often critical for organizations (Scott, 2008: 60). In 
identifying important constituents and sources of institutional pressure, most 
institutional scholars have relied on the notion of organizational fields. Within 
such fields or social sectors (cf., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1991) 
institutional forces are believed to have their strongest effects, and hence, are 
most readily examined (Scott, 2005; 2008a: 44). Fields have been defined as: 
“...those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized 
area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148). 
Once disparate organizations are structured into an institutional field, powerful 
institutional forces emerge, which, in the aggregate and with the passage of time, 
lead to an increased homogeneity of organizational structures and practices 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 147-148)1. By complying with the institutional 
demands in their field, organizations “avoid social censure, minimize demands 
for external accountability, improve their chances of securing necessary 
resources and raise their probability of survival” (Greenwood et al., 2008: 4).
1  DiMaggio and Powell proposed three field-level mechanisms of diffusion – coercive, mimetic and 
normative - (1983: 148). Coercive isomorphism occurs because organizations want to avoid sanctions from 
powerful external constituents (such as the State) on which they are dependent. Mimetic isomorphism 
occurs when organizational uncertainty encourages imitation. Normative isomorphism stems primarily 
from professionalization projects and occurs when organizations follow the expectations of professions. For 
instance, via formal education or accreditation systems particular practices can ‘become the norm’ in a field 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
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1.3 Main Theoretical Building Blocks
The ‘default’ institutional model stresses that organizations all conform to 
institutional pressures (Scott, 2008b; Greenwood et al., 2008) because this 
grants them legitimacy, even “without necessarily making them more efficient” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 147). By adopting institutionalized practices, 
complying with regulatory demands, and pursuing appropriate goals and 
means, organizations are less vulnerable to scrutiny or having their conduct 
questioned (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995) and they can secure access 
to important resources such as funds, personnel or a license to operate. 
However, the idea that organizations will always accommodate institutional 
expectations has received increased criticism over the years (e.g., DiMaggio, 
1988; Beckert, 1999; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997a; 
1997b) and research attention has shifted to incorporate the role of agency 
and heterogeneity of responses (e.g., Oliver, 1991; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). Especially, in situations featuring 
competing institutional demands, full or quick compliance seems to be largely 
impossible, as satisfying one demand may require the organization to violate 
others (D’Aunno, Sutton & Price, 1991; Heimer, 1999): 
“When organizations face environments characterized by strong 
beliefs systems and rules, survival and effectiveness depend more on 
the legitimacy acquired from conforming to widely held expectations 
than on efficient production (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). Conforming to strong environmental beliefs and rules is difficult 
for many organizations, however, because they face fragmented 
environments in which multiple independent groups and organizations 
make demands that are, at best, uncoordinated” (D’Aunno et al., 1991: 
636).
1.3.1 Institutional complexity 
Recently, interest among institutional scholars has turned to the issue of 
institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). This 
stream of research recognizes that organizations are often situated at a juncture 
of multiple institutional demands and expectations. The study of institutional 
logics has been especially influential in this respect. Institutional logics are 
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generally understood as macro-level believe systems which guide the behavior 
of organizational and individual actors, by influencing which problems receive 
attention and which legitimate solutions are available (Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012). 
Actors embedded in society or organizational fields often face logics from 
contending institutional spheres. For instance, at the societal level of analysis 
different macro institutions are available, each with its own central logic, such 
as: market logic, logic of the state, family logic, logic of religion, and professional 
logic (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004). In addition, organizational 
fields are rife with multiple logics (Reay & Hinings, 2005; 2009; Purdy & Gray, 
2009; Dunn & Jones, 2010). For instance, in academic settings the competing 
logics of science and commerce are both at play, and by setting distinct means-
ends relations and prescribing different behaviors they may cause tensions for 
the actors involved (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Mars & Lounsbury, 2009; Greenwood 
et al., 2011). In this dissertation we will study several manifestations of 
institutional complexity. 
1.3.1.1 Studying various manifestations of institutional 
complexity
The Dutch childcare setting, which entails a multiplicity of active institutional 
demands, provides a compelling setting for studying how institutional 
complexity is experienced, assessed and managed. Within this dissertation we 
study different manifestations of institutional complexity in Dutch childcare. 
In Chapter 2 we will start at the macro level of analysis and trace the origins 
of plural logics in the Dutch childcare field and show how these various 
logics, in a dynamic interplay, have permeated the field over the course of its 
history and contributed to the institutional sources of complexity the field is 
still facing today. In Chapter 3 we will study a critical event which shocked 
the field in December 2010; the sexual abuse of children in a childcare center 
in Amsterdam. This event ‘spilled over’ and damaged the legitimacy of the 
whole field as media scrutiny diffused broadly (Jonsson, Greve, & Fuijwara-
Greve, 2009) and various actors tried to make sense of what had happened. This 
event evoked a complex institutional situation for childcare organizations, as 
the taken-for-granted belief that children are safe in childcare was challenged 
and organizations faced the critical task of maintaining institutional support 
while various actors (e.g., the government, the parents, the public) pressured for 
change in practices. In Chapter 4 we will study the introduction of a new law, 
The Act on Childcare. We will show that even a singular institutional pressure 
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may never be monolithic, but it can (differently) affect both the material as well 
as the ideational make-up of organizations. Depending on the decision makers’ 
interpretation of the (mis)alignments of new institutional requirements and the 
existing organizational situation, this coercive institutional pressure varied in 
complexity for the organizations involved. Finally, in Chapter 5 we will explore 
how organizations respond to complex situations that arise when a powerful 
actor (the government) mandates organizations to adopt a new practice, while 
other important constituents (employees and/or parents) may not accept the 
practice as legitimate.
1.3.2 Organizational responses 
An important question in the literature on institutional complexity is how 
do organizations respond to situations of institutional complexity? As we 
have pointed out earlier, full compliance to each and every demand may be 
impossible to achieve in situations of institutional complexity (Seo & Creed, 
2002; Pache & Santos, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Agency unfolding in 
situations of institutional complexity is not determined in a straightforward 
way, and actors may follow different paths of action, thus creating a possibility 
for a variety of responses among organizations (Oliver, 1991; Delbridge & 
Edwards, 2013). Institutional complexity creates uncertainty about what is the 
appropriate way to act in a situation and how the organization should adapt. 
Yet, our understanding of the manner in which individuals and organizations 
experience and respond to institutional complexity remains selective at best 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). 
According to Oliver, organizations are capable of responding in a variety 
of ways to institutional pressures and organizational responses may vary 
“depending on the nature and context of the pressures themselves” (Oliver, 
1991: 146). Oliver (1991) connected institutional theory and resource 
dependency theory and proposed a whole range of possible strategic responses 
besides compliance. In addition to full compliance, Oliver (1991) identified 
other possible responses: organizations may avoid the institutional pressure, 
they may strategically search for compromises, defy the institutional pressure, 
or manipulate the content or source of the pressure. She predicted the likely 
use of these various strategies based on organizational, contextual and 
pressure-specific antecedents. Predictive factors of organizational response 
include whether complying will result in increased social or economic fitness, 
how dependent the organization is on the constituent exerting institutional 
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pressures, whether there are many competing demands (multiplicity), how 
consistent the pressure is with organizational goals, whether the pressure 
will impose constraints on the organization, whether the demand is legally 
coerced or voluntary, and how uncertain and interconnected the context is 
(Oliver, 1991: 160). For many years this response framework has been very 
influential in understanding organizational responses, and the heterogeneity 
thereof, to institutional pressures. Yet, this framework is especially useful for 
understanding how organizations respond to a singular institutional pressure, 
giving us fewer leads to find out how organizations respond to multiple, possible 
contradictory pressures, operating simultaneously. 
Kraatz and Block (2008) describe four basic ways in which organizations may 
adapt to pluralistic demands. Organizations can attempt to (1) eliminate the 
sources of conflicting demands, (2) compartmentalize the conflicting demands 
and deal with them independently, (3) reign over the tension created by 
conflicting demands (e.g., by attempts to balance demands, play off constituents 
against one another or search for more cooperative solutions), (4) or become an 
‘institution in their own right’ and thus forge new institutional orders. Still, the 
antecedents of each strategy are not explicitly discussed in their model.
Pache and Santos (2010) further specified the theoretical model of 
organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. They note that 
conflicting institutional demands may differ with regard to either the ideological 
goals they deem legitimate, or the means or courses of action they prescribe. 
They suggest that conflicts or disagreements over goals are particularly 
challenging for organizations, since their resolution requires “organizational 
members to overtly recognize the incompatibility of the demands on goals, 
which may, in turn, jeopardize institutional support” (Pache & Santos, 2010: 
466). Likewise, organizations face challenging situations if the conflict between 
institutional demands is internally represented and different groups inside the 
organizations fight with one another in an effort to have their views prevail 
(Pache & Santos, 2010: 461). 
Although we know that organizational responses to situations of 
institutional complexity are unlikely to be uniform, the studies discussed above 
are conceptual in nature and the empirical evidence on the various manners 
in which organizations cope with institutional complexity and what explains 
their responses is still scarce (Greenwood, Díaz, Li & Lorente, 2010; Greenwood 
et al., 2011). 
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1.3.3 Micro-foundations 
Recently, scholars called attention to individuals as sites for interpretation, 
maintenance and change in institutions through their everyday processes 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Barley 2008; Suddaby, 2010). Under the rubric of 
micro-foundations Powell and Colyvas (2008: 276) argued that institutional 
theory, which predominately focused on macro-lines of analyses, would largely 
benefit from devoting more attention to individuals’ “enactment, interpretation, 
translation and meaning” as they muddle through day-to-day activities and try 
to make sense of macro institutional pressures or events. 
Various micro-level studies have recently appeared in the institutional 
literature. For instance, studies have pointed out how local actors translate, 
reconstitute, enact or interpret macro institutional prescriptions (e.g., Hallett, 
2010; Binder, 2007), how an individual’s identity filters responses to multiple 
(contradictory) institutional logics (e.g., Creed, DeJordy & Lok, 2010; Lok, 2010), 
how institutional change may emerge from the everyday work of individuals 
(Smets, Morris & Greenwood, 2012) or how individuals creatively employ 
multiple logics in daily interactions (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). What all these 
studies share is a focus upon ‘the insiders’; mundane individual actors who, 
situated in their specific local situation, experience and respond (or may not 
respond) to institutional pressures (Powell & Colyvas, 2008).
In order to explain the heterogeneity of organizational responses, several 
scholars who focus their attention on studying micro-foundations, have 
identified the need to study decision makers’ perceptions and interpretations 
of institutional pressures directly (e.g., George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 
2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Lepoutre & Valente, 2012; Crilly, Zollo & Hansen, 
2012). Particularly for our understanding of how organizations experience and 
respond to institutional complexity, the study of individual-level factors may 
constitute a valuable addition to the field-level (i.e., fragmentation, formal 
structuring/rationalization, centralization) and the organizational-level (i.e., 
field position, structure, ownership/governance, identity) factors which have 
already been put forward in the literature (see Greenwood et al., 2011 for a 
review). 
Likewise, we will focus on individuals: namely, the key role played by 
decision makers, who must interpret and assess the various demands in their 
environment (George et al., 2006). After all, decision makers are focal actors 
who need to factor institutional complexity in their decisions about when and 
how to respond. By making “decisions as to what demand to prioritize, satisfy, 
21Chapter 1
alter or neglect in order to secure support and ensure survival”, they need to 
navigate their organization through the complex institutional environment 
(Pache & Santos, 2010: 462; George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Lepoutre 
& Valente, 2012; Ritchie & Melnyk, 2012). Their interpretation and enactment of 
institutional pressures mediates between the complex sets of pressures in their 
environment and organizational action. By focusing on underlying individual-
level factors that shape organizational responses, we can attain a more fine-
grained understanding of the relationship between institutional complexity and 
the heterogeneity in organizational responses that it often elicits (Greenwood, 
Díaz, Li & Lorente, 2010). 
1.4 Questions and Outline of the 
Dissertation 
As we have explained above, we aim to understand how organizations experience 
and respond to situations of institutional complexity, and which micro-level 
factors explain the variation in responses to institutional complexity. Here, we 
repeat the overall research question:
  
How do Dutch childcare organizations respond to situations of institutional 
complexity and which micro-level factors explain variation in organizations’ 
responses? 
In several successive studies, using various methodologies, we will address this 
main research question. 
We will start in Chapter 2 with an historical narrative of the Dutch childcare 
field for which we have used multiple data sources, such as historical books/
articles, governmental reports, and census data. Scott (2008a: 47) asserts that 
“to an institutionalist, knowledge of what has gone before is vital information”. 
To understand the functioning of any field and the organizations within it, we 
believe we need to know ‘what has gone before’. The nature of institutional 
complexity experienced by organizations in a particular field is not given or 
completely fixed, but instead it “unfolds, unravels and re-forms, creating 
different circumstances to which organizations must respond” (Greenwood et 
al., 2008: 319; Van Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011). In this chapter we aim to gain an 
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understanding of how a dynamic interplay among multiple logics has shaped 
the Dutch childcare field throughout its history. Therefore, in the next chapter 
we will begin by tracing the roots of Dutch childcare as a contested practice, 
clamped in multiple logics. Hence, we will subsequently trace the sources of 
institutional complexity found in this field. The question guiding this chapter is: 
How has the interplay of several institutional logics shaped the emergence 
and evolution of the Dutch childcare field? 
In Chapter 3 we will examine an extraordinary event that shocked the Dutch 
childcare sector in December 2010, the sexual abuse of children at a childcare 
center in Amsterdam, and triggered an emotionally charged societal and political 
debate on childcare. Following the widespread criticism and intense scrutiny 
that the scandal provoked, this event ‘spilled over’ and induced a field-wide 
threat to the legitimacy of organizations throughout the sector (e.g., Jonsson et 
al., 2009: Yu, Sengul & Lester, 2008). The institutional expectation that children 
are safe when placed in childcare had been challenged. Even though the event 
was highly salient for the field, organizations responded in various ways to this 
event. Yet, we still lack a theoretical understanding of how organizations respond 
to situations when a crisis spills over and affects the whole field. Therefore, 
the aim of this chapter is to better understand how organizations respond to 
field-wide legitimacy threatening events, and more specifically to explain the 
variance found in these responses. A year after the event, we distributed a survey 
among childcare organizations in the field to investigate how decision makers 
had experienced the event and which responses the organization had used to 
deal with the event. Towards this end, we identified several micro-level factors, 
namely decision makers’ field identification, legitimacy loss perceptions and 
negative affect that can influence the salience of events for individual decision 
makers and could shape the extent to which they will mobilize organizational 
responses. The research question which will be answered in the study is: 
Which micro-level variables explain differences in organizational responses to 
a legitimacy threatening event in their field?
Chapter 4 is an explorative study for which we conducted interviews with 
childcare managers2. We focus on the institutional contradictions which might 
2 Whenever we refer to childcare managers in this dissertation, we are referring to the key decision maker in 
the childcare organization (hence, top-level management). In the Netherlands, these childcare managers are 
often referred to as childcare directors (kinderopvang directeur/bestuurder in Dutch). 
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arise when a new institutional demand (in this study: The Childcare Act) creates 
a misalignment for decision makers on either ideological or material organizing 
aspects. The aim of this paper was to delineate in what way material objects 
(such as buildings, technologies or artifacts), besides the symbolic aspects (such 
as meaning systems and beliefs) which have been predominantly emphasized 
in institutional theory, shape responses to new institutional pressures. The 
research question guiding this study is: 
In what way does the configuration between material and ideational aspects of 
institutional pressures shape the nature of actors’ strategic responses?
In Chapter 5 we will report on a vignette experiment conducted among childcare 
managers. In this study we have elicited various levels of institutional complexity 
(following a new coercive pressure) by manipulating different configurations 
of constituents’ demands (both internal demands stemming from childcare 
professionals and external demands stemming from parent-customers). We 
aim to understand both the timing and the nature of organizations’ responses to 
various levels of institutional complexity. Towards this end, we have constructed 
a vignette text about a hypothetical new legal requirement: the government 
mandates organizations to adopt a new practice (a digital wall) within a 
fixed time frame of five years. Depending on the experimental condition, the 
managers ‘faced’ a situation in which the employees and the parents either did 
or did not support the new mandated practice (yielding four conditions in total). 
We measured decision makers’ time to compliance and asked them to describe 
and explain their anticipated response strategies to multiple pressures. We 
believe this study contributes to institutional theory by opening the ‘black box’ 
of decision makers’ interpretations of institutional complexity, identifying first 
the effect of complexity on the timing of adoption, and then its effect on the 
range of strategies directed at various targets to attempt to resolve complexity. 
The research question guiding this study is: 
When and how do organizations respond differently to the same coercive 
institutional pressure under conditions of institutional complexity? 
In the chapters which follow we will be addressing these research questions. 

2
Based on a historical narrative of 
childcare in the Netherlands, we 
show how childcare issues have been 
continuously affected by multiple 
societal level logics throughout 
history: family logic, state logic, 
religious logic and market logic. We 
discuss how a dynamic interplay 
among these logics shaped the 
preconditions for the emergence, 
shape and growth of the Dutch 
childcare field. We will discuss 
the implications of our findings 
in relation to the literature on 
institutional logics and institutional 
complexity. 
A B S T R A C T
Growing pains: The interplay 
of multiple institutional logics 




A key premise of the institutional logics perspective is that institutional fields – 
similar to societies in general – are usually characterized by multiple logics, such 
as logics of the family, religion, the market, professions and the state (Friedland 
& Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Hoffman, 1999). Institutional logics 
provide individual or organizational actors with a certain ‘frame of reference’, 
which shapes our reasoning, guides the manner in which we behave and 
provides us with unique principles, practices, and symbols (Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Townley, 1997; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 2008; Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton, 
2004; Thornton, Ocasio, Lounsbury, 2012). For instance, within the sphere of the 
market sense-making occurs through the lens of self-interest and the main focus 
lies on the accumulation, codification and pricing of human activity (Friedland 
& Alford: 1991: 248). In contrast, under the family logic, legitimate behavior is 
rooted in the unconditional loyalty for family members and responding to their 
reproductive needs, while the institutional logic of the state is based on the 
rationalization and regulation of human activity (Friedland & Alfrod, 1991: 248; 
Thornton, 2004). 
The differences and contradictions between logics allow for agency and 
heterogeneity as multiple logics provide actors with alternative meanings and 
solutions (Ocasio, 1997; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). 
In a wide variety of empirical contexts, studies have vividly demonstrated 
how institutional fields change as new logics emerge and provide alternative 
organizing principles (e.g., Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Scott, Ruef, Mendel & 
Caronna, 2000; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). The prevailing 
picture that resulted from these studies, portrays fields as having either one 
dominant logic, with other less salient logics residing in the background, or 
shows how logics co-exists in an ‘uneasy truce’. However, implicit in many 
of these studies is the underlying assumption that logics are fundamentally 
incompatible and that due to their contrasting prescriptions a new logic arises 
as the previous dominant logic has been dismantled (Dunn & Jones, 2010: 114; 
Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011). 
What has remained largely uncovered, however, is the manner in which 
logics may affect each other’s evolution and accordingly shape field emergence 
and -change. Even though the contradiction between logics received most 
research attention, logics probably interact in more complex and dynamic ways 
(Thornton et al., 2012). Next to driving contradiction and contestation, logics 
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may also reinforce, complement or adapt to one another, depending upon the 
specific historical and cultural context (cf. Greenwood et al., 2010). Because 
most studies only focused upon two logics, the issue of how larger numbers 
of logics might severely complicate the institutional conditions organizations 
face, has been largely missed (Greenwood et al., 2011: 332; Kraatz & Block, 2008). 
If we delve deeper into the institutional evolution of a particular field, while 
being attentive to the historical interplay of various logics, we might therefore 
better understand the patterns of complexity that confront contemporary 
organizations in a field. 
In this paper we try to grasp the dynamic interplay among multiple logics 
over a long period of time. We believe there are two reasons why it is important to 
understand how logics unfold, unravel and fluctuate between stages of conflict 
and cooperation in a field. Multiple logics may create internal contradictions, 
which can result in tensions or inconsistencies within the broader system (Seo 
& Creed, 2002). Yet, we still have little understanding of how pluralistic fields 
emerge and evolve over time as “most studies are restricted to a shorter period 
and/or a specific stage of field-level change” (Van Gestel & Hillberand, 2011: 
248). Additionally, attending to the interplay of logics also matters for practical 
reasons, because actors’ interventions, such as regulatory changes, aimed at 
changing one logic may yield unforeseen consequences if concurrent changes 
in other logics have not been accounted for. A more informed understanding 
may help in devising and implementing appropriate interventions (Greenwood 
et al., 2011). 
In a historical narrative of the Dutch childcare field, we will depict how 
formal childcare in the Netherlands carefully paved its way into Dutch society 
as a product of a dynamic interplay between various societal level logics: the 
institutional logics of the family, religion, the state and the market. Even though 
the Netherlands has a reputation for being liberal and generally progressive 
in its social organization, institutionalized childcare emerged relatively late 
compared to other Western welfare states (Knijn & Kremer, 1997; Bleijenberg, 
2004; Kremer, 2007; Lewis et al., 2008; Knijn & Saraceno, 2010). To understand 
the specific pace, shape and goal of childcare provision in The Netherlands, 
we demonstrate how care for children outside the home could only become 
a legitimate ‘solution’ as concurrent changes unfolded within multiple 
institutional logics. Situated within a fragile balance of logics since the field’s 
emergence, Dutch childcare organizations have extensively been exposed to a 
multitude of demands and varying conceptions of what constitutes appropriate 
organizational behavior, a situation which has been referred to as institutional 
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complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Heimer, 1999; Kraatz & Block, 2008). 
This chapter traces the manner in which societal level logics change and 
evolve in interaction, thereby shaping the preconditions for a field to emergence 
and grow. We contribute to a more nuanced and dynamic understanding of the 
manner in which multiple logics may simultaneously shape field trajectories. 
Thereby we complement recent research insights which have depicted a more 
complicated picture of field evolution than the mere replacement of one logic by 
another (e.g., Van Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011; Goodrick & Reay, 2011). Moreover, 
by unpacking the historical interplay of logics that permeated a field, we can 
better assess the level of institutional complexity that organizations may face 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). 
2.2 Background Literature
Building on the work of Friedland and Alford (1991), the institutional logics 
perspective has grown into a vivid research stream (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; 
Greenwood et al., 2011). Applying a logics perspective has provided scholars with 
in-depth insights into the current and historical functioning of various fields, 
where changes in practices, structures, meanings, forms and categories have 
been related to the logics that emerge, persist, wane or reemerge in particular 
fields (e.g., DiMaggio, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 2002; 2004; Rao, 
Monin and Durand, 2003; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006; Glynn & Lounsbury, 
2005; Lounsbury, 2007; Heimer, 1999; Hoffman, 1999; Jones, Maoret, Massa & 
Svejenova, 2012). Institutional fields have predominantly been conceptualized 
as battlefields where different logics generate largely incompatible expectations 
and behavioral prescriptions, vie for control and compete for attention 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Hoffman, 1999; Lounsbury, 2007; Reay and Hinings, 
2005; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). Below we will give a short overview of the types 
of relationships between logics which have been addressed in the institutional 
literature. For an overview see Table 2.1. 
2.2.1 A typology of the interplay between 
different logics
We discern several types of relationships between multiple logics. First of 
all, logics can compete and generate contrasting scripts for behavior. For the 
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most part studies have documented that such competition between logics is 
temporary and that fields will settle around one dominant logic that guides 
the behavior of actors in the field. According to this view, change unfolds as an 
old logic is substituted for a new logic over time (Greenwood et al., 2011). For 
instance, Thornton and Ocasio (1999) showed how the field of higher education 
publishing shifted from an editorial logic to a market logic. Under the editorial 
logic during the 1960s most publishers viewed their mission as building prestige 
and sales, legitimacy was based on personal reputation and executive attention 
was directed at organic growth and author-editor relationships. By the early 
1980s the market logic became dominant. Under the market logic, resource 
competition was the focal point of executive attention and market position 
formed the main basis for legitimacy. Similarly, Rao et al. (2003) documented 
how a logic of nouvelle cuisine replaced classical cuisine in French Gastronomy. 
An identity movement of nouvelle cuisine activists who were striving for more 
professional autonomy was a motor for the changes within the professional 
logic shaping French cuisine between 1970 and 1997. Another example is 
provided by Galvin (2002), who examined the erosion of professional dominance 
in U.S. healthcare and the rise of alternative logics that challenged the view 
that the ‘doctor knows best’ and gave greater voice to costumers. These studies 
documented how fields evolve as a new logic ‘takes over’ and accordingly 
guides the work practices of actors within their fields of activity: after a short 
transition period in which different logics compete (often induced by a shock 
or jolt), the conflict is resolved and the field stabilizes or ‘settles’ again around 
a ‘winning’ logic. However, logics may not necessarily be mutually exclusive or 
completely replace another, and the process of field-level change may result 
in more outcomes than a one-logic dominance (Van Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011; 
Thornton et al., 2012). 
A second type of interplay among logics describes a situation in which logics, 
even though they may be conflicting in nature, can co-exist in a field over a longer 
period of time. Hence, a combination of logics, some perhaps more salient than 
others, can inform different field participants (e.g., Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Dunn & Jones, 2010). For instance, even 
though a logic has lost its dominance in a field, it can remain influential (for 
instance as a ‘secondary’ logic) and guide the behavior of particular actors (e.g. 
Reay and Hinings, 2005; 2009). In this respect, Reay and Hinings (2005) showed 
that although the healthcare field in Alberta moved from a logic of medical 
professionalism to a business-like logic after the government imposed reforms, 
the previously dominant logic did not disappear. Supported by a powerful group 
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of actors, namely physicians, the logic of medical professionalism continued 
as “an alternative view of how the system should be organized” (Reay and 
Hinings, 2005: 377). In a follow-up study the authors documented that, even 
after 13 years, this so-called ‘uneasy truce’ between logics still characterized 
the field (Reay and Hinings, 2009: 634). Another example is provided by a study 
conducted by Purdy and Gray (2009), who documented a continuous battle 
between two logics in the field of alternative dispute resolution in the United 
States. A judicial logic and a social service logic vied for domination, resulting 
in fierce disagreement between actors adhering to conflicting logics over the 
mission of state offices of dispute resolution. Similarly, Dunn and Jones (2010) 
illustrated how medical schools have persistently relied on both science and 
care logics from 1910 to 2005. Moving through alternating periods of balance 
and imbalance, both logics remained influential, suggesting that plural logics 
can co-exist within a profession over time. 
Third, different logics may blend/converge over time. A few studies have 
suggested that logics may blend, thereby creating hybrid organizational forms, 
practices or identities within a field (e.g., Glynn & Lousbury, 2005; Mars & 
Lounsbury, 2009; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Tracey, Phillips & Jarvis, 2011). For 
instance, Mars and Lounsbury (2009) depicted how student eco-entrepreneurship 
in university settings represents a blending of market and activists logics. They 
demonstrated how “the convergence of otherwise opposing logics” in higher 
education, enabled the creation of a pool of students who are socially conscious 
entrepreneurs leveraging private market opportunities to create both economic 
and social gains (Mars & Lounsbury, 2009: 8). For more examples see Table 2.1.
A fourth relationship between logics, which received little research attention, 
is the notion that logics may complement or even reinforce each other. In a 
study of downsizing behavior of Spanish manufacturing firms, Greenwood et al. 
(2010) showed how two nonmarket logics – a family logic and a regional state 
logic - both tempered firms’ responses to the market logic. The Catholic Church 
(logic of religion) amplified both non-market logics. For instance, throughout 
Spain’s history the family logic has been positively reinforced by the Catholic 
Church, which emphasized family values and obligations. As such, this study 
underscores the importance of history for a fine-grained understanding of 
logics: The enduring influence of the family as a core societal institution is 
best understood in relation to Spain’s strong Catholic tradition, and the strong 
influence of regional sentiments and identities in firm’s reluctance to downsize 
only makes sense in juxtaposition to the repressive Franco regime (Greenwood 
et al., 2010: 535). 
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TABLE 2.1 The nature of the interplay between logics
Interplay between logics Research examples
1) Logics compete and over time one 
logic replaces the other
Fields stabilize around one dominant logic 
that guides behavior: Logics generate 
competing bases for action and change 
occurs when one logic substitutes the other. 
Fields evolve when, after a relatively short 
period of contestation, a new logic ‘takes 
over’ and replaces the previous dominant 
logic. Hence conflicting logics eventually give 
way to one dominant logic that is diffused.
• Thornton and Ocasio (1999): Based on interview data and event history 
analysis this study shows how institutional logics changed from an editorial 
to a market focus in the field of higher education publishing. The shift from an 
editorial to a market logic changes the determinants of executive succession. 
• Rao, Monin and Durand (2003): Based on an analytical narrative and 
analysis of panel data the authors show how the identity-discrepant cues 
disseminated by the nouvelle cuisine movement induced French chefs to 
abandon the logic of classical cuisine. 
• Zajac and Westphal (2004): The authors study the shift from a corporate 
to an agency logic of governance in the financial sector in the U.S. This 
shift in logics changed the perceived value of practices and altered market 
reactions to stock repurchase plans (event study analysis of repurchase plan 
adoptions). 
2) Multiple logics co-exists
Multiple logics guide behavior in a field: Even 
though logics may generate competing bases 
for action, they can co-exist for a lengthy 
period of time. Logics may exist in an ‘uneasy 
truce’ and can be associated with different 
actors, regions or types of organizations. Yet, 
logics may differ in salience. 
• Purdy and Gray (2009): In the field of alternative dispute resolution (U.S.) 
the authors identified the institutionalization of two conflicting logics. Based 
on content analysis of multiple data sources and a case study the authors 
identify the mechanisms through which competing logics diffuse and the 
conditions supporting the persistence of multiple logics within a field.
• Reay and Hinings (2009): Based on in-depth case study, the authors show 
how in the healthcare field in Alberta (Canada) competing logics (a business 
like logic and professional logic) coexisted for a lengthy period of time 
and separately guided the behavior of different actors (physicians versus 
managers). They identified four mechanisms to manage the rivalry between 
logics that allowed different actors to work collaboratively even though they 
were guided by different logics. 
• Lounsbury (2007): Based on an analytical narrative and quantitative analyses, 
the author shows how different logics (trustee and performance logics), 
rooted in geographical differences (mutual funds in Boston versus New York 
funds), fundamentally shape variation in the practice and behavior of distinct 
actors in the mutual fund industry. 
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TABLE 2.1 The nature of the interplay between logics (continued)
Interplay between logics Research examples
3) Logics blend/converge
A combination of logics may simultaneously 
guide behavior: When logics blend or 
converge a mix is created which guides 
behavior. As such, a new logic that is a hybrid 
version of two previous logics arises. 
• Glynn and Lounsbury (2005): In the U.S. symphony orchestra field the 
aesthetic logic (that traditionally informed the practices of the symphony) 
blended with a commercially oriented market logic. Using content analyses 
the authors explored how the broader blending of market and aesthetic 
logics worked their way into the reviews of critics of the Atlanta Symphony 
Orchestra performances. 
• Battilana and Dorado (2010): In a comparative case study of two micro-finance 
organizations in Bolivia, the authors showed how hybrid organizations, with 
varying levels of success, strike a balance and handle the tensions between 
two logics they combine. Commercial microfinance organizations had to 
bridge a development and a banking logic, and in doing so contributed to the 
construction of an emergent commercial microfinance logic (2010: 1423).
4) Logics may complement or reinforce 
each other 
Although the relationship between logics 
has predominantly been conceptualized as 
competing, logics may also exist in a more 
cooperative relationship and complement or 
even reinforce each other.
• Greenwood, Diaz, Li and Lorente (2010): The authors show how variation 
in firms’ downsizing behavior in Spain stems from two non-market logics: 
the regional state logic and the family logic, notably because of its link with 
the Catholic Church. Based on quantitative analysis of panel data, they show 
how both logics (the regional state logic and the family logic) tempered the 
play of the market logic. Contrary to their expectation, family-managed firms 
were not especially influenced by regional pressures.
• Goodrick and Reay (2011): In their historical case study of U.S. pharmacists, 
the authors show how the work of a single profession was guided by a 
constellation of logics. Next to a competitive relationships between logics 
(i.e. one logic’s ‘win’ is another logic’s ‘loss’), the authors observe cooperative 
relationships between logics (i.e., increase in strength of one logic does not 
mean a corresponding decrease in the other). Work practices consistent 
with one logic may support change consistent with an alternative logic, or 
demands stemming from various logics may simply add up.
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As we have shown above, the existing literature proposes several types of 
interplay between multiple logics. Despite these valuable insights, we still 
know relatively little about the complex and dynamic ways in which multiple 
logics, in combination, influence a field’s trajectory and subsequently affect 
organizations in the field. Most studies have focused upon the mere presence 
of two logics that may compete, blend or coexist (Greenwood et al., 2011), 
without addressing how multiple logics may evolve together and interact on 
a more continuous basis (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). Consequently, this limits our 
understanding of the source and degree of institutional complexity confronting 
organizations. Institutional logics are not static, but their salience, resilience, 
content, and degree of incompatibility with other logics likely varies over time 
and place (Greenwood et al., 2010; Van Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011). Critical 
events (or a sequence thereof), internal contradictions, and changes in resource 
environments may all constitute potential sources of change both within as 
well as across logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012). 
On the basis of the insights presented above, we study the history of the 
Dutch childcare field and trace the origins of institutional complexity in this 
field. By studying the broader historical and socio-political context surrounding 
the care for children in The Netherlands, we will depict how the evolution of the 
family logic has been affected by the changes that occurred in (the shape and 
salience of) other logics. Hence we will show how this interplay among multiple 
logics established the conditions for field emergence and growth.
2.3 Methods
Our initial observations in the Dutch childcare sector suggested that 
childcare organizations need to run and sustain their businesses, while they 
simultaneously face strict regulation concerning children’s safety and health, 
and strong societal norms concerning the manner in which young children 
should grow up. Hence a complex set of institutional pressures seems to shape 
the practices and day-to-day business of childcare organizations (Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011). With further investigation into the history 
of childcare, we learned how childcare issues were consistently affected by 
multiple societal level logics. 
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2.3.1 Data sources 
The rise and growth of formal childcare in many Western welfare states is 
inextricably intertwined with changes within the family logic, especially the 
changing role of women. Today, the majority of mothers in Western welfare 
states work, and becoming a full-time mother is no longer a cultural given 
(Eurostat, 2009; Kremer, 2007: 11). This not only transformed labor markets, but 
also the relationships, (power) dependencies, and care arrangements, within 
families. According to Hochschild (1989) this ‘revolution at home’ is the biggest 
social and cultural revolution of our time. Understanding the issue of childcare 
therefore starts with an understanding of the changes that have unfolded 
within the family domain. 
In order to build a historical narrative about the changes in families and 
the related issue of formal childcare in the Netherlands, we have drawn upon 
various documents and secondary data sources encompassing a period running 
from approximately 1850 to 2010. To get started, we conducted several library 
searches to look for historical records on the topics of families and childcare in 
The Netherlands. One of our starting points for instance, was a classic book titled 
‘Mothers, children and childcare’ (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981) which constitutes 
the first, and thorough, historical-sociological investigation of the emergence of 
organized childcare in The Netherlands. Next to books and historical overviews, 
this library search also provided us with various advisory reports on childcare 
written by a large variety of organizations such as: the Family Council, the 
Emancipation Council, the European Commission, the OECD, social partners, 
and The Scientific Council for Government Policy. It quickly became evident 
that issues of childcare (or issues related to reconciling work and family-life 
more broadly) are located within different discourses and include a wide range 
of actors. If we missed relevant information to fully understand the processes 
and events that either blocked or supported the emergence and growth of 
childcare outside the home, we collected additional information through back- 
and forward snowballing. In order to understand the dominant pedagogical 
beliefs, and normative assumptions surrounding childcare and childrearing 
in the various historical periods, we also consulted several historical books on 
childrearing and parenting advice, for instance: ‘Five ages of childrearing in the 
Netherlands: Ideas and practice’ (Bakker, Noordman, Rietveld-van Wingerden, 
2006). 
Next to the documents described above, we also collected information 
concerning the role of the state in the provision of childcare. Social policies 
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of welfare states concerning childcare are often divided into ‘the right to give 
care’ (i.e., time to care) and ‘the right to receive care’ (i.e., time to work) (Knijn 
& Kremer, 1997; Bleijenberg, 2004; Kremer, 2007; Lewis, 2008). The right to give 
care encompasses interventions such as (paid) parental leave schemes, derived 
rights to care (like the so-called male breadwinner bonuses in taxation), and 
statutory regulations for part-time work. The right to receive care encompasses 
the provision of childcare services either directly by the state or funded in whole 
or in part by the state through supply- and sometimes demand-side subsidies 
(Lewis, 2008: 499; Kremer, 2007: 40-41). Although a focus on the right to give 
care was important to fully understand the Dutch social policy concerning 
childcare, given the scope of this paper our main focus has been on the right to 
receive care. To get an understanding of the political discourse on childcare we 
looked at parliamentary reports (such as policy proposals, Acts of Parliament, 
letters from ministers, government reports from project groups related to 
childcare). These parliamentary reports were available via two governmental 
websites and contain information about the motives behind the childcare 
policy, childcare spending, and changes in the regulation of childcare. In order 
to map the political attention to childcare issues, we counted the number of 
parliamentary reports referring to ‘childcare’ in various periods (also see Figure 
2.1 a&b). Whereas we were able to read most parliamentary reports before the 
1980s, given the overwhelming increase in political attention in recent years 
we more selectively focused on turning points in the childcare discourse and 
changes in regulation. We defined these by focusing on the moments in which 
political attention peaked and through the political narrative we were able to 
draw on the basis of the information from our library search. 
Another crucial source of information concerned the research reports and 
secondary data sets of several large research institutions in The Netherlands: 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS), The Dutch Institute for Social Research (SCP) 
and the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB). Some reports were issued 
periodically for instance the Emancipation Monitor (published jointly by CBS and 
SCP biannually) and the Family Report, providing rich longitudinal information 
concerning the position of families and women in Dutch society or the hurdles 
in combining work and care for example. The reports and datasets of these 
organizations allowed us to trace descriptive statistics on (changing) work and 
family patterns, such as: women’s labor market participation and hours of paid 
work, maternal employment, divorce rates and lone parenthood, various types 
of households and their economic models. Moreover, it provided us with data 
on the childcare field: number and types of organizations in the field, childcare 
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capacity, childcare attendance, and the division of childcare costs among public 
and private parties. 
In issues concerning families, gender and childcare, values play a particular 
strong role (Lewis, Knijn, Martin & Ostner, 2008) and culturally defined moral 
images of ‘appropriate’ care influence both the origins and outcomes of 
childcare policies and practices (cf. Kremer, 2007: 21; 71-75). In order to obtain 
an indication of the prevailing Dutch values concerning work and family issues 
in various periods, we looked at existing longitudinal attitudinal data. Two 
longitudinal data sources were particular helpful in this respect, the Cultural 
Changes in the Netherlands Survey by SCP (CV’65-‘10)3 and the European Value 
Studies4 (EVS ’81-’08). These two data-sources and the reports/articles which 
were based on these data provided rich insight into, among others, attitudes 
towards the employment of mothers, the domestic division of labor, and 
childcare. In Appendix A at the end of this chapter we give an overview of all 
the documents we have used for this study.
FIGURE 2.1a Political attention to childcare issues 1900-1980a
a Number of parliamentary reports referring to ‘childcare’ in a period of ten years. Two keywords were used: 
Whereas in the early 20th century they used the word ‘kinderbewaarplaats’ (day nursery) to refer to childcare, 
later on this term became obsolete and one talked about ‘kinderopvang’ (childcare). Source: Based on the 
database Staten Generaal Digitaal which contains full texts (in Dutch) of all official parliamentary reports from 
1814 until 1995.
3 This is a trend study measuring changes in general opinions and attitudes of the Dutch population aged 
16 and over (sample sizes of 2000 citizens on average). Data was collected annually till 1999 and bi-annual 
since then.
4 The European Values Study is a cross-national, and longitudinal survey on basic human values. It provides 
insights into how Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, politics and society. It started in 1981 and 














FIGURE 2.1b Political attention to childcare issues 1981-2010a
a Number of parliamentary report referring to ‘childcare’ in intervals of two years 
Source: Staten Generaal Digitaal for period before 1995. 1995 until 2010 based on www.overheid.nl
2.3.2 Data structuring and analysis 
During and after the data collection period we examined the materials 
and carried out an initial analysis with the aim of getting a more holistic 
understanding of childcare in The Netherlands. We aimed to understand the 
‘how’ and ‘why’ of the case as it evolved over time. For this purpose, we made 
timelines and wrote memos about important social as well as political events. 
We also identified the type of actors (e.g., political parties, labor unions, women’s 
movements, child experts5) which were involved in the events. It soon became 
clear that issues of childcare (or issues related to reconciling work and family 
life more broadly) were located within different discourses such as the family 
discourse, the gender equality discourse, the childhood discourse and the labor 
market discourse6, each involving particular actors. Therefore, we clustered the 
documents per discourse whenever this eased our understanding of the case. 
We went back and forth between our memos and the documents and searched 
for new information if that appeared to be missing. We continuously updated 
5 In this, we refer to a group of experts such as pedagogues, child psychologists, child psychiatrists, and 
pediatricians. 
6 For instance the gender equality discourse, which concerns the equal treatment between men and women; 
the family discourse, about family functioning and the importance of the nuclear family as a social institution, 
the childhood discourse; about children’s needs and their inclusion in society; the labor market discourse, about 
the importance of improving competiveness and making optimal use of human resources (Bussemaker, 1998; 


























































































our memos after we obtained new information. 
With information encompassing a total time-span of more than a 100 years, 
we needed a way to organize the data (Langley, 1991). We proceeded in several 
steps. First, we ‘temporally bracket’ our case summaries into four relatively 
distinct historical periods (cf. Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Dutton & Duckerich, 1991). 
Dutch family life is relatively stable (in its form, practices, role divisions, and 
dominant beliefs) within each era, while certain discontinuities characterized 
its frontiers (Langley, 1999: 703). The historical eras we defined as such, were 
also commonly used in historical studies or textbooks on families and childcare. 
The decomposition of process data into such adjacent periods allows for a 
comparison of theoretical ideas across periods and enables an examination of 
how actions in one period lead to changes in the context that will affect actions 
in subsequent periods (Langley, 1999: 703). 
In a second step we identified the changes within the family logic on the 
basis of two questions: What does the family logic look like in each period? 
and In what manner does the logic change from one period to the next? In 
order to systematically analyze these questions we identified the same set 
of characteristics in each era: (1) the place of the nuclear family in Dutch 
society, (2) its economic system, and (3) the dominant role divisions within the 
family. Next we identified two characteristics which were specifically related 
to the care for children in each period: (4) the prevailing pedagogical beliefs 
and assumptions about parenting, and (5) the types of childcare organizations 
and their raison d’être. On the basis of this analysis we were able to trace 
the dominant institutional beliefs and practices concerning where care for 
children should be provided, by whom it should be provided, and in what way it 
contributes to children’s rearing.
In a next, but related step, our analysis was guided by the question: How do 
(changes within) other societal level logics affect the evolution of the family logic 
and, relatedly, how do these multiple logics influence the issue of childcare more 
specifically? By relating the changes within the family domain to concurrent 
changes in other societal level logics we gained a holistic understanding of the 
manner in which family life has changed and how, parallel to these changes, 
formal childcare could emerge and grow. In Table 2.2 we provide a schematic 
overview of the main findings of our analysis. In the next section we will present 
our historical narrative. Each era is divided in two main parts, the first part 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.1 Era 1: Late 19th century – World War II 
2.4.1.1 Families in Dutch society during era 1
Families have been defined as key social institutions that unite individuals into 
cooperative groups that oversee the bearing and raising of children (Macionis 
& Plummer, 2002: 436). Although all societies contain families, just who is 
included under the umbrella of kinship and what place families occupy in 
society, varies trough history and from one culture to the next. In the 19th 
century, the typical Dutch family was a relatively small unit consisting of a 
husband, a wife and children. There were only a few ‘extended’ families, like 
the three-generation household and most Dutch families were characterized by 
a nuclear family pattern (Van Poppel, 2012). Marriage was the only appropriate 
context for procreation and divorce hardly occurred; in 1850 less than 2 out of 
10,000 couples divorced. However, marriages were cut short by death. Because 
people died young (in 1850 the life expectancy was around 38 years for men and 
40 years for women) almost a third of all children did not live with both their 
biological parents and many households consisted of blended families after 
remarriage or adoption (Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992; Van Poppel, 2012). 
In the pre-industrial stage (in Dutch society this was the period before 1870), 
families played a central role in society and economic and social standing were 
both defined by birth, local custom and family ties (Macionis & Plummer, 2002). 
Family life was largely influenced by The Church and centered in the local 
community. Attending church and reading the Bible were part of daily family 
practice. The gap between the rich and the poor was enormous in the 19th 
century and families in need were dependent on the help of their neighbors 
or turned to the church for material support. Dominant family values stressed 
among others religious piety, sobriety, obedience to parents and superiors, and 
hard work (Stone, 1994). Family life, like society at large, centered on patriarchy. 
The father had formal power over the family and mother and children were 
expected to obey his authority (Macionis & Plummer, 2002). 
Most economic activity took place within the household. Mothers combined 
their housework and caring tasks with productive labor at home, such as 
work in the farmhouse. Mother’s work was necessary and in the interest of all 
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members of the household - even though it came at the expense of time and 
care for children. The mother was solely responsible for the wellbeing of her 
children, but normally shared caring tasks with neighbors, relatives or older 
children. The bond between mother and child was predominantly related to 
nursing. Usually ‘older’ children, ages six to seven, worked as well. Childhood 
lasted for only a short period and children were quickly treated as adults (Van 
Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981:188-189; Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992). As such the 
economic system of the family before the industrial revolution could best be 
characterized by the notion of a family economy, where all family members 
actively contributed to the family’s income.
A breadwinner model becomes dominant 
With the start of the industrial revolution in 1870 family life and family roles 
started to change drastically. The physical separation of the household and the 
workplace (the factory) contributed to a new conception of the family. Moreover, 
due to city migration many families lost their tight social network. During 
the early 20th century, there was a growing belief that children’s nurture and 
moral development should be solely entrusted to mothers, while the husband 
or father was the family’s sole (or primary) wage earner. Increasingly, men 
left home each day to go to work, while the mother stayed at home. As such, 
family roles were organized around the idea of sexual difference, with men 
and women increasingly occupying highly separate roles. This family ideal of 
a working father and stay-at-home-mom already developed in the bourgeois 
class in the 17th century but “became a guiding model for Dutch family life in 
other social classes and later epochs” (Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992: 57; Van 
Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; Maassen van den Brink, Gustafsson & Groot, 1995). While 
this ideal was dominant in the middle class, not all working-class families were 
able to meet it. In poor families, women and even children – sometimes as 
young as five years old - were ‘forced’ to work in factories as well. 
Both the government and the church fiercely propagated the normative 
ideal of the nuclear family where fathers worked and where women’s position 
in the family was rooted in childcare and household work. The church, both 
the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Church, propagated traditional 
family standards, with segregated gender roles: Women meant to be at home 
and serve their husbands and children (Clerkx & Pot, 1987: 22; Hooghiemstra 
& Niphuis-Nell, 1993: 27; Van Dijk, 1994). By law women were inferior to men 
and via several labor laws the government increasingly restricted possibilities 
for married women to be employed, as illustrated by the following quotation of 
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a Catholic politician: 
“Labor of married women has detrimental consequences for 
motherhood and children, causing a neglect of the family. The husband 
does not find a cozy home after work, but finds a dirty place, rude 
children, improperly prepared food and is forced to find pleasure 
somewhere else…. Children are left to fend for themselves. Some 
are locked inside the home while others wander down the streets. 
Fortunately many women bring their child to family or they pay someone 
to watch them. However, these children are not raised as they should 
be and a lot of them misbehave. They are rowdy and will not grow-up as 
useful citizens. Nurseries are not a solution. For children until the age 
of six but also for children that go to school, the absence of a mother 
during the day equals neglect and severely damages the children….And 
so I ask: isn’t it the duty of the State to respond to this by prohibiting 
women’s labor?” (Tweede Kamer, Handelingen 1910-1911, 1863). 
Dutch society and politics were characterized by a compartmentalized system 
(also referred to as ‘pillarization’). This refers to a highly segmented but stable 
system, in which different ideological and religious groups represented the 
population. The most important ‘pillars’ were Roman Catholics, Protestants, 
Liberals and Socialists (Maassen van den Brink et al., 1995; Bussemaker, 1998; 
Dekker, 2002; Bleijenbergh, 2004). Although these different political groups 
in general varied greatly in their core values and beliefs, they all favored 
traditional family standards, with segregated gender roles and the notion 
that children should be taken care of by their mothers at home. In 1924 a law 
was enforced which regulated that female civil servants would be fired when 
they got married (Van Baalen, 2007). By restricting women’s labor, prohibiting 
child’s labor, expanding workmen’s compensation and via income taxation, the 
Dutch State solidified the father-centered breadwinner model in the early 20th 
century. Stable family life was felt to be essential to social cohesion in Dutch 
society (Van Dijk, 1994; Bussemaker, 1998; Bleijenbergh, 2004).
The socialist labor-movement fought for better working conditions and 
higher male wages (Clerkx & Pot, 1987) and consequently most married women 
stayed at home. The crisis in the 1930s strengthened the arguments for a sole 
breadwinner: “women did not belong on the labor market” and they should not 
be competing for jobs along men in an already tight labor market (Maassen 
van den Brink et al., 1995: 25; Baalen, 2007). Also among private companies it 
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became common practice to fire women as soon as they married or became 
pregnant (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). Because societal norms, religious values 
and formal laws all largely prevented women from making their own living, 
married women faced an inescapable dependence upon men’s income. Even 
most women’s organizations that were part of the first wave of feminism (1870-
1920) were in favor of this dominant family pattern. Many of them focused on 
‘raising the status of the married wife as housekeeper and mother’ and were 
predominantly concerned with voting and educational rights (Van Rijswijk-
Clerkx, 1981). Due to the rising standard of living, people got older and on 
average 90 percent of the children born between the 1920s and 1940s still lived 
with both biological parents by the time they reached the age of 15 (Van Poppel, 
2012; Clerkx & Pot, 1987). 
2.4.1.2 Childcare in Dutch society during era 1
Pedagogical ideas and assumptions about parenting 
As we explained above, mothers were ‘the hub’ of the family and responsible 
for the physical and moral well-being of the children and father’s role in the 
family became essentially economic (especially since the industrial revolution). 
In ‘domestic science schools’ girls were prepared for their role as mother and 
housewife and learned about food, child development and nutrition. In the 19th 
century parents were mainly concerned about their children’s health as infant 
mortality was high. In the 20th century - influenced by an increased standard 
of living and humanistic ideas - increasingly more attention was paid to the 
importance of childhood and childcare and education got more attention from 
experts (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). Moreover, children’s rights got political 
attention: several successive laws preventing child’s labor were enforced 
(in 1874, 1889 and 1917), education for children between 6 and 12 was made 
compulsory (1901); and parents could lose custody in case of child neglect (1901 
and 1905). 
Pedagogical advice in the early 20th century emphasized tranquility, 
cleanliness, and regularity. Childcare experts predominantly stressed the 
importance of moral development (Bakker et al., 2006). Children needed to 
obey authority, respect their parents and be polite - otherwise they would be 
punished (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). Most childrearing experts advised mothers 
to establish strict (feeding and sleep) schedules for their children, and avoid 
picking them up, kissing them or caressing them whenever they cried. Holding 
children whenever they cried would only teach them to cry more, which would 
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not prepare them to be strong and independent individuals. As such, mothers 
were told not to spoil their children but instead set clear guidelines (Clerkx & 
Van IJzendoorn, 1992; Singer, 1989). Hence, childrearing advice recommended a 
degree of ‘maternal detachment’ and popular books and magazines emphasized 
too much mother love was bad for a child’s development:
“One should be careful with providing love. Above all, true love means 
responsible childrearing. Mother love that only expresses itself through 
cuddling and caressing is foolish and would actually do more harm 
than good” (Riemens-Reurslag, 1927 in Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 147). 
Motherhood was idealized in Dutch society and just like the church, the state, 
the labor-unions and women’s movements, also child experts (be it physicians, 
psychologists or pedagogues) stressed that mothers did not belong on the labor 
market: “Even poor women had to nurse and take care of their own babies, 
which was what mothers wanted anyway” (Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992: 61-
62). Although there probably has been some differences in pedagogic advice and 
parental attitudes during this period, a certain convergence can be assumed: 
Mothers were fully responsible for childrearing and the moral development of 
children was key (Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992: 63; Singer, 1989; Van Rijswijk-
Clerkx, 1981). 
Childcare arrangements in era 1
Even though in the vast majority of families the mother took care of her 
children, some mothers had to join the labor force to earn a living, because 
their husbands died or their husband’s income was insufficient to support the 
whole family. When possible, these women would try to take on work which 
they could perform from home or they worked in the evening (Van Rijswijk-
Clerkx, 1981). Nevertheless, there were situations in which mothers and their 
babies were separated during the day because mothers had to work (Clerkx 
& Van IJzendoorn, 1992; Clerkx & Pot, 1987). Mothers usually ‘solved’ this 
situation by having the older siblings take care of the younger ones, but this 
became difficult after children’s education became compulsory (in 1901) and 
the older children that used to watch their younger siblings went to school. 
Also neighbors or family members in the local community were an important 
source of childcare assistance in case the mother needed to go out to work (Van 
Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). 
Outside the informal network of neighbors and family members, some other 
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childcare arrangements existed in this era. For instance mother could bring 
her infant to a ‘strange’ woman who took care of other people’s children in her 
home, in return for money. These private child-minding initiatives were called 
‘matressenschooltjes’ and were situated in the slums of large cities. Although 
not much is known about these facilities, probably 200 of such places existed. 
By taking care of a group of children, these women (called a matres, Latin 
for ‘mother’) earned a living. Children usually stayed in overcrowded, small, 
dark and unsafe places like a basement or attic (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 53; 
Verschuur et al., 2006; Zwier & Mostert,1989).
Also nuns and women from the bourgeois probably have played a substantial 
role in taking care of children whose mothers needed to work. However, the 
function of these ‘schools’ (‘bewaarscholen’ in Dutch) was primarily related to 
(religious) education, while caretaking was secondary. They were not meant to 
stimulate women’s labor but to provide children with some basic skills and 
teach them the appropriate behavioral norms, such as piety and obedience 
(Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; Clerkx & Pot, 1987). 
During 1870 daycare facilities arise that specifically had a caretaking 
function. These facilities were called ‘kinderbewaarplaatsen’ (in Dutch), 
stemming from the Dutch verb ‘bewaren’, which literally means ‘to store’. 
These day nurseries (also referred to as crèches) aimed to provide shelter to 
children during mothers’ work hours. They were founded based upon charity 
initiatives of rich women in large cities who had been concerned with the faith 
of poor women and their children (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; Verschuur et al., 
2006). The board of ladies privately funded a nursery and collected charity 
funds, clothes and toys. Parents only had to pay a few cents. Children from 
a few weeks upward could stay in these day nurseries for the whole day. In 
keeping with strong societal norms and values, women that asked for a place 
had to prove that they were forced to work out of necessity. In case of doubt the 
director would inspect if the mother really worked (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 
83). Most attention was paid to hygiene and care in these facilities, especially 
because there were a lot of contagious diseases and high infant mortality at 
the time. Giving shelter to these poor children was the main raison d’être of 
these facilities. Children’s development only gained scarce attention, because 
in general the board of ladies believed that these children should not be ‘lifted 
out of their social class’ (Verschuur et al., 2006: 15). Children received proper 
care, milk and a decent meal, and were bathed daily (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; 
Zwier & Mostert, 1989; Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992). In an employment 
agreement of child minders who worked in a nursery in the city of Groningen 
49Chapter 2
these daily routines are nicely illustrated:
“Diapers are changed as soon as the children arrive in the morning… 
Children’s faces are cleaned after every meal. At noon it is meal time 
and the older children get a sandwich in the evening; the babies 
need to be nurtured regularly. When the children have left, the room 
is ventilated and the floor is mopped…Ill children, dirty children or 
children with lice cannot attend the nursery…” (employment agreement 
Kinderbewaarplaats Groningen, 1902 in Verschuur et al. 2006: 16). 
Compared to the private child-minding initiatives (‘matressenschooltjes’ in 
Dutch), the day nurseries were of good quality. However, not many of these 
nurseries existed (approximately 20 in the 1930s) and many ran into financial 
problems as charity funds declined during the early 20th century (Verschuur et 
al., 2006: 17; Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 86). To survive they asked for subsidies 
from their municipality. In general, they would receive some money via the Poor 
Act (1912), although amounts provided were very small. In general childcare 
was propagated as something immoral and only approved as an emergency 
provision for poor (single) mothers that were forced to work and for children ‘at 
risk’ (Bussemaker, 1998). 
During the second World War many families were torn apart. Because a large 
part of men needed to work in Germany, Dutch women took care of most duties 
and tasks. Women took part in heavy physical work, were involved in resistance 
movements, and during the famine of 1944 women tried everything in their 
power to secure food for their children. Women did things that previously would 
have been considered impossible. In a particular way, the war induced a process 
of emancipation among these women and authority was not automatically 
taken for granted anymore (Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). However, women – like men 
- were tired and exhausted both physically and mentally after the war (Tweede 
Kamer, 1945-1946). 
2.4.2 Era 2: Post war period (1945 – mid-1960s) 
2.4.2.1 Families in Dutch society during era 2
The war had changed the lives of many people. The economy recovered at a 
slow pace and food and proper housing were scarce. In the initial years after 
the war divorce rates and unmarried motherhood increased, crime rates grew, 
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and some experts suggested that the youth were ‘running wild’. The Dutch 
government feared radicalization after several years of poverty and tried to 
prevent the loss of norms and respect for authorities (Bakker et al., 2006; Clerkx 
& Van IJzendoorn, 1992). As a result a joint campaign of the government and 
some private initiatives called “Restoration of the family brings restoration of 
society” was initiated in 1946. The family ideal stemming from the period before 
the war became the model for this campaign: in which women have a full-time 
task inside the home and men are considered the sole breadwinners (Clerkx & 
Van IJzendoorn, 1992; Garssen et al., 2001). The following quote of a politician 
during a parliamentary meeting in 1946 illustrates the central role that was 
‘assigned’ to the nuclear family: 
“We all know that our youth is running wild, that they try to break 
away from authority and morality. The urge for freedom already 
existed before the war, but it has peaked after five years of war and 
suppression followed by unbridled freedom. As a matter of urgency 
we therefore must restore marriage- and family life, the anchor of our 
society. Herein lies a primary task for housewives…. educating children 
outside the family in schools or youth-associations is useless without a 
stable and healthy basis within the family” (Tweede Kamer, Handelingen 
1945-1946, February 21 1946).
As such, the central role of the family as a key social institution was heavily 
emphasized. The socialization function of families – teaching children the 
appropriate norms and values – was seen as the precondition for developing a 
‘healthy’ society in this post-war period (De Hoog, 2003). Even though the state 
facilitated family life in several manners (as we will explain below), the family 
was seen as the repository of moral values. Hence, childcare and childrearing 
where not part of state interference. This also reflects the political climate at the 
time. The 1950s were dominated by the Cold War, in which state interference 
with education or childcare were associated with totalitarian regimes of 
oppression and state control (Bussemaker, 1993; 1998: 77; Bucx, 2011: 22). The 
low state interference with issues concerning childrearing and childcare has to 
be understood in the Dutch tradition of pillarization, where these issues were 
delegated to the different subcultural (religious) groups (Bussemaker, 1998: 77: 
Bucx, 2011: 22)7.
7 For instance educational institutions differed by ‘pillar’ and where – though publicly financed – highly 
autonomous vis-à-vis the state.
51Chapter 2
The state and the family
In several ways the state assisted families. For instance, in 1952 a special 
ministry - The Ministry of Social Work- was set up. This ministry provided 
funding and coordination to various facilities which assisted families, such 
as counseling centers and child health centers (Clerkx & Pot, 1987; De Hoog, 
2003). During this post-war period the Dutch government moreover developed 
a very extensive social security system which protected workers against 
unemployment, illness and disability. A general pension system was developed 
and with the introduction of the General Welfare Act of 1965 (replacing the Poor 
Act) a minimum income for everyone unable to claim any other provision was 
guaranteed (Bleijenbergh, 2004). Central to all these measures was the model 
of the nuclear family with separate gender roles: Women were seen as the 
protectors of family life and men where fully responsible for the family income. 
Consequently, the social security system was based on the idea that married 
women did not (have to) work; insurances for men were therefore based on 
the absence of work, whereas women’s rights were based on the absence of 
men (Kremer & van Kersbergen, 2008; Bussemaker, 1993; Outshoorn, 2002). 
The otherwise strictly divided political parties all agreed upon this system of 
separate gender roles and breadwinner allowances (Bussemaker, 1993;1998; 
Bleijenbergh, 2004). 
Also labor practice still reflected the idea that married women did not 
belong on the labor market. Although during the war the labor policy that 
had prevented married women to work was not strictly adhered (due to the 
emergency situation), the law (stemming from 1924) prescribing that women 
in the public sector would get fired after marriage still existed (Morée, 1992; 
Van Dijk, 1994). Between 1946 and 1948 the social democrats and liberals were 
willing to abandon this policy as working women could help in building up 
the economy. Especially social democrat and feminist Corry Tendeloo stressed 
women should be given the opportunity to build upon their own capacity. 
According to Tendeloo the decision to work “was something between husband 
and wife, and should not be the terrain of government interference”… “Besides 
no other countries in Europe had such restricting rules” (Handelingen Tweede 
Kamer, 1954-1955, 15 September, 3000m-3000q). However, the religious parties 
strictly opposed to this idea; “stimulating women labor would be irresponsible” 
(Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1954-1955, 15 September, 3000q-3000r). As such, 
it was too early a point in time for such ‘liberate’ ideas and it would last until 
1957 before this rule was no longer enforced (Van Baalen,2007). Even though 
formal rules preventing women’s labor did not exist in the private sector, most 
52
employers followed the same behavioral norm and where hesitant to hire 
married women as strong societal norms favored women’s role in the family 
(Outshoorn, 2002). 
The church and the family 
Religious values continued to shape societal and political beliefs during this 
post war period as well. The church fiercely rejected birth control and pressured 
married couples to have a large number of children (Van Dijk, 1994). Religious 
expectations proclaimed that the primary purpose of the institution of marriage 
was reproduction (Macionis & Plummer, 2002) and among Catholic families the 
priest would make home visits to check whether the wife was pregnant. The 
church also prescribed the division of tasks among married men and women; 
women belonged at home. The age at which people married dropped and the 
birth rate sharply increased after the war (Van Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 1997; 
Garssen, De Beer, Cuyvers, De Jong, 2001). 
The state logic that insured the strong bread-winner model in Dutch society 
and religious beliefs thus mutually reinforced each other (Dekker, 2002). Leading 
actors in the church had regular contact with political leaders on both the 
national level and at the level of the municipality. Moreover, religious political 
parties were strongly represented in government coalitions and voting behavior 
was largely ‘determined’ by religion, church attendance and social position 
(Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 1989; Dekker, 2002):
“It has been estimated that in 1958 72 percent of the vote in the 
Netherlands could be explained simply by knowing the religious 
affiliation, church attendance and social class of a voter” (Irwin & Van 
Holsteyn, 1989: 21). 
During the fifties, government coalitions existed of Catholic and Social Democrat 
parties. In the sixties Dutch politics was characterized by successive Christian 
coalition governments (Dekker, 2002; Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). As a result, religious 
values and beliefs were largely reflected in Dutch politics. 
The Golden Age of the family 
The post-war period has also been characterized as the golden age of the family 
(De Hoog, 2003) and the family was often referred to as the ‘cornerstone of 
society’ (Garssen et al., 2001). Stable life was propagated by the state and the 
church and seen as a precondition to restore the nation after the war. Marriage 
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was extremely popular and the nuclear family was the dominant cohabitation 
form. In 1960 the household pattern consisting of a ‘married couple with 
children’ accounted for 56% of all Dutch households (Van Praag & Niphuis-
Nell, 1997: 15). Divorce - considered to be a huge threat to family life - hardly 
occurred (Garssen et al., 2001; De Hoog, 2003). In 1960 only 2.2 out of 1,000 
marriages ended in divorce (Van Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 1997: 20). 
Among Dutch women, the average number of births (i.e., total fertility rate) in 
1960 was 3.11 (Van Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 1997: 23) and the average age at which 
women gave birth to their first child sharply dropped after World War II (Van 
Gaalen & Van Poppel, 2007). In 1960 60% of the unmarried women participated 
in the labor market, compared to only 7% of married women (Hooghiemstra 
& Niphuis-Nell, 1993: 22). “All mothers, whatever their professional education, 
were restricted to kitchen, vacuum cleaner, washing diapers and looking after 
their children” (Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn: 1992: 64). According to Hooghiemstra 
and Niphuis-Nell (1993) the church has influenced this division of tasks within 
the household much longer in The Netherlands than in other countries. But as 
we have explained this was reinforced by the government, employers and labor 
unions, who all did not stimulate women to enter the labor market either (Van 
Dijk, 1994). 
2.4.2.2 Childcare in Dutch society during era 2
Pedagogical ideas and assumptions about parenting
Next to the government and the church, child-experts also fiercely propagated 
the motherhood ideology in this post-war period. Especially the psychological 
development of children got increased attention from experts during this period. 
Particularly influential became the attachment-theory based on the work of 
Bowlby (Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992; Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). Bowlby was a 
child psychiatrist and investigated – at the request of the United Nations - the 
mental health of homeless children (children who were orphaned or separated 
from their families) in post-war Europe. Bowlby (1952) postulated that the 
deprivation of mother love caused psychological damage for these children: 
“When deprived of maternal care, the child’s development is almost 
always retarded – physically, intellectually, and socially – and symptoms 
of physical and mental illness may appear. Such evidence is disquieting, 
but skeptics may question whether the retardation is permanent and 
whether the symptoms of illness may not easily be overcome. The 
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retrospective and follow up studies make it clear that such optimism 
is not always justified and that some children are gravely damaged 
for life. This is a somber conclusion which must now be regarded as 
established” (Bowlby 1952: 15).
In his report Bowlby postulated that maternal love and care was as vital for 
psychological development of children as vitamins are for their physical 
development and that separation or deprivation of the mother was as harmful 
for children’s mental health as contagious diseases are for their physical 
health (Van IJzendoorn, Tavecchio, Goossens & Vergeer, 1985: 3). As such the 
attachment of a young child to its mother was seen as a crucial determinant of 
children’s mental health.
Although some critics questioned Bowlby’s method of investigation and 
conclusions, in general his ideas about the importance of motherhood fell on 
fertile soil in the Netherlands (Clerkx & Van IJzendoor, 1992; 64 Van IJzendoorn et 
al., 1985). His attachment-theory strongly influenced psychologist, pedagogues 
and psychiatrists and found its way into social work and popular magazines, 
reinforcing the motherhood ideology (Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992: 65). In 
general it was believed that the quality of the infant-mother relationship was 
crucial and that deprivation of mother love or insecure attachments would 
cause damage (Bakker et al., 2006; Morée, 1992; Singer, 1989). As such, mothers 
belonged at home and maternal employment was largely condemned. Childcare 
provision was largely regarded as something immoral (Bussemaker, 1993; 1998). 
That full-time motherhood was still strongly embedded in Dutch society 
was also reflected in the public opinion: In 1965 84% of the Dutch population 
had strong objections towards mothers of school children being employed 
(Bronneman-Helmers, 1986: 18; SCP, 1998: 141). 
Child experts focused their attention on the psychological development 
of children and stressed many of the possible problems in childrearing. 
Mothers were told to be attentive to the emotional well-being of their babies 
and toddlers, try to understand their emotions, and be available all day and 
night (Clerkx & Pot, 1987; Wubs, 2004). In sharp contrast to the dominant 
childrearing advice in the period before the war, maternal bonding, empathy 
and attunement were now greatly emphasized. However, most child experts 
shared the notion that mother’s love or mother’s intuition where not enough 
for ‘responsible’ childrearing. Mothers needed to possess information about 
children’s development and child-psychology. “Without this knowledge parents 
would not understand their children and consequently they would not be able 
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to guide their children in a good way” (Wubs, 2004: 65). The most important goal 
of childrearing was ultimately morality. Thus, child experts emphasized that 
childrearing was a very responsible task, which required a planned approached 
and had a clear purpose (Wubs et al., 2004: 116, 135). With a delicate balance 
between love and discipline, parents needed to prepare their children to become 
decent, moral adults that could contribute to society. Hence, respect, solidarity 
and a sense of duty where prescribed as guiding childrearing norms during 
this post-war period. Mothers were advised to set a good example and children 
were expected to obey their authority (Knijn & Verheijen, 1988; Wubs, 2004: 142; 
Brinkgreve & Korzec, 1978). In order to accomplish this important childrearing 
task, childcare experts stressed that mothers should be available day and night 
(Wubs, 2004: 147). 
The fact that mothers where hold almost fully responsible for their children’s 
psychological, social, and emotional development and that problematic 
behavior was attributed to childrearing mistakes (Wubs, 2004: 77), caused 
much insecurity among mothers (Bakker et al., 2006: 281). The American child-
physician Benjamin Spock proposed a different view on childrearing. Instead of 
emphasizing all the possible failures in childrearing, Dr. Spock learned mothers 
“you know more than you think you do” and “don’t bother too much about 
professional advice”. He encouraged mothers to be more flexible and treat their 
children as individuals. In 1950 his “Common sense book of baby and childcare” 
was translated into Dutch. Even though his philosophy did not correspond with 
the mainstream advice of Dutch child experts, his book quickly became very 
popular among the public. Probably, his optimistic tone and advice reassured 
mothers and loosened the strict childrearing advice a bit (Bakker et al., 2006: 
295). Nevertheless, in Spock’s book the mother is the designated parent as well. 
Childcare organizations in era 2
Shortly after the war there had been few requests for increasing the number 
of day nurseries - especially because men’s wages were low and some women 
wanted to contribute to the family income. For instance the socialist Dutch 
Women’s Movement (NVB) plead for more nurseries to assist lower class families 
in combining care and labor, but bumped upon the negative childcare policy 
of the government and the institutionalized beliefs that a mother belonged 
at home (Singer, 1989). Moreover, socialists ideas were heavily criticized 
and suppressed during the period of the Cold War8. Most other women’s 
8 The NVB was not allowed to take part in the National Women’s Council (NVR), the umbrella organization 
of different Dutch women’s movements (Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 180-181). As such, their ideas did not gain 
momentum.
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organizations did not see much value in organized childcare (Van Rijswijk-
Clerkx, 1981: 179) and felt that the most important issues they had been 
fighting for - such as voting or educational rights, and independent legal status 
- were ‘accomplished’ (Outshoorn, 2002: 39). Given the strict division of gender 
roles, the strong motherhood ideology, the rising standard of living and the 
development of an extensive welfare state, childcare organizations remained 
a marginal phenomenon in the Netherlands and in general were disapproved 
of. An influential person in the field of children’s education repeatedly refuted 
childcare services for the under-fours:
“Fortunately, Dutch women realize their place in the family is 
irreplaceable”…A nation can only be ‘healthy’ if its main cells - the 
families - are healthy. To sustain the mental health of our nation, 
maternal employment should be largely prevented” (Wilma Nijkamp, 
quoted in Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 96). 
Public childcare was not seen as a necessity. Rather, “the absence of such 
facilities was proof of the achievement of the welfare state” (Bussemaker, 1998: 
76; Kremer, 2007). Roughly two types of childcare facilities existed during this 
era: 
Day nurseries/daycare organizations: The day nurseries, which provided full-
time daycare for preschool children, still comprised an isolated group in society 
(just as in the period prior to the war). Because charity funds largely declined, 
these day nurseries increasingly had to rely upon the scarce funding provided 
by their municipality (via the Poor Act and later via the General Welfare Act) 
and the contribution of parents. Applying for subsidies became an important, 
but challenging, practice for directors, who took over many of the tasks 
previously done by the board of ladies (Verschuur et al., 2006: 19; Van Rijswijk-
Clerkx, 1981: 89). The inclusion rules of these existing day nurseries remained 
strict: Only in case of emergency daycare was allowed, because in general the 
childcare directors themselves also believed that the separation of mother and 
child should be prevented whenever possible. In 1965 approximately 30 daycare 
organizations existed and they were primarily meant for poor single mothers 
that needed to work, ill mothers, or for children who did not receive enough 
attention at home (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; Bussemaker 1998). The national 
government did not take much interest in these day nurseries and condemned 
public childcare as something immoral (Bussemaker, 1993). Childcare issues 
only rarely surfaced on the political agenda during this era (see again Figure 
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2.1a) (Clerkx-Pot, 1987). By providing very little financial support, municipalities 
largely blocked the founding of new daycare initiatives and hence “followed 
the policy of the national government, employers, unions, political parties, 
churches and most women’s organizations who all rejected maternal labor” 
(Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 196). 
There were, however, some changes in these day nurseries. The most 
notable change, however, is seen in the name of the facilities. Between 1953 
and 1965 most day nurseries changed their name from ‘kinderbewaarplaats’ to 
‘kinderdagverblijf’ (daycare organization), mirroring a change in their mission 
(Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 91). Instead of merely giving children shelter and 
comfort while being preoccupied with hygiene measures, increasingly more 
daycare organizations wanted to enlarge the pedagogical component in their 
work and give more attention to recreation, childcare and childrearing. Some 
organizations came to hire social workers next to ‘nurses’. However, a real 
and shared pedagogical vision on how to guide and raise children was often 
lacking and because many organizations had financial problems, many of the 
envisioned ideals were not turned into practice (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 93; 
Verschuur et al., 2006: 18). 
Special social work nurseries and childcare in community centers: Soon 
after World War II some specific childcare facilities emerged. For instance 
special social work nurseries were set up in extremely impoverished urban 
areas. The aim of these facilities was to socialize children while simultaneously 
educating housewives (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). These nurseries where not 
open to everyone. Instead, social workers specifically selected impoverished 
families that were in need of pedagogical advice and assistance. Also nuns 
and workers in community centers were taking care of children of lower 
class families. With education, advice and moral supervision these facilities 
helped the poor and aimed to restore society after the war. Even though these 
organizations provided care for children during the day, their aim differed from 
the day nurseries. These organizations did not aim to facilitate mother’s labor, 
but instead aimed to socialize/civilize families (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 178; 
Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992). These nurseries existed for a relatively short 
period, only during the post-war years. 
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2.4.3 Era 3: mid-1960s- mid 1980s 
2.4.3.1 Families in Dutch society during era 3 
Individualization, emancipation and secularization 
In the 1960s some important societal changes happen that turned out to have 
a large impact on family life. During the sixties Dutch society (like many other 
western countries) is changing due to a combination of factors such as growing 
economic prosperity, access to modern consumption goods (such as television 
and cars), high income security (due to the extensive social security system), 
rising educational levels, urbanization and the introduction of birth-control 
pills (Outshoorn, 2002; Dekker, 2002; Garssen et al., 2001). Often provoked by 
various action groups who challenged authority, these factors induced increased 
individualization, emancipation and secularization. Authority was no longer 
simply taken for granted and the idea that ‘you can control your own destiny’ 
was on the rise. Especially among young people and people living in the cities, 
the influence of the church weakened and the ideological differences between 
various ideological groups (e.g., Catholics, Protestants, socialists) became less 
sharp (Dekker, 2002; Clerkx & Pot, 1987). The electorate of the religious political 
parties, which historically had been very stable, was losing ground. Whereas in 
1946 the three biggest religious parties made up 52 percent of all votes, in 1971 
this declined to 37% (Dekker, 2002: 15; Irwin & Holsteyn, 1989). Voting behavior 
was less determined by religion, church attendance or social class. 
With a very generous welfare state (a lot of things were taken care of) and 
economic prosperity, the ideology guiding family and social values became 
one of independence, individualism and a the pursuit of personal happiness. 
With the demise of religious and social control, family matters became private 
matters (Bakker et al., 2006: 242-243; Damsma, 1999) and the freedom to choose 
how to life your life became a guiding principle (Bucx, 2011:20). 
The place of the nuclear family in society 
Influenced by a trend towards greater individualism, emancipation and 
secularization substantial changes take place in family life (De Graaf, 2011; 
Bucx, 2011). The previously dominant household pattern of ‘the married couple 
with children’ is losing ground. Whereas in 1960 this type still made up 56% of 
all household types, this decreased to 38% in 1985 (Van Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 
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1997: 15). This reflects among others an increase in the number of people that 
live alone, a postponement of marriage, and an increased number of childless 
couples (Van Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 1997: Garssen et al., 2001: 29). During the 
1970s and 1980s cohabitation before marriage became more common, sexual 
norms were loosened, and homosexuality became increasingly accepted 
(Bakker et al., 2006). 
Marriage as such changed as well. The popularity of marriage decreased 
and the number of divorces rapidly increased in the 1970s (from around 2 out 
of 1,000 couples in 1960 to 10 in 1985) (Van Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 1997: 20). One 
the one hand, this was related to changes in divorce law (in 1971). On the other 
hand, since the introduction of the General Welfare Act (in 1965) single mothers 
could claim social assistance and consequently became less dependent on their 
husbands’ income (Bucx, 2011: 52; Bakker et al., 2006). 
Because birth control became widely accessible and the influence of the 
Church waned, fertility rates dropped significantly during this era. Whereas the 
average number of births in 1965 was still 3.03 this decreased to 1.51 in 1985 
(Van Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 1997: 23). Couples gained more control over the size 
of their families and the decision whether or not to start a family (yet) became 
a deliberate individual choice (Bronneman-Helmers, 1986).
The increased diversity of household types, the steep increase in divorce 
rates, and the drop in fertility rates during this period, all reflect an important 
shift in norms toward progressiveness and individualism and a changing 
value orientation towards relationships and families (Kaa, 1987; Van Praag & 
Niphuis-Nell, 1997; De Graaf, 2011). This pattern, however, was not restricted to 
the Netherlands, but characterized many European countries during that time 
and has been referred to as ‘Europe’s second demographic transition’ (e.g., Kaa, 
1987). 
The role of women 
As we have explained above, with the introduction of birth control women 
gained more control over the size of their families. The decision whether and 
when to start a family became a conscious choice and was no longer strictly 
prescribed by social or religious norms (Bronneman-Helmers, 1986). The 
decreasing size of families and the introduction of household appliances made 
household duties less demanding(Clerkx & Pot, 1987; Van Dijk, 1994). Besides, 
women’s educational attainment was clearly on the rise (CBS, 2011: 12-13; 
Bronneman-Helmers, 1986: 16). 
It was against this background that some women wanted to remain in 
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the workforce after the birth of their first child. Especially higher educated 
married women had become dissatisfied with their sole role as housewives 
and they questioned the traditional family ideal of full-time motherhood 
(Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992; Hoog, 2003). They felt a need to strive for their 
own development and independence. As a result, increasingly more women - 
although their numbers initially remained small – decided to keep their jobs 
after marriage. Reinforced by the exceptionally strong motherhood ideology, 
these women were initially blamed (for instance in women’s magazines) for 
wanting luxury, being egocentric or socially irresponsible as they preferred a job 
over being at home with their children (Knijn & Verheyen, 1988; Morée, 1992). 
Mothers with a job would later often feel the need to apologize, saying: “but my 
child never suffered” (Morée, 1992). 
In 1967, Joke Kool-Smit, a politically active Dutch feminist wrote an 
influential article in which she illustrated the unequal position of women 
in Dutch society. She called attention to the fact that even though women’s 
organizations had been under the impression that their most important tasks 
had been accomplished, the position of men and women in society was far from 
equal: 
“Apart from formal voting rights, feminists strived for three things: 
That women would become free citizens, that women would fully 
realize their potential and that women would become full members 
of society. At none of these three issues have feminists reached their 
goals and at none of these three issues have women accomplished 
what theoretically would have been possible….Regarding the majority 
of women the emancipation remained in a passive stage: even though 
opportunities came within reach, women situation remained the same: 
Just like fifty years ago women are housewives…”(Kool-Smit: 1967: 267).
Her article demarcated the start of the Second Feminist Wave in The Netherlands 
(Outshoorn, 2002). She criticized marriage and the fact that a woman’s identity 
was absorbed by her husband’s. Joke Kool-Smit called attention to the limited 
role of women in public life and the lack of alternatives other than full-time 
care for children by mothers at home: 
“When a man gets married he chooses a life partner, women in 
general choose a way of living, namely the life of a housewife” (Kool-
Smit, 1967: 268-269)…. “As soon as there are children, women will be 
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locked inside their homes. As long as this remains the case, human 
potential is wasted and I really cannot grasp that such a diverse group 
of individuals will sacrifice their life and accept this uniform task” (Kool-
Smit: 1967: 271)……Once a woman has found her raison d’être outside 
her home, she is looked upon with suspicion. Even worse, one cannot 
belief this is really what she wants” (Kool-Smit: 1967: 277).
Joke Kool-Smit urged women to fight for equal rights, to critically reflect upon 
their social position and their ambitions and not just passively accept their 
‘condition féminine’ (Kool-Smit, 1967: 280). 
Together with Hedy D’Ancona she founded a new women’s movement the 
Man-Vrouw-Maatschappij (MVM, Man-Women-Society) in order to fight for 
women’s rights. Other women’s movements appeared as well (such as ‘Dolle 
Mina’). These women’s organizations had many goals such as equal pay for 
women, legalizing abortion, and the elimination of barriers to women’s 
participation in public life. With various provocative demonstrations they tried 
to influence public opinion and politics (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). 
The traditional versus the modern family 
During the 1970s, norms related to working women became somewhat less 
stringent, especially for mothers with school-age children and more married 
women entered the labor market (Van Dijk, 1994). The percentage of married 
women on the labor market increased from 7% in 1960 to 24% in 1977 
(Hooghiemstra & Niphuis-Nell, 1993; Van Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 1997: 44). Many 
women decided to re-enter the labor market once their children were older. 
However, mothers of preschoolers often did not work. In 1975 only 12% of them 
participated on the labor market. In 1981 this increased to 18.5% (of the women 
with school-aged children 30 percent worked outside the home) (Bronneman-
Helmers, 1986: 16). The vast majority of people held the opinion that women 
with pre-school children were still supposed to stay at home. Thus even though 
the employment of mothers with older children was ‘permitted’, norms relating 
to maternal employment of pre-school children were more traditional (we will 
come back to this issue in the next paragraph). (Bronneman-Helmers, 1986: 18; 
Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981).
Whereas in the fifties women had participated in the labor market because 
they needed to supplement their husband’s income, during and after the sixties 
the need for personal development and social contacts became more important 
(Van Dijk, 1994: 4: Morée, 1992). Even though increasingly more women entered 
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the labor market and the number of dual-income families was clearly on the 
rise, the economic system governing most families was still characterized by 
a bread-winner model. In 1982 of all couples, 57% qualified as a breadwinner 
household and 30% of the couples fell into the category of two-income 
households, of which the woman predominantly worked part-time (Van Praag 
& Niphuis-Nell, 1997: 65).
Accordingly, in the seventies and early eighties roughly two different family 
types existed. The first and most common, is the traditional family, in which the 
father earns the family income and mother is fully responsible for childrearing 
and household duties. The second is the ‘modern family’, in which both parents 
work (father in a full-time job and mother mostly in a small part-time job) and 
childrearing responsibilities are shared (although mothers devote substantially 
more time to caring tasks and household duties are almost completely mothers’ 
responsibility) (De Hoog, 2003). 
2.4.3.2 Childcare in Dutch society during era 3
Pedagogical beliefs and assumptions about parenting
Corresponding with the declining influence of traditional authority in society 
and the rising quality of living, strict obedience of children was no longer 
expected and childrearing advice changed. Instead of stressing children’s moral 
development as the ultimate goal of childrearing, children’s well-being and the 
individual relationship between parent and child was now emphasized by child 
experts (Wubs, 2004). Childrearing advice in the 1970s was less prescriptive 
than in the previous two eras: Above all, love, understanding, and a confidence 
in children’ development were important (Wubs, 2004: 122). Because the size of 
families had decreased, parents were able to give their children more individual 
attention. Instead of setting clear rules, the importance of communication 
with children became the ingredient for ‘good’ parenting (Van den Brink, 1997; 
Bakker et al., 2006).
In general, childrearing – both in theory and practice - became increasingly 
more child-centered and less authoritarian and the previously strict hierarchy 
in families largely disappeared (Brinkgreve & Korzec, 1978; Damsma, 1999; 
Wubs, 2004; Bakker et al., 2006). In a rather extreme form some left-wing student 
activists propagated anti-authoritarian parenting in the 1960s and 1970s. Based 
on a boarder political ideology, namely humanization of society and attacking 
all compulsory forms of hierarchical authority, they believed children should be 
‘deliberated’ and raised ‘freely’. They would have less frustrations and eventually 
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grow up to become more conscious citizens (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 224-
225). In the early 1980s the radical ideas of the anti-authoritarian movement 
had waned, but the importance of norms such as children’s autonomy, self-
confidence and self-development remained. The most important theme in 
childrearing advice during the 1980s became the facilitation of children’s 
development. As a pre-condition for good child development, a good affective 
relationship between parent and child was heavily emphasized (Bakker et al., 
2006: 297; Wubs, 2004).
Underlying most childrearing advice during this era was still the notion that 
mothers were the prime care takers (Singer, 1989). Especially the attachment 
theory (of Bowlby) was still very influential among pedagogues and psychologists, 
which focused almost exclusively on maternal attachment (Wubs, 2004: Bakker 
et al., 2006; IJzendoorn et al., 1985: 121). As such, mothers were advised to be 
‘sensitive’ and ‘responsive’, to understand their children’s emotions, to stimulate 
their development and be available all day and night to comfort and play with 
their children. The quality of the infant-mother attachment relationship was 
considered to be the cornerstone of children’s socio-emotional development 
(Clerkx & Van IJzendoorn, 1992: 71; Bakker et al., 2006: 242; Singer, 1989). As 
childrearing became more intense and expectations rose, some women and 
child experts raised attention to the fact that toddlers, who were always staying 
at home with their mother, remained somewhat restricted in their experiences 
and developmental possibilities (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; Clerkx & Pot, 1987; 
Tijdens & Lieon, 1993; Singer, 1989). Therefore, it was considered to be desirable 
that toddlers would – for a few hours a week – play with other children and 
learn to socialize. As we will explain later on, so-called ‘playgroups’ were set up 
for this purpose and became very popular. Maternal employment, however, was 
still largely condemned: A frequent separation of the mother would stimulate 
insecure attachments and non-maternal care (except for a couple of hours a 
week) was believed to have adverse effects on child-development (even though 
this often was not empirically tested) (Bakker et al., 2006; 242; Clerkx & Van 
IJzendoorn, 1992: 71; Singer, 1989). 
The tendency to stress motherhood as a full-time responsibility and largely 
disapprove non-maternal care for young (pre-school) children was also reflected 
in the general public opinion. In 1970 still 68% considered it undesirable ‘for 
mothers with pre-school children to work outside the home while her children 
go to daycare’. For school-aged children maternal employment was considered 
to be more acceptable; only 44% disapproved of this in 1970 (Bronneman-
Helmers, 1986: 18). By 1980 the public opinion against maternal employment 
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had become more favorable: Only 36% disapproved of mothers with school-
aged children having work, however, still 64% of the people refuted the notion 
that ‘mothers of pre-schoolers could work while their children attend daycare’ 
(CV’80; Bronneman-Helmers, 1986: 18; SCP, 1998: 141; Damsma, 1999). 
Thus, even though the labor market participation of women was on the rise 
and opinions about motherhood became somewhat more pluralistic in Dutch 
society during this era, mothers were still considered to be the “designated 
parent” and expected to give priority to their children’s wellbeing (Morée, 1992). 
Especially when it concerned babies and toddlers, mothers’ employment was 
still frowned upon and in both the political and public debate mother’s interests 
were often placed against the interest of the child (Singer, 1989; Kremer, 2007: 
21). This might have been reinforced by the fact that having children became 
a conscious choice due to birth control and a declining influence of religious 
beliefs: If one made the decision to have children their needs and developmental 
possibilities should come first (Bronneman-Helmers, 1986: 25; Clerkx & Pot, 
1987: 125; Weusten, 2011). In women magazines attention to working women 
slowly changed and gradually became more positive (Brinkgreve & Korzec, 
1978, Morée, 1992), but in the midst of these changes they kept stressing the 
important role of housewives and the happy lives of stay-at-home mums: 
“The majority of Dutch women – as intellectual as feminists - is happy 
to dedicate herself to the family. They do not see running a modern 
household as an imposed task, but stress that raising children is the 
best and most challenging experience one can have” (Libelle Vijftig, 
1984: 56 in Morée 1992). 
Childcare policy debated 
While more mothers worked, the conditions for combining work and parenthood 
only slowly materialized (Morée, 1992; Clerkx & Van IJzendoor, 1992) and 
accessible daycare facilities where greatly lacking in numbers. Increasingly more 
parents tried to secure a spot for their children in the existing daycare facilities. 
However, in most Dutch municipalities there was no daycare organization 
(Pelzer & Miedema, 1990; WVC, 1992). Moreover, not all of the existing daycare 
organizations were willing to place children of women who worked ‘for fun’ or 
‘out of luxury’. The waiting lists of daycare organizations that did place children 
of mothers who did not work out of economic necessity grew enormously in 
this period, which signals the need for daycare was growing (Verschuur et al., 
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2006: 21; Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; Bussemaker, 1998). 
In order to facilitate gender equality and the labor market participation of 
married women, various women’s organizations emphasized the need for good 
and accessible childcare facilities, with slogans such as “We are not kangaroos, 
we want crèches” (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 236). In 1970 they organized various 
demonstrations (such as the “open-air crèche” in Amsterdam) to call attention 
to the growing need for childcare. They challenged the widespread notion that 
childcare was an emergency provision for ‘defective’ families. Instead, some 
women’s organizations stressed that accessible and affordable childcare should 
be a basic right for all families (Bronneman-Helmers, 1986; Bussemaker, 1998). 
In November 1970 they presented a petition to the national government in 
which they asked for childcare subsidies and a uniform system of quality rules 
(Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 231-236). 
Although the government granted some national subsidies for childcare 
(Rijks-bijdrageregelingen Kinderdagverblijven) during the late seventies, 
feminists’ appeals for the expansion of daycare based on women’s interest for 
autonomy did not really gain momentum and a large expansion of daycare 
facilities did not set in during this era (Bronnemans-Helmers, 1986; Bussemaker, 
1998; Wilbrink-Griffioen, Van Vliet & Elzinga, 1987; Singer, 1989). Although 
feminists (who as a group lacked consensus on the issue of childcare9) achieved 
that childcare became a regular issue on the political agenda, during the 
seventies and eighties politicians where largely divided concerning the issue 
whether the expansion of childcare was desirable and whether this should be 
a responsibility of the state (Bussemaker, 1998; Clerkx & Van IJzendoor, 1992; 
Clerkx & Pot, 1987). Especially, the relationship between childcare and women’s 
interests for autonomy or self-development was still very much disputed. In 
1974 the government decided that part-time childcare for a few hours a day (in 
so-called playgroups) could be beneficial to children’s development, but they 
rejected all-day childcare as they did not want to stimulate greater numbers of 
women going out to work than was currently the case (Bussemaker, 1998: 79-
80). The notion that children belong at home to be taken care of by their mother 
was still wide-spread (Van Rijswijkk-Clerkx, 1981: 244; Bussemaker, 1998: 79-
80). As such, mothers’ interests (for autonomy or development) and children’s 
9 During the 1970s even the feminists themselves became divided concerning the issue of childcare and 
discursive conflict emerged. Some feminists did not want the movement to became totally absorbed with 
issue around children (they thought that women had done this long enough), others questioned the role 
of the state in childcare provision (Bussemaker, 1998: 79). Some were afraid that public childcare provision 
would leave the role of fathers and the organization of the labor market intact or doubted whether greater 
labor market participation would be the central mains for achieving independence (Bussemaker, 1998: 83). 
As such, the women’s movement itself lacked consensus on the question of whether childcare was important 
for women (Bussemaker, 1998: 84).
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interests (children’s welfare and development) were largely presented as if they 
were mutually exclusive (Singer, 1989; Kremer, 2007). 
At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s women’s emancipation 
regained political attention. Women from the social-democratic and communist 
party, supported by women’s groups in trade unions, argued that childcare 
should be a universal basis provision in order to enlarge the equivalence of men 
and women and create equal possibilities for both sexes: 
“Childcare facilities constitute an essential precondition to achieve a 
fairer redistribution of labor within and outside the home. Therefore, 
I have the opinion that childcare needs to be expanded and should 
become accessible to lager groups of people. We ask the government to 
produce a statutory and financial regulation for as many different kinds 
of childcare as possible” (Van Es, Ter Veld, Tweede Kamer, Handelingen 
1981-1982, 17100 XV 35). 
Even though they gathered much support and ideas were developed for a law 
on childcare, the idea that childcare should be a basic entitlement quickly lost 
ground (Pelzer & Miedema, 1990; Bussemaker, 1998). On the one hand this 
was related to the relatively weak power of the women’s movement in The 
Netherlands. The women’s movement was not coherent and strong enough to 
break the dominant rationale as they had not yet built a viable, recognized 
constituency in the political arena (Bussemaker, 1993; 1998). Another reason 
was the shift to a more conservative government after new elections in 1982. 
The Christian-democrats in the new government coalition were fiercely opposed 
to state interference in domains that traditionally belonged to the church, the 
family or the community. Childcare was seen as a private responsibly of families 
and public childcare would threaten care in the family10: 
“In the Christian-democratic ideology “state funded childcare embodies 
both the evils of government interference and control in private life, as 
well as the indifference and selfishness of individual citizens who allow 
their own interests to prevail over those of their children” (Bussemaker, 
1998: 85). 
10 This is called the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ (Catholic) or ‘sovereignty’ (Protestant), which emphasizes that in 
the Christian-Decomcratic ideology the state will only intervene when the family’s resources are exhausted 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kremer, 2002: 115).
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Moreover, the economic crisis in the first half of the 1980s urged the government 
to cut on public expenses. Even though a working group on childcare points to 
a shortage of approximately 24,000 childcare places (Verschuur et al., 2006: 28), 
the responsible minister for childcare (the Christian-Democrat Elco Brinkman) 
decides to economize on childcare in 1984. The government acknowledges 
there is a shortage of childcare facilities, but argues childcare is a responsibility 
of parents, not the state (Bronneman-Helmers, 1986:26): 
“Our point of departure is that we need to do justice to parent’s own 
responsibility and freedom of choice in how to arrange the care for 
their children. This means that the government will restrict its policy to 
creating the conditions which facilitate parents in arranging childcare 
themselves” (Tweede Kamer, Handelingen 1984-1985, 18483, nr 3).  
Hence, in 1984, instead of raising the budget for childcare, the government’s 
preferred strategy was a tax deduction for parents. No separate law on childcare 
was established, but childcare was placed under a new decentralized Welfare 
Act (‘Welzijnswet’ in Dutch) with some new fiscal measures allowing parents to 
deduct part of their childcare costs (Tijdens & Lieon, 1993). 
Thus, during this era women’s organizations could not yet break the dominant 
rationale in the public and political discourse, through which childcare was still 
seen as a ‘dangerous’ expression of mothers’ self-interest (Kremer, 2002: 123; 
Singer, 1989). A rationale which would predominate well into the 1980s. New 
state-subsidized childcare facilities were established only sporadically in cities 
where there was a ‘demonstrated need’ (Kremer, 2002: 123). 
Childcare organizations in era 3 
The lack of childcare facilities and the still minor role of fathers in the household 
called for a great level of flexibility among working women during this era 
(Morée, 1992). Therefore, most women worked part-time with significant less 
hours than before motherhood and their career possibilities were in general 
significantly lower compared to men’s (Clerkx & Pot, 1987). The majority of 
women arranged childcare by a combination of paid and unpaid baby-sitters, 
care by relatives, neighbors and friends, parental sharing and/or a few hours in 
which their child attended a childcare facility (Tijdens & Lieon, 1993). 
The number of public daycare organizations (kinderdagverblijven) increased 
from 30 in 1965 to around 200 in 1984 (Tijdens & Lieon, 1993). Even though 
this is seven times bigger, it stands out starkly against the rising demand for 
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daycare during this period and waiting lists kept growing. Moreover, daycare 
organizations were regionally concentrated in the urbanized west, leaving a 
large part of the county underserved (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 259). For the 
first time in their history daycare organizations were confronted with parents 
from higher income groups, who wanted daycare during work hours. The Central 
Association of Daycare Organizations cautiously recognized the link between 
daycare services and women’s emancipation (Verschuur et al., 2006). For the 
government, however, daycare primarily remained an emergency provision 
and in order to receive any subsidies, daycare organizations were forced to give 
priority to children from socially deprived families over children from well-to-
do families (Tijdens & Lieon, 1993: 17). Although some organizations held on to 
their strict inclusion rules, others enlarged their clientele. Because parents paid 
a fee according to income, this had some financial advantages. 
Even though the daycare centers comprised a rather isolated and small 
group, they started to professionalize during this period. Quality issues, such 
as the interaction with and guidance of children, received more attention 
(Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 260). Within the Central Association of Daycare 
Organizations directors discussed about issues such as: inclusion rules, the 
appropriate group-sizes, the desired educational background of personnel, and 
the salaries of the employees (child-minding was a very low-paid job and it was 
difficult to get qualified personnel) (Verschuur et al., 2006: 22). In a professional 
magazine entitled A Small World, directors and employees wrote about the 
pedagogical problems they encountered during work (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981: 
213). Also the contact between daycare organizations and parents intensified 
during the seventies. The employees and parents more often talked with each 
other about the child and parents became somewhat better informed about the 
daily routines. Moreover, daycare organizations established a parental board, 
which gave parents a voice in some organizational issues. 
Because the demand for childcare had outgrown the supply by a wide margin, 
other types of childcare facilities, some more useful for working women than 
others, also arose during this period:
Playgroups (peuterspeelzaal): In the late sixties and seventies attention was 
raised to the fact that toddlers who were always staying at home with their mother 
remained somewhat restricted in their experiences (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; 
Clerkx & Pot, 1987; Tijdens & Lieon, 1993). And because families had become 
smaller, children had less siblings to play with. Some mothers therefore started 
a kind of mutual child-minding: they would, in turn, have ‘a few hours off’ while 
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their children were provided with a broader childrearing environment. These 
private initiatives quickly became more popular. They diffused throughout 
the country and their organization was professionalized. Instead of caring for 
each other’s children at home, mothers often decided to rent a room in public 
building such as a library or a community center and decided these facilities 
should be open to all young children (aged 2.5 to 5) (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; 
Clerkx & Pot, 1987). Whereas playgroups were largely run by volunteers, most 
facilities also hired a professional teacher. Mothers’ interests (having a few 
hours off), however, quickly resided to the background and playgroups were 
widely accepted and legitimized because of the developmental possibilities it 
offered to children: It offered a wider playing environment in addition to - not 
as a replacement of - childrearing with the mother at home (Clerkx & Pot, 1987). 
Because the separation from their mother was only short (children attended a 
playgroup for only a few hours a week) and children’s interests prevailed (i.e, 
supporting children’s development), playgroups received much more political 
and public support than did daycare organizations. Playgroups were centered 
on the notion that “mothers needed support as caregivers and not as workers” 
and the playground movement thereby strengthened the public perception that 
childcare centers, providing full-time care, were bad for children (Kremer, 2007: 
204; Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). Playgroups quickly institutionalized, received 
governmental subsidies and by the end of this era more than three thousand 
playgroups had been founded across the country. The difference between the 
number of playgroups and daycare organizations during this period is telling. 
See also Table 2.3. According to Van Rijswijk-Clerkx (1981) the playground 
movement even hampered the development of daycare organizations as it 
reinforced the perception that children’s interests, not mothers’ interests, 
should prevail (see also Singer, 1989). Because of the their limited opening hours 
playgroups were not helpful for working mothers. 
Company crèches: During the late sixties increasingly more employers 
started daycare facilities in their factories, so-called company crèches, to keep 
women aboard during times of great labor shortages (Pelzer & Miedema, 1990; 
Clerkx & Pot, 1987). These facilities remained rather small in scope, because 
the preferred strategy to make up for the shortage in labor supply was to 
attract migrant workers (Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; Bussemaker, 1998). Especially 
in companies with many female employees such as hospitals, welfare 
organizations and in the clothing industry such crèches were set up. Not much 
is known about these facilities, because employers did not want to put too 
much attention to this issue. They were afraid for reputational damage of the 
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firm and felt some emotional resistance because they believed themselves a 
child should be with its mother (Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981; Tijdens & Lieon, 1993). 
During the mid-1980s there were approximately 50 of such crèches in total 
(Bronneman-Helmers, 1986: 33). 
TABLE 2.3 Daycare Organizations versus Playgroups during  
 
the mid-1960s until the mid-1980s
1965 1975 1984
# Daycare organizations 30 167 209
# Playgroups 0 1589 3292
Source: The years 1965 and 1975 are based on Van Rijswijk-Clerkx (1981: 259). The year 1984 is based on 
Tijdens & Lieon, (1993: 23). 
Family dayhomes: During the seventies and eighties another private form 
of childcare appears as well. These are the family dayhomes, which is called 
host parenthood in the Netherlands, for children from 0-12 years old, whose 
mothers worked. Childcare is provided in the home of the childcare provider 
often including the caregiver’s own children. As such, host parenthood comes 
closest to caring for children inside the home, if not the home of the mother 
(Bussemaker, 1998). Host parenthood was not regulated nor subsidized by the 
government during this period. Most host-mothers joined an intermediary 
organization, who connected these private child-minders with parents who 
were looking for childcare (Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). 
2.4.4 Era 4: Late 1980s- beginning of the 21st 
century 
2.4.4.1 Families in Dutch society during era 4  
During the last decades, the rising importance of individualism and 
emancipation which started in the 1960s proceeded. Decisions in life were 
increasingly driven by individual deliberations and a greater need for self-
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fulfillment, personal development, and autonomy (Garssen et al., 2001: 12; 
Van der Avort, Cuyvers, de Hoog, 1996). Also secularization further progressed 
and the ‘pillars’ that were once so strongly embedded within Dutch society, 
lost much of their power during this era (a process which has been referred to 
as de-pillarization) (Kremer, 2007: 173; Van den Brink, 1997). For most people, 
decisions such as marriage and getting children are no longer influenced by 
religious norms and often postponed to a later age (Garssen et al., 2001; Van 
Gaalen & Van Poppel, 2007). Moreover, having children increasingly happened 
outside of marriage11.
Power relationships within families have changed enormously during this 
fourth era. The traditional hierarchy - where father was head of the family, and 
children obeyed their parents – is no longer dominant and family relationships 
have become more egalitarian (Van den Brink, 1997). Due to a revolutionary 
growth in women’s employment (we will further elaborate on this later on), 
increasingly more women have become economically independent and 
also the relationship between parents and children ‘democratized’. Children 
nowadays have a voice in many decisions, which has been referred to in the 
Dutch literature as the ‘negotiation household’ (onderhandelingshuishouden) 
(Van den Brink, 1997: 59). Moreover, family members have spent increasingly 
more time outside the home within their own network of relationships (Van 
den Brink, 1997: 65-67; Damsma, 1999). 
Thus, instead of families, individuals have become the basic units in society 
(Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 1997: 9; Garssen et al., 2001; Damsma, 1999; Van den 
Brink, 1997). Whereas in 1985 the percentage of Dutch households consisting of 
a (married) couple with children still made up 39% of all households, in this last 
era this decreased further to less than 28% in 2010 (Bucx, 2011: 36). Increasingly 
more people live alone, either permanently or temporarily. Also the proportion 
of one-parent families that resulted from a divorce as opposed to the death of 
one of the parents, drastically increased (Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 1997: 15; Van 
Poppel, 2012: 6). Even though families may no longer be characterized as ‘the 
cornerstone of society’, families still serve an important function in society, not 
at least because they constitute the primary place where children are born and 
raised (Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 1997; Bucx, 2011). During this last era, however, 
this important family function has become more of a shared responsibility 
(Tavecchio, 2001) as the labor market participation of mothers further increased, 
11 The average age at which Dutch people marry has increased from around 22 in the 1970s to over 30 in 
2009 (Bucx, 2011: 45). The average age at which women have their first child has increased sharply (from 24.3 
years in 1970 to 29.4 years in 2009) (Bucx, 2011: 47) and more women remain childless (Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 
1997: 25-26; De Graaf & Loozen, 2005). 
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role divisions in the family have become relatively more symmetrical, and the 
government radically changed its position towards childcare. We will explain 
these processes in more detail below. 
Traditional breadwinner model no longer dominant 
In the last decades Dutch women significantly changed their role in society. 
First of all, the level of education among women has increased and women have 
eliminated the relative education gap compared to men. In the population aged 
25 to 64 years, men are still slightly better educated than women, but women 
quickly catch up. Since a couple of years, women in the youngest age groups 
(up to 35 years) are even better educated than men (Merens, Hartgers, Van den 
Brakel, 2012; CBS, 2011). Secondly, the labor force participation of women kept 
increasing at a high pace during this last era (see Figure 2.2). In 1990 close to 
forty percent of all Dutch women aged between 15 and 64 had a job of 12 hours 
or more. In recent years the labor force participation rate among Dutch women 
surpassed 60% (Merens & Hermans, 2008; Merens, Van den Brakel, Hartgers 
& Hermans 2010). This change in women’s labor force participation has been 
associated with a host of social-economic changes, such as: the steep growth 
in women’s education attainments; a severe growth of the service industry 
(a sector where women have historically been overrepresented); the growing 
availability of part-time jobs; a postponement of motherhood and changing 
public opinions concerning maternal employment (Van Praag & Niphuis-Nell, 
1997: 45-49). 
FIGURE 2.2 Labor-market participation of women in 
  
The Netherlands between 1950-2010







































































































Mothers now have a job outside the home almost as often as women without 
children (Portegijs et al., 2006: 318) and looking after children or the family 
is less and less often seen by women as a reason for not wanting or being 
able to work (Merens et al., 2012: 191). Where in the previous period we saw 
that increasingly more mothers re-entered the labor market as soon as their 
children attended primary school, during this era also the proportion of women 
who kept working after their first child sharply increased (Portegijs, Hermans 
& Lalta, 2006). Whereas in the early 1980s almost 70 percent stopped working 
after their first child, recently only one in ten women give up work after the 
birth of their first child (Merens et al., 2010; Merens et al., 2012) although a large 
group of mothers cut down their working hours when they have children. The 
labor market participation of mothers of pre-school children (aged under four) 
is currently around the 73 percent for women with a partner, and 53 percent for 
women without a partner (Merens et al., 2010: 80). Remember, during the early 
1980s less than 20 percent of the mothers with pre-school children participated 
in the labor market. From Figure 2.3 it becomes clearly visible that during the 
last decade the labor market participation of women with children (aged 0 to 
12) has grown rapidly. 
FIGURE 2.3 Labor market participation Dutch women 2001-2011
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Mothers with children between 0-12 Total women 15-65 
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With the revolutionary growth in women’s employment during this era, Dutch 
society is bidding farewell to the once-popular ideal of the male breadwinner 
(Keuzenkamp & Oudhof, 2000: 170). Whereas in 1986 more than half of all 
Dutch couples formed a traditional one-income household, by 1998 this has 
dropped to 34%, while the two-income households increased from 30 (in 1986) 
to 56 percent (1998) (Keuzenkamp & Oudhof, 2000: 63). Thus the proportion of 
two-income households changed from the minority to the majority and the 
traditional breadwinner household is no longer dominant (Keuzenkamp & 
Oudhof, 2000: 170: SCP, 1998: 225). 
Also in families with minor children the proportion of dual earners 
drastically increased during the last two decades. Currently, the male 
breadwinner model characterizes less than a quarter (in 1990 this was still 60%) 
of all families with minor children and in about 70% of the cases both parents 
are employed ( Portegijs et al., 2002: 78Merens & Hermans, 2008: 87; Merens 
et al., 2010: 82). Although it is increasingly more common for both partners 
to work, three quarters of Dutch women work part-time (Merens et al., 2012: 
59; Plantenga, 1996). Especially women who are looking after young children 
rarely work full-time (Portegijs et al., 2006: 318; Merens et al., 2010: 82). As a 
result, the most common economic system of Dutch families has become the 
so-called one-and-a-half earner model, where women work part-time and men 
have a full-time job12. Next to a redistribution of paid work, Dutch families 
have also redistributed unpaid work, where women have devoted less time to 
such work and men more. Although the division of unpaid work has become 
more symmetrical, men did not increase their share in household work to the 
same extent as women increased their share in paid labor. Women still devote 
substantially more time to unpaid labor than men do (Merens et al., 2010: 108-
109).
In order to understand the increase in female employment and the 
disappearance of the strongly institutionalized breadwinner model during this 
era, we will explain in the remainder of this chapter: the changing position of 
the state towards working women; the introduction of a market logic (which 
informed social policy); the changing beliefs concerning maternal employment 
and parenthood; and the significant rise in formal childcare provision. 
12 Compared to other European countries, the prevalence of part-time work in the Netherlands stands 
out. Whereas for decades the Dutch female employment rate was among the lowest in Europe (Phillips & 
Moss, 1989; Hooghiemstra & Niphuis-Nell, 1993: 9), currently it among the highest (being exceeded only in 
Denmark). However, where on average around 30% of European women work part-time, three-quarters of 
Dutch women do so (Merens et al., 2010: 201; Eurostat, Labor force survey). 
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The role of the state and the market
Flourishing in the 1970s, the generous Dutch welfare state was financially 
supported by a relatively small group of economically active people with a high 
productivity rate. This was the result of successive governments which had 
filled labor shortages (in the 1960s) by attracting immigrant workers rather than 
stimulating married women to have a job, and which had solved a labor surplus 
(in the 1980s) by financially supporting the early retirement of older workers 
(Bleijenberg, 2004: 64; WRR, 1990a). As such, the Netherlands was characterized 
by a relatively low labor market participation of women and elderly. In the late 
1980s and during the nineties the Dutch welfare state came under attack for 
its inefficiency and lack of incentives to stimulate economic- productivity and 
independence (Bussemaker, 1998). 
The welfare state was criticized in two ways. First, the neo-conservative 
critique, predominantly voiced by the Dutch Christian Democrats, argued that 
the welfare state contributed to an ‘immoral ethos’: people would become 
too much dependent on the state and this had caused selfishness (Kremer, 
2002: 124). According to the Christian Democrats to turn back this culture of 
dependency, the state should decentralize many of its responsibilities and 
stimulate a “caring society” where citizens take responsibility to care for each 
other (Bussemaker, 1998: 84-85). As such, the Christian Democrats strongly 
advocated the role of the market and the community (Kremer, 2002: 124; 
Kremer, 2007: 171). The second critique, centered on the fact that the welfare 
state became too expensive (Kremer, 2002; 2007; Bussemaker, 1998). The number 
of inactive people in relation to employed inhabitants was large and a large 
number of people relied on (sickness) benefits (Kremer, 2007). With a relatively 
low proportion of the population participating in society through employment, 
the welfare system would become untenable in the long run, and in the light 
of an ageing society this would impair the competiveness of the Netherlands in 
the world economy (WRR, 1990a). This neo-liberal and social-liberal criticism, 
voiced by the right wing Liberal Party and some Social Democrats, concentrated 
on the harmful effects of welfare provisions, which hindered the economic 
independence of citizen’s. 
In the second half of the 1980s these ideas rapidly gained in popularity 
(Bussemaker, 1998: 86). In order to achieve a more efficient welfare distribution, 
economic growth and competiveness, the labor market participation had to 
increase. With the reappearance of the Social Democrats in the government 
in 1989 (with the Christian Democrats) the Dutch authorities began to activate 
people with limited labor market affiliation (such as women, elderly, disabled) to 
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get a job (Bleijenberg, 2004: 64). Especially influential in this process was a report 
produced by the Scientific Council for Government Policy entitled ‘A Working 
Perspective’ (WRR, 1990a). This report summarized the problem Dutch society 
was facing and in so doing marked a turning point, particularly for women” 
(Kremer, 2007: 171). According to the report: “Compared with other OECD 
countries the Netherlands has a low labor force participation rate” and this 
picture is even more worrisome “if allowance is made for the fact that part-time 
work is particularly common” (WRR, 1990b: 5). According to the report a large 
amount of human capital was wasted because women were largely inactive 
and a greater labor force participation of women was crucial for a sustainable 
welfare state (the state will benefit from greater employment among women 
via the taxes and contributions they will pay). The report explicitly emphasized 
the significance of childcare for the labor market: 
“In the Netherlands only 1-2% of children aged 0-4 years are looked 
after in day-nurseries. Inadequate child-care facilities, including after-
school care, probably forms the single most significant obstacle to 
employment outside the home for women with children. … Allowing 
for an annual increase in the labor force participation of women of an 
average 1.5 per cent, such facilities will need to grow by at least 3-4 per 
cent a year” (WRR, 1990b: 9). 
The social-liberal notion that the state had a responsibility to increase the 
economic independence of citizens, especially among women, and therefore 
needed to shape the conditions for increased independence quickly gained 
momentum: “the language of the market became predominant in Dutch social 
policy, spoken by the Social Democrats, liberals and Christian Democrats alike” 
(Kremer, 2002: 127). During the 1990s and 2000s the Dutch debate came to focus 
on inclusion of women in the labor market and this put the issue of combining 
work and family care on the Dutch political agenda (e.g., Bussemaker, 1998; 
Bleijenbergh, 2004; Kremer, 2002;2007; Lewis et al., 2008). As we will explain in 
the next paragraph this marked ‘the beginning’ of a Dutch childcare policy as 
the cautious policy on childcare of the seventies and eighties was replaced for 
a stimulatory policy (Bussemaker, 1998). 
The policy of stimulating women’s employment was not restricted to the 
national level. In the 1990s the issue of combining work and family life also 
became a central issue on the European political agenda (Bleijenbergh, 2004: 
74; Lewis et al., 2008). For instance in 1992 The Council of Ministers issued a 
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Recommendation on Childcare (European Commission, 1996). It did not provide 
an enforceable European right to care services, but was a statement of intent by 
the member states to work towards a basic level of childcare facilities, with the 
economic need for women’s labor market participation as its main justification 
(Bleijenbergh, 2004). Greater employment of women was also part of the 2000 
Lisbon Strategy, where member states committed themselves to become “the 
most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world” by 
2010 (European Communities, 2004: 6). A larger number of employed citizens 
was regarded as the best way to safeguard the sustainability of the welfare 
states, and a higher female employment rate called for a better provision of 
available, affordable and adequate childcare (e.g., European Communities, 
2004: 31-32). In 2002 the Barcelona European Council added: 
“Member States should remove disincentives to female labor force 
participation and strive, taking into account the demand for childcare 
facilities and in line with national patterns of provision, to provide 
childcare by 2010 to at least 90% of children between 3 years old and 
the mandatory school age and at least 33% of children under 3 years of 
age” (Barcelona European Council, 2002: 12).
As such, women needed to work in order to sustain the Dutch welfare state and 
as we will show in the next section, this macro-economic rationale shaped the 
development of Dutch childcare policy during this last era. 
2.4.4.2 Childcare in Dutch society during era 4 
One of the most notable changes that happened during this fourth, and last, era 
is the enormous growth in both the demand and the supply of formal childcare. 
To understand the context in which this change could come about, we will 
elaborate on the childcare policy of the Dutch government and the normative 
assumptions and pedagogical beliefs about how children should be cared for. 
Dutch childcare policy since the late 1980s-2010
During the second half of the 1980s various constituents pressured the Dutch 
government to improve the provision of childcare services; among them 
women’s organizations, labor unions, the national childcare association, 
various working groups and many advisory boards (e.g., Emancipatieraad, 1987; 
Nederlandse Gezinsraad, 1989; 1990; Instituut voor consumentenonderzoek, 
1987; Commissie Vrouw en Arbeid, 1989; Raad voor het Jeugdbeleid, 1989, WRR, 
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1990; Pelzer & Miedema, 1990; 1992). Also the European Commission signaled 
the lack of childcare facilities. With only 1 to 2 percent of Dutch children aged 
0-3 using publicly-funded childcare services13, the Netherlands was severely 
lagging behind, see also Table 2.4 (Phillips & Moss, 1989: 75). Hence, various 
constitutes in and outside the country, called for more childcare facilities. 
Although they did so for different reasons (e.g., to create gender equality, to 
increase female employment, to enlarge children’s well-being, to raise women’s 
economic independence, or to include children in society), consensus was 
reached on the necessity of investments, which paved the way for a childcare 
policy.
TABLE 2.4 Volume of childcare services in  
 
European countries 1985-1986a
Country Percentage of children < 3 years old in public daycareb
Percentage of children aged 3-5 















a Adapted form Anttonen & Sipilӓ (1996) and based on Philips & Moss (1989) and Yearbook of Nordic Statistics 
(1992).
b As a proportation of the age group. 
c In the Netherlands most children attend shool when they turn four. 
By the end of the 1980s all political parties agreed that child care was necessary 
to raise women’s productivity and tackle ‘the crisis of the Dutch welfare state’ 
(see previous paragraph). Even the Christian Democrats could concur with the 
13 Playgroups not included because these had hardly any function for working women. 
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expansion of children as an instrument of labor market policy (Bussemaker, 
1998: 87; Bussemaker, 1993). The government described its role as that of ‘a 
stimulator’ of childcare services, based on a shared responsibility of the state, 
the employers and parents. As such, childcare did not become a universal basic 
provision (Bussemaker, 1998; Verschuur et al., 2006; Knijn & Saraceno, 2010).  
Several successive ‘Temporary Simulative Measures on Childcare” where 
launched by the government in the 1990s (OECD, 2000). In total the government 
invested approximately 600 million euros to promote the expansion of 
formal childcare capacity (i.e., daycare centers and dayhomes) (OECD, 2000: 
57; Verschuur et al., 2006).14 Municipalities were responsible for allocating 
the national funds to the daycare organizations (WVC, 1992). Employers and 
employees needed to negotiate childcare in their collective labor agreements. 
Employers were supposed to buy company places (bedrijfsplaatsen) for 
their employees in the childcare centers. In line with its notion of ‘a shared 
responsibly’, the government gave companies a tax deduction for the costs they 
incurred for childcare (Schuit & Dobbelsteen, 2000). As a result of the national 
incentives combined with the significant increase in the contributions of 
employers15 - whose requirements for female employees in times of economic 
growth led them to accept the necessity of providing financial contributions 
- the number of child places increased rapidly during the 1990s (Keuzekamp 
& Oudhof, 2000: 88; Knijn & Saraceno, 2010: 451; Graafland, 1998; Kok, Groot, 
Mulder, Sadiraj & Van Ham, 2005). See also Figure 2.4.
14 The playgroups that used to receive a fair amount of subsidy (especially in the 1970s) now ‘miss the boat’, 
because their role in stimulating mothers’ labor market participation would be small given to their limited 
opening hours.
15 During the 1990s, the contribution of employers in the overall costs of childcare increased significantly 
from 11% in 1990 to 45% in 1998. State subsidies fell in this same period from 53% to 33% and parental 
contributions decreased from 34% to 19% (Keuzekamp & Oudhof, 2000: 88; CBS statistiek kindercentra 1990-
1998).
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FIGURE 2.4 Childcare capacity in the Netherlands 1990-2008
Source: CBS Statistiek Kindercentra
Despite the investments in childcare capacity, around the millennium change 
the demand for childcare still outpaced the supply, waiting lists were long, the 
childcare market lacked transparency, and there was no uniform system of 
quality rules in place (Hillen, Golder & Westerkamp, 2001; Vergeer et al., 2006). 
Moreover, the field was highly fragmented due to the different types of childcare 
places that were in place: subsidized places (for which allocation was based on 
social-economic grounds), company places, and private places (fully paid for by 
parents themselves) (Keuzekamp & Oudhof, 2000; Hillen et al., 2001). In order 
to effectuate a new comprehensive system of supply, finance and quality, the 
government decided to restructure the field and design a national regulatory 
framework for childcare. In 2005 The Act on Childcare was implemented (SZW, 
2005). The basic principle remained the same: employers, employees and the 
state are jointly responsible for childcare (each contributing 1/3 in the childcare 
costs from a macro-economic perspective) (SZW, 2004; Plantenga, Wevers, 
Rijkers, De Haan, 2005). However, the financial structure changed. Subsidies 
were no longer allocated to municipalities (supply driven), but working parents 
were compensated via income-related tax deductions16 (demand driven) (SZW, 
2004; 2005). Thus, under the guise of a three-party finance structure, the 
parents receive funds from their employers and the tax administration office 
16 Consequently, the distinction between subsidized, employer-financed and private child places disappeared 
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shares the costs. Next to regulating the financial system, the law introduced a 
national framework of basic quality requirements. The inspection is done by 
the GGD, which is a municipal healthcare service institute in the Netherlands 
(SZW, 2004; 2005). 
As such, the Act on Childcare weakened the role of municipalities in 
coordinating childcare centers in favor of market competition between 
childcare providers. Parents became ‘real’ consumers who were supposed to 
compare prices and quality in the ‘childcare market’ (Plantenga, 2004; Kok et 
al., 2005; Lewis et al., 2008; Knijn & Saraceno, 2010). According to Kremer (2007: 
170) this law “has been seen as the crowing stage of the implementation of 
the liberal notion of free choice” (see also Plantenga, 2004). A macro-economic 
argument – influencing maternal employment of mothers with young children 
– was (again) the predominant rational behind the Act on Childcare. Also in 
Dutch emancipation policy this market logic has been emphasized in recent 
years (Portegijs et al. 2006): 
“The government aims to enlarge the labor market participation and 
economic independence of women. In this first place this is important 
for women themselves…Increasing the hours of paid work among 
women is, however, also of vital importance for our economy. In an 
ageing society and globalizing economy we should use all talents of 
both men and women to compete in the world’s economy” (Tweede 
Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005–2006, 30 420, nr. 2: 6-7). 
Reregulation 
Although the government celebrated free choice of parents in a private childcare 
market, the state nevertheless intervened in the childcare sector several times 
after 2005. Initially employers were not obliged to contribute towards the costs 
borne by the parents and consequently many employers choose not to do so. 
As a result of the reluctance on the part of the employers, the government 
intervened and changed the scheme. From the 1st of January 2007 employers 
are statutorily obliged to pay a sixth part of the costs of childcare per parent.
During the mid-2007 the government intervened again (Motie Aartsen-
Bos) because the discrepancies between children’s school-hours and parent’s 
working hours caused a lot of strain among working parents. This time, the 
government obliged primary schools to offer or arrange daycare for children 
aged four to twelve before and after school hours (from 7.30 a.m. to 6.30 a.m.) 
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(Tweede Kamer, 2005-2006, 30300, 14; Knijn & Saraceno, 2010). In general schools 
did not offer out-of-school-care themselves but asked a childcare organization 
to arrange this. As a result, this regulatory change has increased the cooperation 
between schools and childcare centers (Hol & Vaes, 2012: 27). 
In recent years several other governmental interventions followed. With a 
first set of interventions the government aimed to get control over the significant 
increase in governmental childcare spending. As the demand for childcare grew 
much faster than the government had anticipated, so did the proportion of 
parents that asked state compensation via the tax administration office. By 
decreasing parent’s tax deductions, strictly relating state compensation to 
hours of paid work, and reregulating childcare provision in family day homes, 
the government tried to regain control over the childcare costs (SZW, 2012). 
With a second set of interventions the government aimed to stimulate the 
quality of childcare provision. For instance by providing subsidies to childcare 
centers to invest in extra training of childcare professionals. A special ‘Agency 
in Childcare Quality’ (Bureau Kwaliteit Kinderopvang) was set up for this 
purpose. Moreover, since the 1st of January 2010, child-minders in dayhomes 
face stricter rules and preconditions (SZW, 2012). In august 2010 a new act 
called Wet OKE has been introduced. The main goal of this law is related to 
early-learning intervention and aims to limit potential language and learning 
deficits of pre-schoolers, targeting all children at “risk” (e.g., children of lower 
social classes, children of ethnic minority groups). In order to reach all these 
children, pre-school training programs need to be provided in playgroups and 
daycare centers as well (SZW, 2012). Municipalities must provide sufficient 
pre-school training programs within their municipality and they need to 
arrange the implementation of these programs in cooperation with daycare 
centers, playgroups, and schools (Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2009-2010, 40-
3902). Moreover this law also arranged stricter quality rules for playgroups. By 
changing the Childcare Act the quality rules for daycare centers and playgroups 
have been ‘harmonized’ (Hol & Vaes, 2012; SZW, 2012). 
A new caring ideal: Parental sharing
Even though the government stimulated formal childcare provision during 
this era, first via the stimulation measures and later via tax allowances, the 
government’s policy was certainly not based on a full-time professional childcare 
ideal (a model which was for instance is pursued in Denmark). A guiding model 
of the Dutch government in both its labor policy and emancipation policy during 
the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s became the Combination Scenario, which has been 
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widely shared and preached by different political parties, trade unions, and 
women’s organizations. The combination model means that all people, men 
and women, should share paid and unpaid work equally (Lewis et al., 2008; 
Knijn & Saraceno, 2010). In practice this would come down to an average 32-
hour work week for both men and women, and investments in formal childcare 
(Commissie Toekomstscenario, 1995; SZW 2000). Hence the government called 
for childcare professionals to take over some of the caring work, but certainly 
not all (Kremer, 2007: 199; Knijn & Saraceno, 2010: 449). Because the ideal 
of maternal care was so firmly established in the Dutch welfare state since 
the Second World War, this combination model was put forward as an ideal 
compromise between the Dutch culture of ‘self-care’ and improving women’s 
position in the labor market, while at the same time creating more gender 
equality: 
 
“Demographic, societal and economic developments push employers, 
employees and the government in considering a new balance between 
labor, care and economic independence…...Certainly there were very 
positive sides to the breadwinner model. One partner specialized in 
paid labor, allowing the other partner (usually the woman) time for 
care. This positive aspect of “self-care” is largely engrained in our Dutch 
culture. Currently, we face the challenge to do justice to this appreciated 
model of self-care while simultaneously enlarging the economic 
independence of both men and women. For these reasons the 
government has chosen the “combination-scenario” as its policy target. 
This scenario means that both men and women equally divide paid an 
unpaid labor. In practice this means that parents with children both 
have three-quarter paid job, mutually share childcare responsibilities 
for one part of the week, while using professional childcare during the 
other part of the week….As such, this will create an appropriate balance 
between self-care and the outsourcing of childcare” (Tweede Kamer, 
vergaderjaar 1998–1999, 26 447, nr 2, p 4,5). 
 
The assumption behind this model of “parental sharing” (cf. Kremer, 2007) is: if 
‘he’ does more work inside the home, ‘she’ can do more work more outside the 
home, while a small part of the care for children can be outsourced to childcare 
centers (Kremer, 2007: 200; Plantenga et al., 1999; SZW, 2000). The model is based 
on two principles. Firstly, the combination model assumes that both partners 
in a couple are allowed to work on a part-time basis. During the 1970s this was 
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already the most viable option for working women because childcare facilities 
were greatly lacking in numbers, and – “as a compromise between working 
full-time and staying at home” - part-time work was more easily accepted 
(Knijn & Saraceno, 2010: 449; Kremer, 2007: 201; Plantenga, 1996). During the 
1980s and 1990s part-time work further institutionalized. With (women’s) 
labor unions lobbying for ‘equal rights for part-time workers’ most rules which 
discriminated against part-time workers have been dismantled. Part-time work 
became a normal job with equal labor conditions and rights (Lewis et al., 2008). 
A second principle of the combination model is that men should be encouraged 
to do more caring and play a larger role in childrearing (Kremer, 2007). The 
government has initiated several ideological campaigns to persuade men to 
give more care. For instance it launched a commercial on Dutch television in 
late 1990s with the slogan “who is that man that comes to our home every 
Sunday to cut the meat?’ (Sire, 1997). In 2003 the government started a big 
multimedia project entitled “men play a leading role” (‘mannen in de hoofdrol’) 
to enlarge the responsibility of men in caring tasks and communicate the 
message that absent fathers are not very modern (Kremer, 2007: 201). Also in 
public debates and in the media fatherhood got increased attention during in 
recent years (Keizer, 2010; Portegijs et al., 2004: 91). Moreover, parental (unpaid) 
leave schemes, further allowed fathers ‘care-giving time’. As such, ‘papadag’ 
(daddy day) - one day a week in which fathers do not work but take care of their 
children - became increasingly popular. 
Pedagogical beliefs and assumptions about parenting 
Among political parties, social partners and women’s organizations there was 
wide consensus concerning the desirability of the combination model, thereby 
influencing Dutch family transition away from the breadwinner model. Also 
child experts during this era are bidding farewell to the once dominant focus 
on maternal care: “a child, indeed, needs secure attachments, but this should 
not necessarily be restricted to one person – its mother” and children can 
also develop secure attachments to other caregivers such as fathers and non-
parental caregivers (Van IJzendoorn, Tavecchio, Goossens & Vergeer, 1985). As 
such, child experts stressed the benefits of a broader childrearing environment: 
“In case of attachment to one caregiver, every separation from this 
caregiver is a very stressful for children as they have nobody else to rely 
on. When more caretakers are available, children are less vulnerable to 
the possible separation from one of the caregivers…(Van IJzendoorn et 
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al. 1985: 86). …Moreover a broader childrearing environment enriches 
the world of experience for children because every relationship differs 
in form and content (Van IJzendoor et al., 1985: 86-87).….For parents, 
such as working mothers, an extended childrearing network – under 
the condition that the attachments to other caregivers are stable and 
of good quality – allows them to have a job without feeling guilty or 
having the idea that the bond with their children is negatively affected 
by their work outside the home (Van IJzendoorn et al. 1985: 86-87). 
More often fathers were mentioned in childrearing books. Whereas previously 
fathers had been advised to support mother while she took care of the children, 
during this era fatherhood and the role of fathers in childrearing received 
increased attention (Wubs, 2004). This is also reflected in the Dutch public 
opinion. Whereas in 1970s still close to 80 percent of the population considered 
women are better at raising children, by the end of the nineties this dropped 
to 34 percent, although differences between men and women are large (CV’75-
’97; SCP, 1994: 142). In general, the traditional notion that childrearing is a task 
for women, is no longer dominant (Keuzekamp & Oudhof, 2000: 172). Since 
the 2000s beliefs about caring fathers did not change much anymore (see also 
Figure 2.5) (Merens et al., 2010: 247).
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FIGURE 2.5 Dutch beliefs about caring fathers a
aPercentage that agrees with proposition: “In general, fathers are as well suited to look after children as 
mothers”. This question was not yet asked in 1990. Source: EVS (2011) European Value Studies 1981-2008
The key task parents hold in enhancing children’s development is emphasized 
in childrearing books and parental advice. The notion that parents should 
stimulate children’s cognitive and social-emotional development to the fullest, 
which was also stressed in era three, becomes even more dominant during this 
era (Bakker et al., 2006).
Dutch opinions concerning maternal employment have become more 
favorable since the 1980s. Especially during the 1980s and 1990s these opinions 
rapidly changed. In 2010, 73 percent of the women and 64 percent of the men 
had no objections towards ‘mothers of pre-school children having work while 
their children attend daycare’ (CV’81-’10; Merens et al., 2012: 99). This is a 
significant change compared to 1980, when merely 37 percent of the people 
approved this (CV’80; SCP, 1994: 141). Similarly, increasingly less people belief 
a ‘pre-school child suffers when mother works’ (See Figure 2.6) and a large 
majority of the Dutch people agrees with the notion that ‘a working mother can 
establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother 
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FIGURE 2.6 Dutch beliefs about working mothers:  
 
Pre-school child suffers if mother works a
a Percentage that agrees with proposition: “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works” 
Source: EVS (2011) European Value Studies 1981-2008. 
FIGURE 2.7 Dutch beliefs about working mothers:  
 
Working mother warm relationship with children a
a Percentage that agrees with proposition: “A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a 
relationship with her children as a mother that does not work”
Source: EVS (2011) European Value Studies 1981-2008
Albeit fewer and fewer people reject maternal employment, a large minority 
of the population (40%) take a negative view of mothers who work full-time. A 
maximum of 2 to 3 days is regarded as ideal for a mother with children under 
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Dutch society and also reflected in attitudinal data concerning care for children 
outside the home. Just under half of women and two-thirds of men think that 
it is best for babies (aged under two) to be looked after by their own parents 
(Merens et al., 2010: 133). Conversely, only a minority (around 30%) take a 
positive view of childcare for babies in a daycare center for several days a week17 
(Merens et al., 2010: 132). Looking after toddlers (aged 2 and 3) by people other 
than their parents for several days a week is the most widely accepted from of 
childcare (67%), a smaller group (just over 40%) approve of out-of-school care 
(Merens et al., 2010: 132; Merens et al., 2012: 99). Although the resistance to 
childcare outside the child’s home has reduced in the last years, the approval 
of childcare largely depends on the age of the children and the number of days 
children attend childcare. Moreover, it seems to be affected by notions people 
have of the quality of care in childcare centers. 
Childcare organizations in era 4 
Compared to the third era, the number of childcare centers in the Netherlands 
has grown extraordinarily during this fourth era (See Table 2.5). Around 2010, 
around 44 percent of working parents with children up to four years of age made 
use of a formal childcare facility (either a childcare center or family dayhome) 
(Merens et al., 2012). Consequently, childcare centers no longer constitute an 
isolated group of organizations and care for children in a daycare center has 
become an accepted phenomenon in The Netherlands (Tavecchio, 2001). 
The new Act on Childcare asked for a different way of thinking and working 
of childcare organizations, since they could no longer fall back on the subsidies 
from the government. They now have to sustain a healthy business and ‘sell 
their services’ (Hol & Vaes, 2012). Yet, via several attempts of reregulation, the 
government still has a very strong influence in the sector through amongst 
others: safety rules, providing demand-side subsidies, and setting a maximum 
fiscal price range (Waarborgfonds, 2006). 
Like in the third era the sector is still compromised of several types of 
childcare organizations. The largest group constitutes the childcare centers. 
Many childcare centers offer both daycare and out-of-school services during 
parents’ work hours, although some specialized in either one of these services. 
The vast majority of organizations is small and has only one to five locations, 
although the bigger organizations have comparatively more market share 
(Waarborgfonds, 2005). Next to the childcare centers, family dayhomes have 
also grown rapidly during the this era, although most parents make use of a 
17 Defined as two to three days in the question (EMOP ’08-’12). 
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childcare center (see Table 2.5). The playgroups lost in popularity during this 
era because they do not really offer a daycare solution for working parents. 
Yet their main function is signaling early learning problems and offering early 
learning programs, targeting children at “risk” (e.g., children of lower social 
classes, children of ethnic minority groups)18.
TABLE 2.5 Childcare in The Netherlands
1990 1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Population children in The Netherlands 
(x1000)
Children between 0-3 years old 756 767 790 819 818 784 749
Children between 4-12 years old 1238 1317 1776 1790 1796 1795 1792
Children between 0-12 years old 1994 2083 2566 2609 2613 2579 2538
Capacity in number of places (x1000)
daycare places (0-3 years) 22.7 49.9 74.7 102.7 117.6 129.6 160.4
out-of-school care places (4-12 years) 3 12.7 36.1 59.5 71.1 93.2 146
Capacity per 100 children 
daycare (0-3 years) 3 6.5 9.5 12.5 14.4 16.5 21.5
out-of-school care (4-12 years) 0.2 1 2 3.3 4 5.2 8.1
Children in childcare (x 1000)
daycare for 0-3 year old children 43.4 100.1 159.8 178.7 203.6 203 253.3
out-of-school care for 4-12 year old children 4.6 23 61.1 90.9 103.3 135.1 220.4
dayhome (guestparent) for 0-12 year old 
children 2.1 13.6 23.5 23 23.9 36.1 112.2
18 In the empirical chapters (3 -5) of this dissertation we will exclusively focus upon childcare centers, hence 
excluding family dayhomes and playgroups. 
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TABLE 2.5 Childcare in The Netherlands (continued)
1990 1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Use of childcare per 100 children 
daycare for 0-3 year old children 5.7 13.3 20.2 21.8 24.9 25.9 34
out-of-school care for 4-12 year old children 0.4 1.7 3.4 5.1 5.8 7.5 12.3
dayhome (guest parent) for 0-12 year old 
children 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.4 4.4
Source: CBS ((Statistiek Kindercentra 1990-2000) en Statistiek Welzijnswerk en kinderopvang (vanaf 2001)) (in 
Emancipatiemonitor) 
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
The simultaneity of processes such as individualization, secularization, de-
pillarization and emancipation have had a large impact on Dutch family life. 
Whether these changes have been for the better or the worse has become a 
debated issue among politicians and research alike (Van den Brink, 1997; 
Damsma, 1999; Bucx, 2011). Some have argued that greater individualism 
has pushed aside feelings of solidarity and a sense of security, consequently 
deteriorating the institution of the family. In the light of this, they point to 
the rise of delinquency and the growth of incivility. Others have argued that 
changes in family life have been for the good as people have more control over 
their personal life, putting an end to the social inequality that characterized the 
‘traditional family’ (Van den Brink, 1997: 17-19; Macionis & Plummer, 2002: 456). 
Irrespective of whether the changes in family life have been positive or 
negative, the place that families occupy in society has undoubtedly changed. In 
this paper we took the changes within the family logic in Dutch society as our 
starting point and we described how, over a period of more than one hundred 
years, its economic system, role patterns and assumptions about childrearing 
have changed (see also Table 2.2). As becomes clear from our results, the changes 
within this family logic cannot be understood in isolation, but only make sense 
if one takes account of the contemporary changes within other societal logics. 
For a long time, the traditional family logic, based upon a breadwinner model 
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and highly segregated gender roles, was strongly propagated by the state and 
entwined with the teachings of the church. This family model - where the 
mother takes full responsibility for non-paid labor, while father earns the 
family income - dominated all sectors of society, was shared among all opinion 
leaders (i.e., politicians, employers, churches, child experts, labor unions and 
women’s organizations) and shaped family beliefs and practices well into 
the 1960s. In the first period, the logics of the state, religion and the family 
largely complemented each other and normative, cognitive as well as coercive 
pressures (such as labor law restricting maternal employment) aligned and 
all underscored the ideal of full-time motherhood. In the sober years after the 
Second World War, when the government feared radicalization, the importance 
of the family as a cornerstone of society was strengthened even more, and 
also children’s professionals (such as the dominant attachment theory of 
Bowlby), reinforced the notion that the only appropriate role of mothers 
was inside the home. The relationship between logics during this period can 
be best characterized as reinforcing. Especially the logics of the state and 
religion amplify each other’s effects due to their common theme: sustaining 
and supporting the nuclear family. The logic of religion strongly emphasized 
that women were meant to be mothers and take care of their family. Likewise, 
the logic of the state persisted in stressing women’s role as predominantly 
caregivers. Within this particular institutional setting, childcare was primarily 
regarded as “something immoral” (Bussemaker, 1998: 71) and the social and 
economic policy of successive (Christian Democratic) coalition governments 
centered on the notion that “in a decent welfare state families should be able 
to afford to have their children at home” (Kremer, 2007: 168). Whereas in the 
1970s playgroups were widely legitimized for the developmental possibilities 
it offered to children, the acceptance of daycare remained largely restricted to 
those situations in which there was a “demonstrated need”. 
Against this background, the emergence and extraordinary growth of the 
Dutch childcare sector in the last decades is striking and can only be fully 
understood if we look at the interplay and simultaneous change in several 
societal level logics, plus the roles played by various actors in this process. First, 
the historically strong and mutual influence of the church (i.e., the religious logic) 
and the state on Dutch family matters weakened, which drastically changed 
the traditional family logic. Next, spurred by the feminist social movement, 
increasingly more women felt a need to strive for their own development and 
independence and with their entrance to the labor market the gender patterns 
and economic systems of many families changed. Also employers, especially in 
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periods of great labor shortages, stimulated women to stay in the labor market 
and sometimes initiated or arranged childcare. All these factors critically shaped 
the changes within the family logic and stimulated the growth in childcare 
demand and (to a lesser extent) supply. However, the biggest turning point set 
in during the fourth era when the government radically changed its position 
towards childcare. Faced with a looming crisis of the Dutch welfare state at the 
end of the 1980s, macro-economic arguments became the legitimization for the 
increased need of labor market participation of woman, boosting the expansion 
of formal childcare facilities. In the 1990s, with the first coalition governments 
since World War I where religious parties where not represented (the so-called 
purple coalitions), the neo-liberal state policies favored the market logic and 
informed the governments social policy. In this stage, market and state logics 
largely align, and the logic of the state and religion grew further apart, as ‘faith 
in God became faith in the market’ (Kremer, 2007: 172). In partnership with 
the employers’ associations and labor unions the government stimulated the 
expansion of childcare in The Netherlands. The resulting “childcare package” 
offered a hybrid combination of a market-driven, demand-oriented approach 
and the shared responsibilities approach of the combination scenario (Knijn & 
Saraceno, 2010: 452). Yet, the relationship between the logics of the state and the 
market concerning childcare issues is difficult to pinpoint. On the one hand the 
state reinforces the market logic, which became particularly evident with the 
introduction of the Childcare Act in 2005. On the other hand, the state tempers 
the play of the market logic via several attempts at reregulation, signaling the 
tension between both logics. 
This study has several implications for the institutional literature. First of all, 
we have presented how field evolution can be much more nuanced and dynamic 
than the mere substitution of one logic by the next as has been suggested by 
several previous studies (e.g., Rao et al., 2003; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). We 
have shown that logics do not exist separately from each other, but affect fields 
and organizations within fields, in an ongoing and dynamic process of mutual 
interaction. Sometimes this results in a constellation of logics which hampers or 
even blocks the evolution of a field, while at other times a different constellation 
of logics may spur field evolution and growth. Next to arguing that logics can 
co-exists (e.g., Reay & Hinings, 2005; Purdy & Gray, 2009) we therefore have 
pointed out how logics evolve in a dynamic interplay. Institutional logics are not 
static but change over time. Logics alternate between stages of opposition and 
harmony and the compatibility between logics largely results from its specific 
time and place in history (cf Greenwood et al., 2010). With the increased interest 
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for agency and change within the realm of institutional theory, organizational 
fields are often presented as battlefields of various actors and logics (e.g., 
Clemens & Cook, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002). Although this proposition is very 
valuable and has rendered many interesting research insights, it may cause 
institutional scholars to overlook situations in which various logics align and 
complement one another. After all, one of the key components of institutions 
is their stability (Scott, 2008). Our study once again demonstrated how stable, 
durable and strong the notion of childcare in the Netherlands has been and 
how over a very long time various logics complemented or reinforced each 
other, creating a strong system that emphasized women’s role belonged inside 
the home. 
 Second, we have shown how the process leading to institutional emergence 
may have profound consequences for current organizational life. Formal 
childcare became a legitimate ‘solution’ due to concurrent changes within 
multiple societal level logics: the family logic changed, the influence of the 
religious logic in society waned, the state changed its position towards families 
and childcare, while the market logic came to dominate many sectors in Dutch 
society. With an institutional legacy of multiple logics driving field emergence, 
organizations are almost per definition faced with institutional complexity or 
are hybrid in their very nature (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013). 
According to Greenwood and colleagues institutional complexity is usually 
implied, without being clearly assessed, where “recognition is limited to an 
acknowledgment that organizational actions are influenced by the potentially 
conflicting interactions between logics” (2011: 322). We believe, that by tracing 
the process leading to the emergence of fields, a fuller appreciation of the 
nature and consequences of incompatible pressures upon organizations can 
be established. Understanding how organizations respond to situations of 
institutional complexity, first requires understanding when such conflict is 
likely to arise and how multiple demands are imposed on organizations (Pache 
& Santos, 2010: 457). 
A limitation shared by most historical case studies concerns our reliance on 
retrospective information. In this research we examined the interplay of logics 
through various historical documents, political accounts and census data. 
Our reliance on these accounts reflects a key limitation of this study because 
we relied on the sensemaking of others and our own ability to accurately 
comprehend the evolution of this field and the events which gave rise to it 
(Silverman, 2006).
Another limitation concerns the specifics of our research context. Interesting 
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research insights might be gained if we could examine the evolution within 
and between logics in other settings. Such as a different field or a comparable 
field in a different country. For instance, in the welfare state literature countries 
have been compared on their different family policies, like the right to receive 
care and the right to give care (e.g, Bleijenbergh, 2004; Kremer 2007; Knijn 
& Saraceno, 2010). New insight might be gained if we could investigate how 
institutional logics have shaped the evolution of this policy domain in different 
countries. Moreover, a greater acknowledgment of the manner in which the 
co-occurrence of multiple logics may shape the origins and outcomes of such 
policies, might help in devising better policy instruments.   
With a legacy of various logics at its base, it is not surprisingly that Dutch 
childcare organizations are oftentimes confronted with situations of institutional 
complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Moreover, with the 
ideal of self-care still largely embedded in the Dutch culture, and a government 
which sees childcare primarily as a labor-market instrument, the legitimacy of 
the Dutch childcare field remains fragile. Recently, this has become plainly visible 
as the government has largely economized on its childcare spending in the face 
of economic downturn (SZW, 2011; Waarborgfonds, 2012). Moreover, because it 
concerns children, childcare is a vulnerable service, eliciting extensive negative 
media coverage if something bad happens (in the next chapter we will come 
back to this). Within this situation of multiple demands and bases of legitimacy, 
Dutch childcare managers have to navigate and run their organization. In the 
remainder of this dissertation we will focus upon the manner in which Dutch 
childcare organizations deal with various situations of institutional complexity 
and we will show how issuing ‘an appropriate” response in neither easy nor 
straightforward.
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childcare managers) in generating 
a response. Our survey results 
demonstrate that managers’ field 
identification positively influences 
organizational responsiveness. This 
relationship is partially mediated by 
managers’ negative emotions and 
their legitimacy loss perceptions. 
Our results underscore that external 
shocks by itself are not sufficient 
to trigger institutional change. 
Whether and how field-wide 
legitimacy threatening events raise 
actors’ reflexivity and possibilities 
for institutional change is partially 
answered at the micro-level of 
analysis.
This paper revolves around an 
extraordinary event that shocked the 
Dutch childcare field in December 
2010. The sexual abuse of children 
in a childcare center in Amsterdam 
challenged the institutional beliefs 
and expectations that children 
are safe in childcare, damaging 
the whole field as media scrutiny 
diffused broadly. To explain how a 
field-wide legitimacy threatening 
event triggers different responses 
among individual organizations, we 
take an institutional perspective 
and explore the role of several 
micro variables that influence key 
decision makers (in our case the 






In December 2010, a 27-year-old man known as Robert M., was accused of 
sexually abusing children at a daycare center in Amsterdam. Images of abuse 
were found at his home and it soon became clear that Robert M. was part of a 
world-wide network of child pornographers. Several weeks later he confessed 
the abuse of 83 children at three daycare centers in Amsterdam and while 
babysitting for private families. 
In the weeks following this disruptive event, the childcare field in the 
Netherlands was extensively scrutinized and the previous taken-for-granted 
safety procedures and quality standards were heavily debated. As childcare 
serves a vulnerable population, it is extremely sensitive to everything that 
could possibly go wrong (i.e., fatalities, injuries, “near misses”19 and sexual 
abuse) (Wrigley & Dreby, 2005). 
Childcare organizations are responsible for providing a safe and sound 
environment to children, as this is where parents’ trust resides in. Any failure 
to meet this responsibility will breach parents’ trust and can be life-threatening 
for childcare organizations (Roberts, 2011). Not surprisingly, this disruptive 
event spurred strong emotional reactions among parents, politicians and the 
general public, and destabilized existing activities and beliefs about childcare. 
The strong negative emotions found in the media were often accompanied by 
disbelieve: How could something like this happen in a childcare center, where 
the presence of multiple employees and established standards and protocols 
are expected to ensure the physical and emotional safety of babies and toddlers 
(Wrigley & Dreby, 2005)? 
What happened in Amsterdam was not seen as an isolated case, but this 
disruption seemed to impair organizations throughout the organizational 
field as media scrutiny diffused broadly and various constituents questioned 
the existing safety procedures in the childcare field. As literature shows, one 
mechanism behind these broader consequences of deviance concerns that of 
generalization: Individuals observe a single act of corporate deviance, interpret 
it as potentially harmful or contrary to social norms, and proceed to incorporate 
the possibility of such events into their general knowledge about organizations 
(e.g., Jonsson, Greve & Fuijwara- Greve, 2009: 195; Yu, Sengul & Lester, 2008). 
19 Near misses are cases in which children could have come to harm but did not (involving lost children, 
potential poisoning(s)) 
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If this happens, discoveries of corporate deviance that damage the legitimacy 
of the responsible organization also have legitimacy consequences for other 
organizations that share the same form or have similar characteristics. 
This broader breach or loss of legitimacy oftentimes has serious negative 
consequences (e.g., consumers may stop buying products, employees may 
leave their jobs, investments may be withdrawn); as audiences seek to avoid 
organizations that they associate with a deviant act. As a result, this can impair 
the access to resources, increase operational uncertainty and threaten the 
survival of organizations in a field (Jonsson et al., 2009; Desai, 2011; Deephouse, 
1999, Suchman, 1995).
Hence, the impact of negative critical events can induce a generalisation 
mechanism, which explains how negative impacts from one crisis can spill over 
and affect other organizations in the field (e.g, Yu et al., 2008; Jonsson et al., 
2009; Barnett & King, 2008; Desai, 2011; Greve, Palmer & Pozner, 2010; King, 
Lenox & Barnett, 2002). While this mechanism addresses the responses of 
audiences and explains the far reaching consequences of certain events upon 
organizational fields, it does not directly explain how individual organizations 
respond to such field-wide legitimacy threatening events. Although many 
studies have addressed how individual organizations respond to their ‘own’ 
scandals and disruptions (e.g. Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Suchman, 1995) we have 
little understanding of the manner in which other organizations respond when 
an entire field’s legitimacy is challenged, nor what explains the differences in 
these responses (Desai, 2011).
In the initial responses of childcare organizations to the Amsterdam case, we 
observed some remarkable differences. Whereas some organizations proclaimed 
to change their safety procedures, intensify the screening of personnel, or even 
install cameras; others argued that it is impossible to protect the organization 
against every possible risk. Notable from these initial reactions were the 
different ways in which these organizations experienced and responded to the 
adverse event. A year after the event we distributed a questionnaire among 
Dutch childcare organizations to measure how they strategically responded 
to the increased institutional pressures for children’s safety in childcare that 
followed from the event. To understand how such a legitimacy threatening 
event in a field triggers differential responses among organizations, we take an 
institutional perspective and explore the role of several micro variables that 
influence key decision makers in generating a response. Our research question 
is: Which micro-level variables explain differences in organizational responses 
to the same legitimacy threatening event in their field? 
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Even though an event may be highly salient to the overall field as it 
challenges the field’s legitimacy and creates confusion for field participants, 
there might be significant variance in how actors experience and interpret the 
event, asses it impacts and decide to deal with it (Hoffman, 1999; George et al., 
2006; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). We propose a decision makers’ field identification, 
which signals the importance of the field for one’s social identity, may critically 
shape organizational responsiveness to the event. Apart from the direct 
impact of field identification on organizational responsiveness, we will focus 
on the mediating role of cognitive and emotional micro-processes. Individual 
cognition can critically underpin strategic responses to institutional events 
because decision makers initiate responses based on their interpretation of the 
institutional environment (George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). As such, 
even though media scrutiny and the responses of key constituents suggest 
a contagion of judgement from the culpable organization to the whole field, 
the meanings individual managers attach to the event can largely differ. Their 
perception of legitimacy consequences may critically shape whether and which 
organizational actions they mobilize (George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; 
Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Emotions also mediate/guide responses to important 
stimuli, especially if events are highly emotionally charged (cf., Dutton & 
Dukerich, 1991). By providing a logic for action, emotions can play a crucial 
role in maintaining and transforming institutions (Goodwin, Jasper & Poletta, 
2004; Scott, 2001; 2008; Voronov & Vince, 2012). However, only a few scholars 
have addressed the role of emotions in understanding institutional processes 
or effects (e.g., Creed, De Jordy & Lok, 2010; Voronov & Vince, 2012; Goodwin, 
Jasper & Poletta, 2004).
The aim of this paper is to understand organizations’ differential responses 
to a legitimacy threatening event in their field, while giving a premium role 
to key decision makers that experience the event, asses its consequences 
and initiate an organizational response. We make two contributions. First, 
we contribute to institutional research by providing a ‘micro-level motor’ in 
a theory that predominantly focused on ‘macro-lines of analysis’ (Powell & 
Colyvas, 2008: 276; Suddaby, 2010, Barley, 2008). Exogenous shocks are often 
thought of as being able to trigger institutional change (Jepperson, 1991; 
Fligstein, 1991; Meyer, 1982; Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). However, 
events may not be equally salient for different key decision makers and their 
individual emotions and legitimacy perceptions can differ. We argue that a first 
step in understanding whether and how a legitimacy threatening event triggers 
change in taken-for-granted beliefs and practices, is understanding how key 
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decision makers feel, judge and ultimately act upon such events that happen 
in their field.
Second, we contribute to literature on organizational crisis more broadly. 
Although we know how organizations handle their own crises, how organizations 
respond when legitimacy losses spill over has not been studied so thoroughly. 
Jonsson et al. concluded that the “loss and recovery of legitimacy as a result of 
deviance by other organizations are important phenomena that we know little 
about, and they should be fruitful areas for research” (2009: 225). Desai (2011) 
recently opened part of this black box and showed how organizations seek to 
influence impressions of their overall field following accidents or disruptions 
occurring elsewhere in their field. He showed how such efforts are more likely 
among organizations in fields characterized by greater prior scrutiny of related 
issues and less likely for organizations that share core prominent features with 
the accident stricken firms. We also focus on organizational responses following 
disruptions that occur elsewhere in the field and cause strong negative spill-
over. Instead of focusing on field-level or organizational level antecedents, we 
focus on micro-level antecedents through which a critical institutional event 
triggers a variety of responses. 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
3.2.1 Field-wide legitimacy threatening events 
Organizations are confronted with a myriad of issues (i.e., events, developments 
and trends) in their external environment. A lot of these issues are routine, 
expected and easy to classify eliciting well-learned and routinized behaviors 
(Weick, 1979). Some issues however are not easily interpreted or processed, like 
situations where environments surprise organizations (Meyer, 1982). According 
to Dutton and Dukerich (1991) issues become problematic because they have not 
been encountered in the past and thus do not fit in the existing categorization 
schemes. Alternatively, issues may also be problematic because of the feelings 
they evoke. Issues that evoke strong emotions represent different types of 
stimuli and elicit different responses from individuals and organizations than 
less affectively charged issues (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Both aspects revolve 
very much around the salience of issues. Salient issues or events capture the 
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attention of decision makers because of the severe consequences that are 
associated with action or inaction and the lack of clear routines to deal with 
them (e.g., Dutton, Fahey, Narayanan, 1983; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990; Isabella, 
1990; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Greening & Gray, 1994). 
Catastrophic events in particular - like safety failures, scandals, oil spills, 
or accidents - constitute salient issues for organizational members as these 
are difficult to foresee and often have disruptive and potentially inimical 
impacts on organizations (Meyer, 1982). Variously referred to as shocks, jolts 
or discontinuities (Hoffman, 1999) such events pose threats to the legitimacy 
of organizations and generate institutional pressures as constituents demand 
redress and structural changes (Greening & Gray, 1994: 477). Legitimacy refers 
to constituents’ perceptions and judgments that an organization follows social 
norms and -expectations and acts appropriately (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse 
& Suchman, 2008). Although it is generally assumed that the responsible 
organization bears the negative consequences of illegitimate acts, such negative 
impacts can spill over and threaten the legitimacy of other organizations in the 
field (e.g., Yu et al., 2008; Barnett & King, 2008; Jonsson et al., 2009; King, Lenox 
& Barnett, 2002). This spill over process happens, because people use mental 
schemes to understand and classify organizations (Turner, 1985; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1985) based on shared characteristics, such as a similar organizational 
form (Yu et al., 2008). This reduces the complexity of inter-organizational 
comparison and simplifies information processing (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). 
Hence, categorization creates a path of generalization that is used once new 
information becomes available. Because of these categorization rules of 
audience members, an isolated act of organizational deviance causes a spread 
of legitimacy loss to other organizations (Jonsson et al., 2009). As a result, the 
non-culpable organizations are also faced with severe negative consequences, 
such as customers or investors withdrawing from transactions, changes in 
legislative acts and higher operational uncertainty (Jonsson et al., 2009; Desai, 
2011; Barnett & King, 2008; Yu et al., 2008). 
3.2.2 Responding to a field-wide legitimacy 
threatening event
We pursue further insight in the way in which organizations respond to field-wide 
legitimacy threatening events and what explains differences in their responses 
(Desai, 2011). For a long time, many scholars have predicted there would be 
little response at all (Barnett & King, 2008: 1154). Whenever organizations are 
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tarred by the same brush - also referred to as ‘the tragedy of commons’ - an 
avoidance strategy may be pursued as organizations do not know how they 
can effectively self-govern such problems, or when collective action to reduce 
the threat of stakeholder sanction (such as the creation of a self-regulatory 
institution) is considered to be too difficult or costly (King et al., 2002; Barnett 
& King, 2008; Barnett, 2006; Oliver, 1991). A passive response may also reflect 
that organizations try to avoid unwanted attention or avoid association with 
stricken firms, or simply wait for legitimacy to recover naturally (Hudson, 2008; 
Yu et al. 2008; Jonsson et al., 2009; Desai, 2011). 
In contrast to such passive responses, organizations may also opt for a more 
active response strategies following a legitimacy threatening event in their 
field. Informed by research that shows how organizations deal with their own 
crises (i.e., a crisis that arises directly from an organization’s own operations) 
organizations may similarly try to manage and repair legitimacy after a field-
wide disruptive event (cf., Suchman, 1995; Elsbach, 1994; 2001; Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990; Oliver, 1991). Organizations may for instance engage in communication 
with stakeholders to restore the legitimacy that has been jeopardized by the 
event (and the negative publicity it brings). By offering normalizing accounts 
such as justifications, denials, excuses, acknowledgments or explanations, 
organizations may attempt to reassure stakeholders and regain stability 
(Suchman, 1995; Elsbach, 1994). Maguire and Hardy (2009) and Desai (2011) 
focussed upon a specific type of communication; namely defensive institutional 
work, where actors produce texts or statements to defend their overall field and 
repair the field’s legitimacy following disruptions. “Defensive institutional work 
is a conscious and strategic response to counter the disruptive work of other 
actors” (Marguire & Hardy, 2009: 169). For instance by providing reassuring 
information regarding contested practices, countering assertions of negative 
impacts, countering the need for regulation, or by blaming actors outside the 
field (Maguire & Hardy, 2009: 169; Desai, 2011: 264). Hereby, field members try to 
manipulate how external constituents view all organizations in the field (Oliver, 
1991).
Besides engaging in communication, organizations may also decide to 
change practices after a disruptive event has revealed flaws in taken-for-granted 
routines. For instance, an organization may selectively confess that some 
aspects of its operations are flawed and then act decisively to remedy those 
specific faults (Suchman, 1995: 598) in order to regain legitimacy. Suchman 
(1995) refers to this response as ‘strategic restructuring’. Although Suchman 
(1995) described this type of response as an reaction to an organization’s own 
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crisis, it can also be applied to responses to field-wide legitimacy threatening 
events - where a crisis that initially happened in one organization reveals flaws 
in the shared practices of many organizations in a field (Hofmann, 1999). Related 
to our research context, a restructuring response may involve the adoption of 
a specific safety enhancing procedure, such as changing personnel screening, 
which organizations have adopted in response to the Amsterdam crisis.
In this paper, we will conceptualize organizational responsiveness to a field-
wide legitimacy threatening event as a continuum ranging from no response 
(i.e., a passive/avoidance response) through increasingly greater levels of 
organizational responsiveness (such as offering accounts and/or restructuring) 
(cf Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995). In the remainder of this paper, we 
will theorize how micro-level factors may influence the degree of organizational 
responsiveness to field-wide legitimacy threatening events. 
3.2.2.1 Decision makers’ field identification 
Institutional theorists are increasingly recognizing the importance of social 
identity. Social identities encompass “that part of an individual’s self-concept 
which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 225, as cited in Tajfel, 1982, p. 24). In institutional 
theory, identity is seen as a mechanism through which institutional change can 
be affected or blocked. Identity channels and affects responses to institutional 
pressures (e.g., Fox-Wolfgramm et al. 1998; Heimer, 1999; Creed et al., 2002; 
2010; Rao, Monin, Durand, 2005; Maguire & Hardy, 2005; Kraatz & Block, 2008; 
Glynn, 2008; Lok, 2010; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012). For example, 
Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) pointed out that professional identity can be 
an important driver of actors’ resistance to institutional change. In a study 
on public management reform in Austria, Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006) 
examined the identity work of public executives and the extent to which 
they anchored their self-conception in the ‘old’ (bureaucratic) or the ‘new’ 
(managerial) logic. They suggest that shifts in institutional logics are brought 
about and can be assessed by the degree of actors’ identification with the social 
category provided by logics. 
An industry or field can also constitute a relevant category for actors’ social 
identification. Hoffman and Ocasio (2001:416) define industry identity as “the 
common rules, values, and systems of meaning by which industry participants 
establish rules of inclusion, competition, and social comparison among 
industry members; create distinctions within and between industries; and 
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delimit industry boundaries.” When a significant event shocks a field, actor’s 
field identification is likely to be activated. Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) showed 
that industries pay more attention to an event if it impacts an industry’s image 
and identity. We extend their line of reasoning by arguing that disruptive 
field-level events are more salient for those field participants possessing high 
levels of field identification (Dutton & Duckerich, 1991). If an event critically 
challenges the behavioral assumptions and norms in a field, the social identity 
of individuals who derive part of their identity from being a member in that field 
is also jeopardized (Scott, 2008; Lok, 2010). Hence, we postulate that field-wide 
disruptive events are more salient for those organizational decision makers 
who identify more closely with their field. Likewise, decision makers with 
low levels of field identification may experience the event - and the complex 
pressures it sets in motion - as less intense (Greenwood et al., 2011). Realizing 
that accessible knowledge and taken for granted routines can no longer be 
applied in the ‘new’ situation (Ocasio, 2011) and driven to protect their group 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dukerich et al., 2002: Dutton et al., 1994; Boivie et al., 
2011), we expect decision makers with higher levels of field identification to 
be more responsive and thus initiate more organizational actions to the field-
wide disruptive event compared to decision makers with lower levels of field 
identification. We formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the field identification of decision makers, the greater 
the organizational responsiveness to a field-wide legitimacy threatening event.
3.2.2.2 Cognitive and emotional micro-processes 
Above we have theorized how decision makers’ field identification may directly 
impact upon organizational responsiveness following field-wide disruptions. 
However, we did not yet elaborate on possible underlying micro-processes. 
When confronted with salient events in their field, decision makers need to 
make sense of the new situation and decide whether and how to respond. As 
such, macro institutional pressures and events need to be translated to the 
micro-level and in this process both cognitive and emotional factors are likely 
to play a role (Zilber, 2002; 2006; George et al., 2006; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Lok, 
2010). Below we suggest that cognitive and emotional micro-processes shape 
the relationship between field identification and organizational responsiveness. 
Specifically, we elaborate on the mediating role of decision makers’ perceived 
legitimacy losses and their negative affective feelings evoked by the event. For 
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a graphical presentation of our hypotheses, see Figure 3.1. 
FIGURE 3.1 Summary of Hypotheses
Decision makers’ perceived legitimacy losses 
In the previous section we explained how a crisis that initially strikes only one 
organization can cause stakeholders to update their beliefs about the reliability 
and accountability of all organizations in a field - generating categorical 
delegitimation (Barnett & King, 2008 ; Hoffman, 1999; Jonsson et al., 2009; 
Greve et al., 2010). However, decision makers may vary in their interpretations 
of the environment and the social meaning they attach to key events (Daft 
& Weick, 1984; Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Dutton & Jackson, 1987). The role of 
individual cognition as a mediator between environmental issues / events 
and organizational responses is well established (Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton 
& Dukerich, 1991; George et al., 2006). For instance, from literature on issue 
management it is known that the manner in which organizational members 
‘gauge how outsiders are judging them’, critically filters and shapes issue 
interpretation and action on an issue (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 1991: 520; 
Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Dukerich, Golden, & Shortell, 2002; Dutton, Dukerich & 
Harquail, 1994). 
Hence, decision makers’ perception of the legitimacy consequences rendered 
by an event, can be an important driver of organizational responsiveness 
(George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). The extent to which they perceive an 
environmental situation as harmful or threatening, may critically shape if and 
which actions are taken. Faced with severe legitimacy losses, organizational 













legitimacy in response to the external threat (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 
1995; Oliver, 1991; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). Hence, the perception of high 
legitimacy losses signals a greater urgency to respond to the event and conceive 
of change tactics as organizations stand to lose resources and stability if they 
adhere to current practices (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse, 1999; George et al., 
2006; Dutton & Duckerich, 1991). The perception of only a minor legitimacy loss 
may trigger avoidance, because substantive changes are not deemed necessary 
and organizations could benefit from waiting for legitimacy to recover naturally 
(Jonsson et al., 2009; Desai, 2011). 
Decision makers may interpret the legitimacy consequences of similar 
events rather differently and accordingly decide on different strategies (George 
et al., 2006). We postulate that field identification may be an important factor in 
shaping managerial cognition after a field-wide disruptive event. The stronger 
individuals identify with a particular social group, the more they will personally 
experience the successes and failures of that group (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). As a 
result, decision makers that strongly identify with their field are more critically 
exposed to the events’ negative impacts: the event not merely threatens the 
field but, as a result, also violates their own (professional) identity (cf., Dukerich 
et al., 2002; Dutton et al., 1994; Boivie et al., 2011). Because the central values 
and goals of the field which they consider worthy, are challenged by the event, 
negative cues become highly salient and threat inferences are strengthened 
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Dukerich et al., 2002). Consequently, decision makers 
with high levels of field identification will likely perceive more legitimacy losses 
following the event as they strongly experience the incompatibilities between 
the behavioral expectations of the ‘old’ versus the ‘new’ situation. Decision 
makers for whom the field is less important for their sense of self, may - by 
virtue of their lower field identification - interpret the event as less legitimacy 
threatening. Decision makers low in field identification can more easily 
cognitively distance themselves from the event and consequently perceive the 
event as less threatening - generating lower legitimacy losses. 
In sum, we hypothesize that the greater the decision makers’ field 
identification, the higher the perceived legitimacy losses, which in turn increase 
the likelihood of organizational responses to counter the threat posed by the 
event:
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Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between field identification and 
organizational responsiveness after a field-wide legitimacy threatening event, 
is mediated by decision makers’ perceived legitimacy losses. 
Decision makers’ negative affect 
Institutional pressures or events are not limited to cognitive or normative 
elements (such as expectations, rules, norms and behavioral assumptions) 
but are often affectively charged and can evoke feelings as well (Creed et al., 
2010; Scott, 2008). Although the role of emotions in institutional theory has 
been hardly addressed, emotions may critically shape institutional processes 
and the responses of actors, because ultimately institutions are inhabited 
by people who experience and enact them (e.g., Lok, 2007; Scott, 2008; Hallet 
& Ventresca, 2006; Hallet, 2010). Emotions are triggered when individuals 
experience an unexpected interruption of an ongoing flow of activity (Frijda, 
1988). Thus, events that transform routine situations and generate discrepancies 
from actors’ expectations induce affective responses (Weick, 1995; Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010; Fiebig & Kramer, 1998; George & Jones, 2001). Crisis situations 
which critically disrupt the status quo, are typically characterized by intense 
negative emotions such as fear, anxiety and panic (Weick, 1990; 1995; Maitlis 
& Sonenshein, 2010). Field-wide disruptive events, are probably just as likely 
to trigger emotional responses, such as feelings of disorientation, anger and 
anxiety, as cognitive-reflective ones. Moreover, due to the contagion of harm, 
organizations may have the feeling they are blamed for something they did not 
do (Jonsson et al., 2009). 
From previous institutional studies we know that properties such as cognitive 
awareness and reflexivity - often associated with characteristics of agents or 
their field positions - allow actors to conceive of and implement change tactics 
(Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006). However, being cognitively aware that the current set of 
institutions and practices is suboptimal may often be insufficient to motivate 
agents to change (cf. Lok, 2007). Next to cognitive antecedents, Voronov and 
Vince (2012) point to the important role of emotional antecedents that motivate 
agents to depart from the current set of institutions they are embedded in. They 
theorize that lowered emotional investment in the current institutional order 
may orient individuals toward institutional transformation. Hence, emotions 
can be a critical stimulus to change practices and previously taken-for-granted 
routines (Barbalet, 2001: 9; Creed et al., 2010; Voronov & Vince, 2012). Along this 
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line of reasoning, we postulate that the level of negative affect experienced by 
decision makers surrounding a critical event in their field, positively influences 
the degree of organizational responsiveness. A disruptive event can critically 
lower the emotional investment of individuals necessary to navigate in a field 
and sustain a tacit belief that the game is worth playing20 (Voronov & Vince, 
2012: 65). When reality is simply too brutal and individuals lose faith in the 
current institutional order, a negative affective state - such as anxiety - signals 
that change is necessary and can motivate decision makers to actively respond 
to a disruptive event (for instance by changing scrutinized practices) (Voronov 
& Vince, 2012; George & Jones, 2001). 
Although emotions may act as an impetus for organizational action, not all 
decision makers will experience a similar amount of negative affect following 
critical events in their field. Given the importance of (system) disruptions to 
emotional responses, it is not surprising that research on organizational crisis 
and change is increasingly addressing how emotions direct organizational 
members’ sensemaking activities and behavioral responses (e.g, Huy, 1999, 
George & Jones, 2001; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, 1995). Emotions 
are often depicted in these studies as mediating the relationship between 
the discrepancy with pre-existing schemas (that is encountered in crisis or 
change situations) and organizational outcomes (such as resistance to change 
or organizational restructuring) (e.g., Bartunek, 1984; Bartunek, Rousseau, 
Rudolph & DePalma, 2006; Gioia & Chittipedi, 1991; George & Jones, 2001). 
Similarly, we focus on the mediating role of negative affect in the relationship 
between field identification and organizational responsiveness. Following a 
disruptive event in their field, we expect that the collapse of meaning, and 
hence the negative affective experiences, will be strongest among those decision 
makers with high levels of field identification. When the values, meanings and 
expectations that are part of the institutional field are being challenged by an 
event, the social identity of individuals who derive part of their identify from 
being part of that field, is also (partly) jeopardized (Scott, 2008; Lok, 2010). 
Individuals with a high level of field identification, will therefore assess a field 
disruptive event as more psychologically relevant and thus experience stronger 
negative emotions related to the event (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Smith, 1993; 
Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus & Gordijn, 2003; 
20 According to Voronov and Vince (2012: 65) agents have made emotional (a way of feeling) and cognitive 
investments (a way of thinking) in the dominant institutional order when they entered a field. These 
investments help agent to navigate in a field and adopt field-prescribed values, norms and behaviors. They 
give the example of doctors, who invest in the ideal of treating patients and curing diseases when they 
become a doctor. Even though doctors may disagree on the approaches for doing so, they share a tacit belief 
that the game is worth playing (Voronov & Vince, 2012: 65). However, such beliefs can be critically challenged 
after field-wide disruptions. 
116
Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus & Dumont, 2006). Those negative emotions, in turn, 
will positively influence the degree of organizational responsiveness (as we have 
explained above). Individuals with lower levels of field identification, can more 
easily psychologically distance themselves from the event and experience less 
negative emotions, decreasing the urgency to issue an organizational response. 
In sum we propose that the greater a decision makers’ field identification, 
the stronger their experience of negative emotions elicited by the event. These 
negative emotions, in turn, increase the likelihood that decision makers will 
mobilize organizational responses. We formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between field identification and 
organizational responsiveness after a field-wide legitimacy threatening event, 
is mediated by decision makers’ negative affect.
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Data sources and research procedure 
In December 2011 we distributed a survey among 1579 childcare organizations 
in the Netherlands that provided daycare services.21 We obtained a database 
with addresses via a leading professional organization (Het Waarborgfonds 
Kinderopvang) in the childcare field. They had the most up-to-date database 
available that covered the whole population. We sent a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire to all organizations in the database. In the cover letter we 
explained the purpose of our study, guaranteed confidentiality and asked the 
manager (i.e., the key decision maker) of the childcare organization to fill out the 
questionnaire. After two reminders 16.7% of the questionnaires were returned.
Prior to finalizing the survey, we conducted a pilot test among six childcare 
managers22. Moreover, the questionnaire was sent out for feedback to three 
employees of the professional organization that provided us with the address 
21 Childcare organizations that only provided out-of-school care (4 to 12 years old), playgroups or guest-
parenthood were not part of the sampling frame because the Amsterdam case happened in a daycare 
organization and the debate was centered on daycare organizations. Daycare organizations provide care for 
babies and toddlers (0-3 years old). 
22 Five interviews were conducted face-to-face and two interviews were conducted over the telephone. For 
the telephone interviews we sent the questionnaire in advance and asked the managers to make notes while 
filling it out. In a scheduled telephone meeting we discussed their remarks.
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list. Based on the pilot study we slightly adapted the wording of some items and 
we adapted the cover letter to better explain the purpose of the study and why 
cooperation of every organization (either large or small, in cities or rural areas) 
was important.
We will start our findings section by illustrating the severe impact of 
the event. We used several data-sources for this endeavor. In order to fully 
understand how the event unfolded over time, and which responses were 
elicited by the scandal, we kept track of two important news broadcasts in The 
Netherlands (NOS news and RTL news). Moreover, via a newspapers search 
we mapped the media attention the event elicited (from December 2010 until 
May 2012), and constructed a timeline of important issues and events related 
to the Amsterdam child abuse case (we refer the reader to Appendix A at the 
end of this chapter for an overview). We also gathered information from three 
professional journals in the field. We collected and read the articles referring 
to the Amsterdam child abuse case in two journals for managers in childcare 
(BBMP and Management Kinderopvang) and one journal for childcare workers 
(Kinderopvang). This information provided us with a better understanding of: 
the event’s impact on childcare professionals, how they (collectively) made 
sense of the event, and which responses and practices were discussed to deal 
with the event. Finally, we analyzed managerial responses to two dilemmas 
presented at an internet forum of a leading professional organization in the 
childcare field (Het Waarborgfonds Kinderopvang). These dilemmas were based 
on the challenges childcare managers faced after the Amsterdam child abuse 
case. The following two dilemmas were presented at the forum: (1) “Cameras 
seem to be the only way to ensure children’s safety” and (2) “The government 
talks about rules that must ensure ‘4 eyes’ in the group. Of course we do 
everything to provide children with a safe and sound environment, but isn’t 
this going too far?” Via the forum managers were invited to share their thoughts 
and feelings concerning these issues. We were given access to these responses 
and we analyzed various reactions of managers to construct a measure for our 
dependent variable (see the next section on measurement). 
3.3.2 Measures 
Organizational responsiveness: To measure the responses of childcare 
organizations to the field-wide threatening event, we extracted a list of 25 
possible responses. We based these responses on several sources: (1) the 
answers given by the managers in the forum (we discussed above), (2) the 
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responses which were discussed in professional journals, and (3) the measures 
which were put forward by an independent advisory committee. Based on the 
reactions of the pilot participants, we were confident we covered most of the 
responses organizations could have pursued. We asked respondents to indicate 
for each of the 25 responses, whether or not they adopted this response as a 
result of the childcare abuse case. 
The total list of 25 items (see Appendix B at the end of this chapter) taps into 
three different categories of responses, which we refer to as: communication, 
control and culture. The degree of responsiveness per category, equals a count 
of the number of responses the organization had adopted related to the event 
(cf. Desai, 2011; Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995). We labeled the first 
group of responses ‘communication’. These responses focus on communication 
with external constituents such as parents, the media or the government. For 
instance reassuring parents or informing them about safety and safety-limits. 
The cronbach’s alpha of this scale was .709. The second group of items, which 
we labeled ‘control’, reflects safety enhancing measures such as: increasing the 
monitoring of employees, tightening safety protocols or procedures, enhancing 
the screening of new personnel, or providing parents with the option to walk 
in whenever they like. The cronbach’s alpha of this scale was .82123. We labeled 
the last group of responses ‘culture’. These are safety enhancing responses 
targeted at the organizational culture or working climate, such as creating 
an atmosphere where employees can openly discuss professional norms and 
confront each other if they notice inappropriate behavior. The cronbach’s alpha 
of this scale was .902.
Field identification: We constructed a multi-item measure of field identification 
based on existing survey scales. We have included six items from the validated 
organizational identification scale developed by Mael and Ashfort (1992), which 
has been used in previous studies (e.g., Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000; Dukerich, 
Golden & Shortell, 2002; Boivie, Lange, McDonald & Westphal, 2011). We 
modified the wording of the items so these would refer to the whole field (in 
our case: childcare). Mael and Ashforth’s scale has been previously adapted 
to measure identification with larger social groups including professions and 
corporate elites (e.g., Johnson, Morgeson, Ilgen, Meyer, Llyod, 2006; McDonald 
& Westphal, 2011). Additionally, we included both items from Bargami and 
Bogazzi’s (2000) measure of organizational identification, which also has been 
used in prior research (e.g. Boivie et al., 2011; Mcdonald & Westphal, 2011). 
23 On the basis of the reliability analysis it was decided to delete two items in this scale (Men are no longer 
hired & Having cameras installed in each room of the daycare center). These items yielded barely any variation 
(almost everyone indicated they did not adopt either one of these measures).
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One of the items used a Likert format, the other asked respondents to assess 
the extent of overlap between their self-definition and the organizational field 
using a graphical illustration. The cronbach’s alpha of this scale was .7824. 
Perceived Legitimacy Losses: Legitimacy represents the reactions of observers 
to the organization as they see it and therefore equals a generalized perception 
of whether the actions of an entity are appropriate and good (Suchman, 1995: 
574). According to Vergne (2011) measures of organizational legitimacy fall into 
three categories: measures based on code adoption, on firm linkages and media 
coverage. We took a different approach as we were not so much interested in the 
legitimacy assessments by constituents, but in decision makers’ perceptions of 
the legitimacy consequences of the event (thus after the assessments of various 
constituents have been made). We constructed our measure by looking at 
Elsbach’s (1994) legitimacy scale. This scale measured organizations’ legitimacy 
in the cattle industry and consisted of items that asked respondents to assess: 
organizational endorsements by internal sources (employees), endorsements 
by external sources (the general public), and organizational normativity 
(attributes that legitimate organizations should have). Sample items in Elsbach’s 
study were for instance: ‘The general public approves of the organization’s 
operating procedures’ or ‘most employees would recommend working for the 
organization to their friends’. We followed a similar logic and developed a scale 
with multiple items specifically related to the critical event that happened in 
the childcare field. Example items are: ‘The public opinion on children’s safety 
in childcare has come under increased pressure” or “working in childcare has 
become less attractive”. (See Appendix B for a complete overview of the items). 
We asked respondents to rate each statement twice: to indicate the applicability 
of a statement for the sector and to indicate its applicability for their own 
organization. As such, we measured the extent to which childcare managers 
perceived that the critical event (1) impaired the legitimacy of the childcare 
field as a whole and (2) impaired the legitimacy of their own organization. In 
measuring both aspects (field versus focal organization) we were able to see 
whether decision makers attributed different social consequences of the event 
to the field- versus the organizational level. The cronbach’s alpha of the scale 
perceived legitimacy loss of the sector was good (.861) as was scale perceived 
legitimacy loss of the organization (.865). 
Negative Affect: The Amsterdam child abuse case triggered strong negative 
emotions, even among people who were not directly involved. The media 
also reported extensively about the case, reporting negative emotions (such 
24 On the basis of the reliability analysis it was concluded to delete one item in the scale (the one using the 
pictorial display). 
120
as feelings of anger, sadness, hostility) of parents, politicians, police officers, 
childcare professionals and citizens. Moreover a fierce debate evolved in the 
media around the safety of children in childcare and also the court case was 
highly emotionally charged. We asked the managers to reflect on the event and 
all the resulting media attention, and to report which negative emotions this had 
triggered among them25. We selected the validated items that measure Negative 
Affect from the 10-item PANAS scale developed by Watson, Clark and Tellegen 
(1988) which has been used in a large body of emotion research, also in the field 
of organization studies (see Cropanzo, Weiss, Hale & Reb, 2003, for a review). 
For translating the emotions in Dutch we made use of a validated translation 
of the PANAS-NA developed by Peeters, Ponds and Vermeeren (1996). Moreover, 
we added 1 item, ‘anger’, because this negative emotion was omnipresent in 
the responses to the Amsterdam child abuse case (see also Appendix B). The 
cronbach’s alpha was .847. 
3.3.3 Analysis 
Due to missing data, the analyses were performed on 177 usable cases. The 
analyses were conducted using structural equation modeling with AMOS 
software version 20 using the maximum likelihood estimation procedure26. 
Structural equation modeling allows for testing several (mediation) variables 
and their interrelationships simultaneously, and provides fit indices for the 
global model. Moreover, it allows the researcher to model error terms (Kline, 
2005; Tomarken & Waller, 2005).
25 We asked them to fill out this question in their role as childcare managers. We learned from the pilot this 
was important for respondents; in their role as parents for instance the experienced emotions could have 
been differently. 
26 Although AMOS can handle missing data using the command model means and intercepts, a lot of descriptive 
fit indices cannot be calculated. 
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FIGURE 3.2 a & b  
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 The salience of the event 
“Not all events are attended equally” (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001: 415) and 
even though disruptive events may be critical triggers of change or industry 
evolution (Hoffman, 1999; Fligstein, 1991), “they must first become the focus 
of public attention to have this effect” (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001: 414). Hoffman 
and Ocasio (2001) have pointed out that the search for accountability is a key 
factor in determining whether an event receives industry level-level attention 
and hence becomes socially salient. They show that when outsiders hold the 
industry accountable for the event or insiders are concerned with the industry 
image, an event is likely to trigger industry attention. Moreover, sustained levels 
of public attention require ‘contestation’ between insiders and outsiders over 
the enactment of the event (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). In order to demonstrate 
the high salience of the Amsterdam event for the whole childcare industry, we 
will give a short narrative of the case and the responses it triggered among 
various constituents. 
On Sunday the 12th of December 2010, the City of Amsterdam held a 
press conference in which the mayor announced a 27-year old man of Latvian 
descent, Robert M., was detained on grounds of suspected child abuse of 30 to 
50 children aged 0 to 4. Robert M. was a childcare worker. That morning, police 
officers had contacted the children’s parents and they were informed - together 
with childcare professionals and various support workers - about the findings 
in the case against Robert M. (Volkskrant, December 13 2010). Robert M., who 
became known in the media as the Monster of Riga, was arrested several days 
earlier. The case gained nationwide coverage after a photo of an unknown 
boy was shown on Dutch television. The images were obtained during a child 
pornography investigation in the United States, where investigators suspected 
the child to be Dutch27. The recognition of the boy by a relative lead to the arrest 
of Robert M. on December 7th 2010. (Algemeen Dagblad, December 13 2010). 
Soon after his arrest he admitted to the abuse of 87 young children and babies 
while working at several day care centers in Amsterdam and as babysitter at 
families’ homes. Some of these children were just a few months old. The abuse 
27 The image showed Robert M. and an unnamed boy with a stuffed toy known as Miffy (Dutch: Nijntje). As 
Miffy is originally a Dutch product, the investigators thought the child might be Dutch and turned to the Dutch 
police. 
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took place between 2007 and his arrest in December 2010. Most of the abuse 
took place at his most recent place of employment (‘t Hofnarretje)28, although 
he worked at three daycare centers during this period. 
The Amsterdam child abuse case dominated the news in the weeks following 
the event and several years later the press still regularly reports about the 
case. In Figure 3.2 a & b we illustrate the media coverage in three major Dutch 
newspapers (also see Appendix A for a timeline of the event). 
Immediately after the first coverage of the abuse, the Dutch press tried to 
make sense of what had happened: How could something this severe happen 
in institutionalized care and who is to blame? A collective sensemaking process 
started, imbued by heavy emotions. Many of the initial responses (especially on 
online fora) focused on Robert M. (calling him all sorts of names and wishing 
him death), his lawyer received death threats, and some citizens blamed the 
sector (Volkskrant, December 14 2010). The editor in chief of a magazine for 
childcare managers responded to some of these initial reactions and stressed 
the urgency of responding to this adverse event:
“Here we go again, childcare negatively reported on in the news. It was 
one of my first thoughts. That might sound a bit selfish, but I thought 
about the sectors’ image. Especially when I hear such conservative 
opinions. It is not the childcare field ‘that has done this’. It’s not ‘the 
society’ that is to blame for ‘sending women to work’. And it did also 
not happen ‘because parents are selfish and do not want to take care 
of their children’… But what happened asks for careful research and 
adequate responses from our field. We need to know what factors 
contributed to the possibility of something like this to happen and we 
need adequate measures to prevent this in the future. Still, all of this 
starts with acknowledging that child abuse can happen everywhere, 
also in childcare” (BBMP, January 2011: 9). 
Newspapers and news broadcasts started their own investigations. Safety 
measures and safety protocols were studied while researching the topic. 
Stricter inspections of childcare organizations and a better quality of childcare 
provision were deemed necessary (Volkskrant, December 20 2010; Volkskrant 
January 4 2011). Also the annual reports of the childcare inspection agency, the 
GGD, were scrutinized. RTL news (a news broadcaster) investigated a series of 
inspection reports regarding the question: “How safe is childcare?”: 
28 Robert M. worked at ‘t Hofnarretje for a substantial longer period than at the other two sites
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“The Amsterdam child abuse case calls into question how childcare 
organizations actually work. RTL news investigated several inspection 
reports and it turned out that often times a lot of things go wrong. 
147 reports (covering three regions) are examined and the results 
are telling. A quarter of the organizations is understaffed, a fifth of the 
organizations do not follow the rules concerning the ‘certificate of moral 
conduct’ (VOG’s). Although these things are notified by inspectors, the 
municipal officers who are responsible for enforcement often do not 
move on to actions in terms of enforcement” (RTL news, December 20 
2010). 
Some newspapers blamed ‘the market forces’ in childcare: The focus on 
efficiency would have encouraged some organizations to have an insufficient 
number of employees in the childcare center, causing a lack of control (e.g., 
NRC, December 15 2010; Volkskrant, December 18 2010). 
Politicians started to ask questions as well. Central in parliamentary 
debates was the question how something like this could be prevented in the 
future. A special independent committee, Committee Gunning, was tasked with 
investigating the case and to advise on preventive measures. The committee 
had to investigate how child abuse could have happened in institutionalized 
childcare and how come it had not been noticed earlier. The responsible 
minister for the childcare field announced an investigation as to whether 
cameras at daycare sites should be part of preventive measures or not. Moreover, 
the government decided to invest an extra 13 million euros to enhance the 
inspection of childcare and its enforcement from 2012 onwards (Volkskrant, 
August 10 2011; BBMP, August 2011). 
In spring 2011 the committee Gunning presented its findings (see also 
Appendix A). They argued that various agencies involved failed to provide serious 
attention to the risk that children might be sexually abused: “no one wants to 
believe something like this can really happen” (p 9). Moreover, due to failed 
communication between agencies in Amsterdam, no complete picture could 
be established around some of the early (but implicit) signs of abuse (Gunning, 
2011: 10). According to their report, several measures are to be taken to increase 
the quality of childcare and prevent disastrous events such as the Amsterdam 
case. They advised, amongst others, to increase the number of employees 
in each group at a daycare center (i.e., ‘4 eyes on the group’), to enhance the 
screening of personnel and increase the proportion of higher educated people 
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working in childcare (Gunning, 2011). The committee moreover stressed the 
implications the case has had for public trust in childcare: 
“Parents want the very best for their children and want to provide their 
children with a safe environment to grow up. In our current society, 
both parents are often employed and must rely on others for the care 
of their young child. Especially between the ages of 0 to 4 years, children 
grow and develop at a rapid rate. This period is tremendously important 
for the rest of the child’s live. For this reason parents and the society 
at large demand for childcare provision of the best possible quality. 
Especially for this reason everyone is so deeply shocked as it turned 
out that our trust in the safety of these childcare facilities is violated, like 
it did in the Amsterdam child abuse case” (Gunning, 2011:9). 
For childcare organizations parents’ trust constitutes a key resource. Part of 
this is related to the fact that the quality of the service is difficult for parents to 
evaluate (Roberts, 2011). The Amsterdam child abuse case damaged this trust 
and many parents became more concerned about the safety of their children 
in childcare: 
“Since the Amsterdam child abuse case, 52% percent of the parents 
report to be more worried about the safety of their children in 
childcare. 12% approaches their daycare center differently and 27% 
avoids childcare centers that employ men on the floor. Parents are 
also extra cautious in choosing a babysitter. According to a director 
of a childcare organization: “the Robert M. case caused a lot of harm. 
The organizational climate for men working in childcare is completely 
different than it used to be. Many of them want to quit their jobs in 
childcare. That is a great loss, not only for the sector but also for the 
children” (RTL news, May 21 2012). 
As becomes clear from the citation above, the event severely affected male 
professionals working in childcare. According to an investigation by the NOS 
(a news broadcast program) and BOiNK (organization for parents in childcare) 
in the beginning of 2012 dozens of men working in childcare left their job and 
some have been fired as a result of the changed public opinion towards men 
in the field. Some male professionals told that since ‘Amsterdam’ they receive 
negative responses from parents, feeling suspicion concerning their motives to 
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work in childcare (NOS, February 1 2012). Many childcare organizations wanted 
to counter this change in attitudes and were very supportive towards the small 
number of male professionals working in the sector. A website for professionals 
in childcare started a support action to hearten men working in childcare. 
“Supporting men working in childcare has become even more important… 
now that men are treated as potential sex offenders” (Professor on childcare in 
BBMP, March 2011). All good intentions included, many male professionals did 
not feel welcome to their jobs and sector anymore (Kinderopvang, August 2012). 
What happened in Amsterdam and the consequences it had for the 
childcare sector, were extensively discussed among childcare managers 
and in professional magazines. “Childcare has lost its innocence” as one 
director remarked (Management Kinderopvang, January 2011: 27). Childcare 
organizations were wondering what they were to do about it. Different measures 
and organizational responses were discussed to decrease the likelihood a 
situation like Amsterdam could happen. However, how to respond to the 
‘new’ situation after the Amsterdam case was by no means straightforward as 
various demands seemed to be contradictory. For instance, the issue of camera 
surveillance triggered a strong debate. Wouldn’t cameras be a sign of mistrust 
in employees and what about their privacy? Even if cameras would be installed 
who would monitor the tapes? 
“79 percent of the childcare professionals is against camera 
surveillance. This is one of the conclusions of a large scale survey 
among 999 childcare professionals conducted by FNV (a labor union) 
and RTL news. 32 percent argues cameras will damage children’s 
privacy, 24 percent is worried about their own privacy and 29 percent 
argue camera surveillance does not constitute an adequate preventive 
measure. “it might create a false sense of safety” according to the FNV 
spokesmen. It is more effective to invest in an open organizational 
climate and enough employees on the groups” (BBMP, August 2011). 
In general, keeping men out of the sector was not considered to be an appropriate 
response. But how to deal with parents who no longer wanted male employees 
taking care of their children? Most measures discussed in magazines focused 
upon creating an open culture where professional norms and taboos (such as 
talking about sexuality) could and would be discussed and where employees 
would hold each other accountable for their behavior. Other responses focused 
on proper, honest and frequent communication with parents, measures for better 
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screening of personnel and better governance build into working methods (e.g., 
BBMP, January 2011; BBMP, October 2011; Management Kinderopvang, February 
2011; Management Kinderopvang, March 2011; Management Kinderopvang, 
June 2011). The design of the childcare center was also discussed: could rooms 
be redesigned in such a way that greater monitoring would be possible (for 
instance more windows in the rooms) and could this be reconciled with other 
building requirements (such as fire regulation for instance)? In response to 
the Report Gunning, advising ‘4 eyes in each room of the childcare center’, an 
employers’ association of childcare organizations (the MO-Groep Kinderopvang) 
- although endorsing most of the advices - questioned the cost-side of this 
measure. Especially since the childcare field was also facing tremendous 
cutbacks in government subsidies (BBMP, April 2011). 
As becomes clear, the Amsterdam case directly affected the core of 
childcare services, namely children’s safety. This disruptive event generated 
wide public attention and various constituents scrutinized the childcare field 
and discussed the need for new safety measures or practices. In two dilemmas 
(about cameras and ‘4 eyes’ in the group) posted on a forum of a leading 
professional organization in the field (see method section), childcare managers 
shared their thoughts and feelings concerning the ‘presumed’ need for new 
safety procedures and practices. For illustration purposes we provide some of 
these responses in Table 3.1. 
Even though the event was highly salient for the overall childcare field (cf 
Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001) and legitimacy losses were not restricted to the daycare 
center where the crisis initially happened, the salience of an event for individual 
decision makers may still largely vary and trigger different organizational 
responses in turn. Below we will discuss our survey results to shed light on the 
underlying micro-variables that drove variety in organizational responsiveness. 
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TABLE 3.1 Responses of childcare managers
Reactions
“Cameras are certainly not the solution. It creates a wrong sense of safety. Your employees cannot perform 
their jobs in freedom anymore. ..and a person with wrong intentions will seek a way to circumvent those 
cameras anyhow. What you can do is make sure you’re at the groups. Management by walking around…..that 
is the best camera one can have” (director of childcare organization).
“Make sure that mutual monitoring becomes part of daily organizational routines. Not out of suspicion or 
distrust but as a quality guarantee for parents and for the safety of children. It remains human labor. Make 
sure employees and parents know each other and dare to ask difficult questions” (director of childcare 
organization).
“Asking for safety guarantees is ridiculous. We should try to remain realistic here. One should not create a 
prison. Make sure you listen very carefully to what children and parents have to say and be critical towards to 
the behavior of other employees” (director of childcare organization).
“Please follow your own organizational vision and do not be distracted by all the things that happen in the 
environment. Just talk with your clients and listen what they want. But every solution also has its opponents” 
(director of childcare organization).
“Don’t act out of fear. Cameras create a sense of distrust. Try to create an open culture instead and make sure 
employees can approach you with all the issues they face. Discuss professional norms with each other and try 
to guarantee that employees will confront each other upon their behavior” (director of childcare organization). 
“Provide careful attention to the screening of personnel. Make sure to check references from previous 
employers…Ask the right questions during job interviews and even if you have the slightest sense of doubt do 
not hire this person” (director of childcare organization).
“This is typically a situation that only happens in big cities. We are situated in a rural area and it probably 
sounds strange in an time where we are all focused upon preventing risks, but at our daycare organizations 
the door is always open and we do not have all these strict inspections going on. That all distracts time and 
effort for the core of our service: which is attention for children” (director of childcare organization). 
“Design buildings in such a way that these are transparent, that there are open spaces with a lot of glass. Make 
sure everyone can look inside a room. This creates social control. Discuss safety issues during weekly work 
meetings” (director of childcare organization).
“We would like to be overstaffed to make sure there are enough employees in each group. But during some 
hours this is just impossible to achieve from a cost perspective” (director of childcare organization).
“Children’s safety should be priority number one. We combine groups at the beginning of the day and in 
the late afternoon to ensure there are always enough employees with the children. Nothing goes too far if it 
concerns children who are trusted to us” (director of childcare organization).
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3.4.2 Survey results 
The descriptive statistics, correlations and internal reliabilities of the scales are 
presented in Table 3.2. Using structural equation modeling, we started from 
the model in Figure 3.1 (with both direct and indirect effects). We allowed our 
mediating variables to be related as well29. In order to get a more parsimonious 
model we constrained the insignificant parameters to zero one by one. This 
resulted in our final model including only the significant effects. This model is 
shown in Figure 3.3. The model yields a good model fit. The overall chi-square 
value (χ2 = 7.871, df = 7, p =.344, CMIN/df = 1.124) shows that the model is not 
significantly different from the data and according to the Tucker-Lewis index 
value (TLI = .99), it cannot be significantly improved. The Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA = .027) does not indicate a bad model fit as it 
is lower than .06 (Bollen & Jong, 1993). The trimmed model is also preferred 
on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC = 49.87 vs 56.00). We 
can, therefore, conclude that the data is adequately explained by our model 
presented in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 depicts all the paths with significant path coefficients. Lending 
support to Hypothesis 1, this figure shows significant direct effects of the level 
of field identification on the frequency of organizational responses following 
field-wide legitimacy threatening events. Field identification turned out to be 
positively and significantly related to control measures (b = .13, p ≤ .05) and 
to responses that focus on organizational culture (for instance the creation of 
open culture) (b = .18, p ≤ .01). 
Additionally, field identification also indirectly impacted upon organizational 
responsiveness following a disruptive event. In Hypothesis 2 we predicted that 
decision makers’ field identification, would positively impact upon perceived 
legitimacy losses, which, in turn, increase the likelihood of organizational 
responsiveness. The effects of field identification on legitimacy loss perceptions 
are rather small. Field identification was directly related to legitimacy loss 
perceptions of the sector (b = .15, p ≤ .10), which in turn strongly impacted the 
legitimacy loss perceptions of the organization (b = .53, p ≤ .01). Lending support 
to hypothesis two, these higher perceived legitimacy losses did subsequently 
increase organizational responsiveness. Especially the perceived legitimacy 
29 We are not theoretically interested in the specific relationship between cognition and emotion in this 
paper. Yet, emotion and cognition are often found to be related and hence we allowed for a relationship 
between negative affect and perceived legitimacy losses. Because a negative emotional frame makes negative 
cues especially salient (George & Jones, 2001), we allowed negative affect to be a predictor in the equations 
for both types of perceived legitimacy losses (i.e., the field and the organization). Moreover, since legitimacy 
losses can spill over (Jonsson et al., 2009), we included perceived legitimacy losses of the field as a predictor in 
the equation for the perceived legitimacy loss of the organization.
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loss at the organization-level was positive and strongly related to each of the 
response categories30. Hence, decision makers that perceived the legitimacy 
of their own organization has been threatened due to the event were inclined 
to respond more elaborately compared to managers who faced less severe 
legitimacy losses for their organization. See also Figure 3.3.
TABLE 3.2 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations a
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. control 1.41 2.17 (.821)
2. communication 2.01 1.71 .574** (.709)
3. culture 1.6 2.17 .699** .575** (.902)
4.field identification 3.5 .59 .187* .051 .194** (.784)
5. negative affect 2.12 .72 .280** .198** .201** .383** (.847)
6.perceived legitimacy 
loss sector 3.46 .52 .255** .299** .244** .235** .284** (.861)
7.perceived legitimacy 
loss organization 2.58 .65 .362** .327** .252** .085 .236** .532** (.865)
a n = 177 * p <.05 ** p < .01 Internal reliabilities (Cronbachs Alpha) appear in parentheses on the diagonal
30 Perceived legitimacy loss of the organization was significantly related to control (b = .33, p ≤ .01), culture (b 
= .24, p ≤ .01) and communication (b = .26, p ≤ .01). Perceived field-level legitimacy loss influenced responses 
related to communication (b = .13, , p ≤ .10)
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FIGURE 3.3 Structural equation modeling results for the adjusted model a
a Standardized path coefficients are provided. * p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤.01
In Hypothesis 3 we predicted that negative emotions would mediate the positive 
effects of field identification upon organizational responsiveness. As is evident 
from Figure 3.3, we did not find (full) support for this hypothesis. Although field 
identification strongly influenced decision makers’ negative emotions after a 
field-wide legitimacy threatening event (b = .38, p ≤ .01) negative emotions did 
not (except for the very small effect on control), at least not directly, increase 
organizational responsiveness (James, Mulaik & Brett, 2006). Mainly via its effect 
on perceived legitimacy losses, did emotions influence organizational actions 
as can be seen in Figure 3.3. 
3.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
Exogenous shocks are often mentioned as sites that potentially block the 
reproduction of taken-for-granted institutional patterns and thus induce 
change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Hoffman, 1999). In this paper we took a closer 
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a childcare organization in The Netherlands. Following the widespread criticism 
and intense scrutiny the scandal provoked, this event induced a field-wide 
threat to the legitimacy of organizations throughout the sector. This paper’s 
theoretical aim was to understand how individual organizations respond 
to such events and, more specifically to explain variance in these responses. 
Towards this end, we identified several micro-level factors, namely decision 
makers’ field identification, legitimacy loss perceptions and negative affect that 
influence the salience of events for individual decision makers and shape the 
extent to which they will mobilize organizational responses.
In today’s society, constituents largely hold organizations accountable for 
their behaviors and the effects of business operations on human health, well-
being and the environment (Galvin, Ventresca & Hudson, 2005; Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; Greve et al., 2010). Organizations that visibly deviate from social norms 
and expectations will likely be penalized. But what happens if an organization 
suffers from an event it was not directly involved in? Recently, several research 
insights have pointed to the risks associated with constituents’ generalization 
after a single act of organizational deviance (Yu et al., 2008; Barnett & King, 2008; 
Jonsson et al., 2009). As a result, negative effects from a crisis that initially strikes 
only one organization, can affect others in the industry that are categorized as 
‘similar’. As Jonsson et al. (2009) have pointed out, network ties to the culpable 
organization are not even necessary and generalization can happen even on 
very weak grounds, making organizations extremely vulnerable to accidents 
that happen elsewhere in the field. 
According to institutional theory, organizational behavior is influenced by 
norms and values that define what is appropriate or expected in a given social 
situation and organizational compliance is held in place by the cost of losing 
legitimacy (Scott, 2008). Thus organizations will, at least in appearance, adhere 
to social expectations and moral obligations stemming from their institutional 
environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, institutional theory provides 
less insights on how other organizations will respond when legitimacy is lost 
without them deserving it (Jonsson et al., 2009: 221; Desai, 2011). Such situations, 
however, create a very complex situation for organizations, for several reasons: 
(i) deviance of other organizations is largely beyond an organization’s span 
of control (ii) the extent to which legitimacy losses will spill-over is quite 
unpredictable and (iii) organizations may not be able to control the institutional 
outcomes of their responses: it could be that attempts to influence constituents 
and defend existing practices may, unintentionally, backfire when such efforts 
are seen as superficial or manipulative (Desai, 2011). In those cases organizations 
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may have been better off by avoiding attention (Hudson, 2008; Yu et al., 2008). 
Given all these uncertainties responding to field-wide disruptive events is a 
complex task in very complex, and ambiguous, context (Meyer, 1982). 
In contrast to studies which point to organizational-level, field-level, or event-
related factors in the spill-over process of organizational misconduct (Yu et al., 
2008; Barnett & King, 2008; Jonsson et al., 2009; Desai, 2011), we have explored 
the role of several micro-level antecedents that may drive organizational 
responses after field-wide legitimacy threatening events. Our findings show how 
proximate cues affect how decision makers make sense of big events in their 
field: the extent to which an issue comes close to individual identity, shapes 
emotions, and affects individual cognition. Our study complements the findings 
of Jonsson et al. (2009) in providing a fuller and more nuanced understanding 
of the impact and mechanisms surrounding field-wide disruptions caused by 
a single act of deviance. Whereas Jonsson et al. (2009) focussed on external 
constituents and showed how they re-evaluate a collective of organizations 
following a single act of deviance, our results point to the mediating role of 
decision makers who subsequently experience and respond to a disruptive 
event and the losses it triggers. Our results show that even though the field as 
whole may be heavily scrutinized after an event, decision makers experience 
such events rather differently on both emotional (negative affect) and cognitive 
dimensions (legitimacy loss perceptions). Some decision makers seem to 
distance or buffer themselves from the event, whereas others are more deeply 
affected by the event. Our findings point out that decision makers’ perceptions 
of the extent to which their own organization had lost legitimacy, was especially 
consequential for organizational responses. Thereby our findings underscore 
recent insights in institutional theory that point out how actors’ perceptions and 
interpretations may induce heterogeneity in responses to a similar institutional 
pressure or event (cf George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). 
Our results may also have implications for studying institutional change 
more broadly. External shocks, jolts or disruptive events are often thought of 
as important triggers of institutional change or industry evolution as they can 
destabilize established practices and trigger issue redefinition (Meyer, 1982; 
Hoffman 1999; Fligstein, 1991; Greenwood et al. 2002; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). 
Although such disruptions or shocks are often believed to be necessary for 
actors to assemble the resources and rationales and (collectively) question 
institutional patterns (Barley & Tolbert, 1997), our study underscores that 
shocks by itself may not be sufficient to trigger change among organizations 
in a field. Our results point out that whether and how field-wide legitimacy 
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threatening events raise actors’ reflexivity and create the possibilities for 
institutional change is partially answered at the micro-level of analysis where 
decision makers’ interpretations and experiences play an important mediating 
role in shaping organizational responses. By the inclusion of micro-level factors 
a more full-fledged understanding is provided of how organizations manage 
the complex institutional situation that arises when disruptions destabilize 
existing patterns of activity within fields. 
The role of such micro-level factors may be particularly influential as long as 
there is field-wide uncertainty regarding appropriate organizational responses 
to the event. As earlier research has pointed out, opportunities for agency and 
a variety of responses may be particularly high as long as clear guidelines for 
organizational behavior are missing (Goodrick & Salanick, 1996; Oliver, 1991) 
or organizations are confronted with mixed or opposing demands concerning 
the appropriate way to act (Seo & Creed, 2002; Pache & Santos, 2010). In our 
research context, the event spurred a field-wide debate which indicated both 
the circumstances that lead to the event and what measures that were to be 
taken were not straightforward. Moreover, regulatory changes were not yet 
implemented at our time of measurement and strong normative and cognitive 
pressures prevailed (cf Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). Recently, institutional scholars 
have begun to study the issue of institutional complexity, where organizations 
are confronted with incompatible institutional demands stemming for their 
environment (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). Critical field-
level events, especially when regularly measures to resolve complexity are not 
(yet) implemented, may constituent a particularly valuable research site for 
future research on institutional complexity, due to the complex and ambiguous 
institutional pressures they can set in motion. 
Finally, we point to some interesting issues for further research. First of all, 
to fully understand the responses of constituents to critical events, and their 
resulting impacts on organizations or fields, it may be critical to investigate 
whether critical events constitute outliers or tipping points in industry’s 
evolution. Similarly, how far categorical delegitimation will spread and how 
long such effects will endure are still largely unexplored issues (Greve et al., 
2010: 89; Jonsson et al., 2009). 
Secondly, the type of industry may affect the degree to which legitimacy 
losses may spill over to other organizations after incidents happen. In fields 
like health care, education and also childcare, quality is difficult to measure, 
creating information asymmetries between providers and users. Moreover, the 
vulnerability of users is high. This makes trust central to the provision of such 
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services (Roberts, 2011: 695). Organizations operating in these kinds of contexts 
may be especially vulnerable to what has been referred to as the ‘tragedy of 
commons’, in particularly a ‘reputation commons’, “that stems from the 
difficulty that stakeholders face in distinguishing the relative performance of 
individual firms” (Barnett & King, 2008: 1164; King, Lenox & Barnett, 2002). More 
and especially comparable research is needed to fully understand the complex 
relationship between single acts of deviance and field-level and organizational-
level consequences. Furthermore, the type of research site possibly constitutes 
a boundary condition for studying the link between emotions and institutions. 
Some fields feature strong emotions due to the nature of the work which is 
carried out (cf Zilber, 2002). Childcare is a good example of this. 
Third, even though our findings point to a relationship between micro-level 
antecedents and organizational actions after a field-wide legitimacy threatening 
event, unfortunately our findings could not reveal the intra-organizational 
processes which are triggered by field-wide legitimacy threatening events 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Pache & Santos, 2010). For instance, we did not 
trace how the meaning of the event or the proposed practices were negotiated 
between management, employees and parents for instance. Although micro-
level factors may provide a logic for action, by our sole focus on the key-
decision maker we did not address how meanings arise in interaction (Scott, 
2001). Related to our research context, important insights might be gained by 
showing how the interaction processes with parents, childcare employees or 
peer organizations influenced the sense making processes of decision makers 
after the field-wide disruptive event. For instance, some childcare professionals 
opposed quite heavily to the idea of having cameras installed in the groups 
because this would breach their privacy. How such (competing) interests 
shape issue interpretation (in processes of negotiations) and organizational 
responsiveness to an event provides a rich and more elaborate picture of the 
micro-level dynamics inside the organization (Scott, 2001; Zietsma & Lawrence, 
2010). 
Another limitation of our research approach is that we used a cross-
sectional survey design and therefore could not trace micro antecedents 
and organizational responses over time. Although we used several sources 
for designing our measure for the dependent variable (organizational 
responsiveness) and capturing the field-level debate, our results could 
potentially suffer from a common-method problem as all the variables were 
measured using one survey. 
In sum this paper further problematized the conditions for which field-
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wide disruptive events can trigger substantive changes among organizations 
in the field. By focussing on the manner in which decision makers have 
experienced the event and the complex institutional pressures it elicited, we 
responded to recent calls for institutional researchers to attend to the ways in 
which individuals experience institutions or institutional events (Barley, 2008; 
Suddaby, 2010). 
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Police arrests Robert M. who is accused of sexually abusing very young children 
while working in childcare and babysitting. Several days later Richard O – Robert 
M’s husband – is also arrested for possessing child pornography and being M.’s 
accomplice. 
Robert M. worked at several daycare organizations in Amsterdam. His latest place 
of employment is “Het Hofnarretje” in Amsterdam. 
December 12, 
2010
Parents and childcare workers are informed about the arrest of Robert M. and a 
press conference follows. Robert M. is believed to have abused between 30 and 
50 children (Volkskrant, December 12). 
December 13, 
2010
It turns out two mothers already pressed charges against Robert M. in 2008 
because they suspected something was not right. Back then, the policy concluded 
that evidence fell short. One of the mothers told the a local news broadcast they 
were not taken seriously by the director nor by the police (NOS, December 13). 
December 14, 
2010
The director of “Het Hofnarretje” resigned after it emerged that he held ‘sleep 
parties’ for children who were leaving the crèche. These sleep parties will be part 
of the police investigation, but the director himself is not a suspect in the case, 
according to the police (NOS, December 14). 
The Amsterdam child abuse case caused heavy emotional reactions among 
citizens. Citizens and the media call him the Monster of Riga and ‘Absolute Evil’ 
(Volkskrant, December 14). 
December 16, 
2010
The Dutch Parliament is shocked by the news of Robert M.’s earlier conviction 
in German for the possession of child pornography. If the Dutch authorities had 
known about this conviction, he never would have been issued a 'certificate of 
moral conduct' (VOG) which is compulsory for child care workers. EU countries 
are unable to access each other's criminal records.
December 19, 
2010
The number of victims has grown. Probably 64 children are directly involved in the 
abuse by Robert M. according to the city of Amsterdam (Parool, December 19).
December 21, 
2010
There is a large gathering of over 500 police officers in Amsterdam to talk about 
the large scale child abuse case. The case has a huge impact on the police officers 
in Amsterdam. They are heavily impacted by watching the videotapes at Robert M’s 
computer. Informing parents about the abuse caused heavy emotional reactions 





The major of Amsterdam has asked a special independent committee “Commissie 
Gunning’ to investigate how the child abuse in the childcare organizations in 
Amsterdam could have happened. Moreover the commission is asked to given 
an advise on how the physical and emotional safety of children in childcare sector 
can be ensured. 
December 24, 
2010
Well-known Dutch lawyers Anker & Anker will defend Robert M. 
December 
2010
The childcare sector tries to allay parents’ concerns. Parents are very worried. 
According to The Childcare Association, organizations in the sector are sending 
parents letters or messages via their website to reassure them that what 
happened in Amsterdam should not be generalized to the whole childcare sector 
(Volkskrant, December 15).
March 17, 2011 The actual prosecution starts: Robert M. is official charged for the sexual abuse 
of very young children and the production, possession and distribution of child 
pornography. He has admitted to sexually abusing 83 children, but is charged 
with the abuse of 67 children. The lawyer of the parents (Richard Kover) reveals 
that several parents do not want to press charges against Robert M. for fear that 
names mentioned in court may leak out to the media
March 2011 Now that formal charges are set, even more scandalous details are emerging and 
again The Netherlands is deeply shocked. Robert M is now suspected of actually 
raping an undisclosed number of children between 2007 and 2010 (Volkskrant, 
March 11). 
Most of his victims were between 0 and 2 years old. “Robert M. chose babies who 
weren’t yet able to speak” (Algemeen Dagblad, March 18)
April 15, 2011 The Committee Gunning that investigated the Amsterdam child abuse case 
presents its findings. Various organizations involved had failed to communicate 
with one another about some of the signs of abuse. Indications of abuse had been 
looked at by separate organizations but were never discussed in joint meetings 
involving the police, local health authorities, and the municipality. As a result not 
enough attention was paid to the risk that children might be sexually abused. The 
quality of the childcare sector in general is argued to be sub-par. The committee 
renders some advises to lower safety risks for children in childcare. 
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Date Main Events
August 2011 The lawyers of Robert M. are under attack. They receive many threats and hate 
mail. In less than a month eight rocks have been thrown at their office windows. 
Dutch citizens are furious about the fact that the lawyers defend Robert M. Lawyer 
Wim Anker tells “We recently hired a security firm….but we’re not going to let this 
change how we work (Volkskrant, August 26).
November 25, 
2011
Based on a psychiatric report of the Pieter Baan Center Robert M is mentally 
ill and long term involuntary commitment seems necessary. The report was 
solely based on observations of Robert M’s behavior in prison as he refused to 
cooperate with the psychiatric evaluations. The Center beliefs the chances he will 
repeat his offends in the future are great (Volkskrant, November 25)
November 22, 
2011
The prosecutors (Openbaar Ministerie in Dutch) decided not to press charges 
against Albert Drent (director of Hofnarretje where Robert M. abused dozens of 
children), because it is believed he did not knowabout the abuse which was going 
on in this childcare organization. The prosecutors did say he appeared to have 
had insufficient operational control over the business at the time when the abuse 
was taking place. 
December 16, 
2011
The judge grants the victim’s parents the right to speak in court. According to Dutch 
law only victims themselves are entitled to make a statement in court. However, 
this is not possible where such young children are involved. A law is in preparation 
that will extend the right of victims to be heard in court. In anticipation of this law 
the judge already grants parents right of speech. 
March 12, 2012 The official trial against Robert M and Richard O starts. The lawyers of Robert 
M. ask for other judges, arguing the judges are not objective and exceeded 
their authority. The lawyers also attempt to prevent the parents from speaking. 
However, their attempts are unsuccessful. 
April 5, 2012 Prosecutors have demanded a 20 year prison sentence and compulsory mental 
treatment for Robert M. and 12 year prison for Richard O. According to Maaike 
Bienfait (prosecution lawyer) “the scale, severity and methods that Robert M used 
were unheard of”. The prosecution said to believe Robert M. has likely abused 
more than the 87 cases he confessed. That became clear during his interrogation, 
where Robert M told the investigators “they had their hands on some of the books 
but not all of them”. So far, no hard evidence for more cases had emerged (De 
Volkskrant, April 5).
According to the prosecution, his youngest victim was only 19 days old at the time 
the acts were committed (Algemeen Dagblad, April 19).
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APPENDIX B: Survey items 
Field identification 
For items 2-8 we used a 5-point Likert scale ranging from totally agree to totally 
disagree 
1. To what extent do you identify with the childcare sector? Imagine one of 
the circles at the left represents your self-definition or identity and the circle 
at the right represents the childcare sector. Please indicate which case (A, B, C, 
D, E) best describes the level of overlap between your self-definition and the 
childcare sector
Date Main Events
April 2012 The police investigations into the network of child pornography spread by Robert 
M. resulted in many arrests worldwide. The police officers read chat conversations 
of Robert M. where he told other pedophiles that he worked in childcare with one 
goal: abusing children
April 2, 2012 Attorney Richard Korver asked the court for damage payments for the families 
involved in the case. According to Korver the families have suffered well over a 
million euros in immaterial damages as a result of the abuse. 
May 21, 2012 Robert M (accused of abusing 67 children as well as possession, production and 
distribution of child pornography) is found guilty and is sentenced to 18 years 
in prison, followed by involuntary commitment (detention of high-risk psychiatric 
patients) (NOS, May 21). 
A B C D E
    
  
2. Childcare constitutes a major part of who I am 
3. When someone criticizes the childcare sector it feels like a personal insult 
4. I am very interested in what people think about the childcare sector 
5. When I talk about childcare, I often say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’
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6. Childcare’s successes are my successes 
7. When someone praises the childcare sector, it feels like a personal compliment 
8. If the childcare sector is criticized in the media, I would feel embarrassed 
Negative Affect 
Respondents were asked to use the following scale to report their answers 1 













Perceived Legitimacy losses (of the sector and the organization) 
Respondents were asked to provide their opinion about each of the following 
statements using a 5- point Likert scale ranging from totally agree to totally 
disagree. Respondents were asked to judge each statement twice; they judged 
whether the statement was true for the childcare sector and whether the 
statement was true for their own organization. 
Since the Amsterdam child abuse case…..
1. parents’ views on children’s safety has come under increased pressure 
2. employees doubt whether they still can ensure children’s safety 
3. the appreciation for childcare is diminished 
4. employees’ professional pride has been damaged 
5. the importance of professionalism has increased 
6. the public opinion on children’s safety in childcare has come under 
increased pressure 
7. people question whether safety procedures and guidelines are followed 
8. working in childcare has become less attractive 
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9. we cannot take our working methods for granted anymore
10. we have to be more committed in proving children are in good hands 
11. the turnover among employees working in childcare is likely to increase 
12. parent’s trust in childcare provision has come under increased pressure 
Strategic Responses 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they took each of the following 
actions as result of the Amsterdam child abuse case. They could answer 
with either yes or no. In between brackets we report the category of strategic 
responses the item belongs to
1. New personnel is screened more stricter than before [control] 
2. Men are no longer hired 
3. Employees are asked to hand over a certificate of moral conduct more 
often[control] 
4. Informing parents about safety and safety-limits [communication]
5. Telling parents 100% safety guarantees are impossible to give 
[communication]
6. Answering parents’ questions related to the Amsterdam child abuse case 
[communication]
7. Reassuring parents (via e-mail/letters or messages on websites) 
[communication]
8. Talking to the local or national media [communication] 
9. Mutual control will be part of daily organizational routines [control] 
10. Ensure that employees will hold each other accountable for their 
(inappropriate) behavior [culture]
11. Encourage employees to report strange or suspicious behavior [culture] 
12. Openly speak and discuss about professional norms [culture]
13.  Give explicit attention to discussing taboos or issues we would normally 
not talk about [culture]
14. From now on, personnel will never be alone in a group [control] 
15. Procedures prescribe that employees are not a single moment alone with 
a child [control] 
16.  Groups are joined early morning and late afternoon in order to ensure 
enough personnel in each group 31 [control] 
17. Giving parents the possibility to walk in whenever they want to [control] 
18. Employees are monitored more extensively than before [control] 
31 Early in the morning and late in the afternoon a lot of childcare organization face a low occupancy rate. To 
make sure enough personnel will be in the groups. Groups with only a few children can be joined. 
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19. The supervisor or manager of the location will be present on the floor more 
often [control] 
20. Having cameras installed in each room of the daycare center 
21. Redesign playrooms as open-space, free-sight areas as much as possible 
(for instance by having windows in doors or making extra windows in 
between rooms) [control] 
22.  Create an open culture where employees are not afraid to confront each 
other [culture]
23. Lobby with the government that 100% safety guarantees are impossible to 
give [communication]
24. Forbid that employees bring their own cameras to work [control] 
25. Addressing safety issues during work meetings [culture] 

a Previous versions of this paper were presented at: the 25th EGOS Colloquium in July 2009 (Barcelona), a 
research colloquium at the University of Alberta (School of Business) in April 2010, and at the CBMO spring- 
conference in June 2010 at Tilburg University (Tias Nimbas Business School). 
A B S T R A C T
and ideational aspects are often 
intermingled. In this paper we will 
show how a new coercive pressure 
in the Dutch childcare field impacted 
simultaneously on both material as 
well ideational aspects of childcare 
organizations. We will show how 
childcare decision makers compared 
the material and ideational aspects 
of the new requirements with their 
existing material and ideational 
situation. The perceived degree of 
(mis)alignment subsequently shaped 
their evaluation of the consequences 
of (non)conformity and the breadth 
of responses available to them. 
Institutional theorists have predomi-
nantly focused upon the symbolic 
and cognitive side of institutions. 
Yet, material objects such as 
buildings, fashion, technologies, or 
artifacts, can also play an important 
role in transferring institutions 
or in defining the repertoire of 
responses available to actors when 
they are confronted with new 
institutional requirements. However, 
this role of materiality is largely 
overlooked in institutional studies. 
Material aspects of organizing can 
nevertheless critically shape actors’ 
responses to institutional pressures, 
not in the least because material 
Children without bruised knees: 






New institutional pressures like changing normative beliefs or newly enforced 
rules can have far reaching consequences for both the material and ideational 
make up of organizations (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio & 
Lounsbury, 2012). For instance, the design and construction of buildings (or 
technologies) can be mandated by regulative authorities, often in the interest of 
safety (Scott, 2008: 82). Consequently, when safety prescriptions change and a 
building is no longer qualified as ‘safe’, it needs to be redesigned or reconstructed. 
However, next to being actively shaped by institutional pressures, these same 
material objects also carry institutions as they have embodied existing ideas 
and values over time (Barley 1986; Orlikowski 2000; Scott, 2008). Therefore ‘a 
building’ also represents a particular set of choices made by its designers and 
users (Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). Institutional pressures therefore often touch 
upon these material and ideational aspects of organizations simultaneously 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). 
Whereas institutional scholars have extensively investigated the ideational 
or symbolic aspects and implications of institutional pressures (e.g., Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), far less attention has been paid to 
the ‘material side’ in explaining organizational responses to the institutional 
environment (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012). Although material aspects have been 
a central object of study among engineers and information technologists, 
within the broader field of organization studies it has received comparatively 
little research attention (Orlikowski, 2005; 2006; Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). 
This is surprising, particularly given: (i) the pervasive empirical presence of 
materiality in everyday organizational practice (Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak, 
Dougherty & Faraj, 2007; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008) and (ii) because ideational 
aspects often exist in relation to a material world, and variables of a material 
nature are institutionally shaped (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999; Scott, 2008). 
Ironically, even the majority of studies on ‘technology and organizing’ has 
largely downplayed the role of technology itself in favor of social and cultural 
explanations (Leonardi & Barely, 2010: 32)
In this paper we argue that whenever decision makers are confronted with 
a new institutional pressure, they likely need to consider and assess both its 
material and ideational implications. Because both aspects could impact upon 
organizations in potentially different ways, this may trigger a variety of response 
strategies (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). In order to better understand the 
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variety of organizational responses to the same institutional mandate, more 
attention needs to be paid to both material and ideational aspects (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991; Law & Mol, 1995; Orlikowski & Barley, 2001; Zilber, 2006; Orlikowski, 
2006; 2007). Using the Dutch childcare sector as our research context we will 
explore these ideas. 
New institutional requirements from the government concerning children’s 
safety, health and well-being, triggered a variety of strategic responses among 
childcare organizations in the Netherlands. In order to understand why these 
organizations responded differently to a (seemingly) similar pressure, we focus 
upon the perception and interpretation of new requirements by key decision 
makers (cf. George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin & Barden, 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 
2009). In this paper, we show how childcare managers compared the material 
and ideational aspects of the new requirements with their existing material 
and ideational situation. The perceived degree of (mis)alignment subsequently 
shaped their evaluation of the consequences of (non)conformity and the 
breadth of responses available to them. 
The research question we raise in this paper is formulated as follows: In 
what way does the configuration between material and ideational aspects of 
institutional pressures shape the nature of actors’ strategic responses? Our 
objective is to understand why responses to the same pressure might differ. 
In doing so we focus on the manner in which institutional pressures ‘work 
through’ and affect the specific local (material as well as ideational) situation of 
organizations (Powell & Colyvas, 2008); In pursuing this research aim we want 
to make two contributions. 
First, we show how material and ideational aspects are interrelated. In 
general institutional scholars have privileged the symbolic over the material 
in studying institutional processes or effects and it remains unclear how the 
specific interrelationship between both aspects shapes organizational responses 
to their institutional environment (Leonardi & Barely, 2010). By investigating 
both aspects and their interrelationship simultaneously, we urge that even a 
single institutional pressure may not be monolithic, potentially complicating 
responses to new institutional requirements. We build on Friedland and Alford’s 
(1991) notion that talking about institutions requires looking at the ideational 
and material world simultaneously. We show that once established, both 
material aspects (such as playgrounds, toys, and buildings in our particular 
context) and ideational aspects (such as ideas and norms about how children 
learn and play or what constitutes ‘good’ childcare) act to filter or translate 
institutional pressures that flow from the governmental level. To our knowledge, 
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not much institutional research has looked into this specific interrelationship 
yet (for a valuable exception see Lepoutre & Valente, 2012). 
Second, we will show how different configurations of the material/ideational 
interrelation shape organizational responses in potentially different ways. 
Focusing on this interrelationship gives us better insight into the underlying 
processes and dynamics by which organizations may ultimately decide how 
to respond to institutional pressures and why responses to a similar pressure 
may differ (Oliver, 1991). As such, we build on recent calls for more attention to 
the micro motives and micro cognitions that shape actors’ responses to macro 
institutional pressures (e.g., Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Barley, 2008; Kennedy & 
Fiss, 2009), and pay explicit attention to the underlying conditions under which 
different response strategies are likely to be mobilized (Pache & Santos, 2010: 
456).
This chapter is structured as follows. First, we present our theoretical 
framework. Next, we describe the research context in which we present the 
institutional pressure of interest. Subsequently, we describe our method and 
present our findings. We conclude with the implications for research and 
practice.
4.2 Theoretical Background 
4.2.1 Material and ideational worlds 
Past research on organization studies has generated valuable insights into our 
knowledge of organizations from a cultural or institutional perspective. Yet, 
these insights are largely limited to the extent that they have “traditionally 
overlooked the ways in which organizing is bound up with material forms 
and spaces though which humans act and interact” (Orlikowski, 2007: 1436). 
Although some organizational scholars have investigated the material 
aspects of organizing, they either: (i) treated technology as a unidirectional 
and exogenous factor affecting organizational structure and change (i.e., 
technological determinism) (e.g., Blau et al., 1976; Perrow, 1967); (ii) or took a 
cultural-centered perspective (e.g., Barley, 1986) and thereby downplayed the 
role of the material itself (Orlikowski & Barley, 2001; Volkoff, Strong & Elmes, 
2007; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; Leonardi & Barley, 2010). For a long time this 
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created two separate spheres, that of “sociality” and “materiality/technology” 
(Bijker, 1995; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999)32. 
To counter this separation Orlikowski claimed that the social and the 
material are constitutively entangled in everyday organizational life, meaning 
“there is no social that is also material, and no material that is not also 
social” (2007:1437), and that a good or enriched account of organizational life 
necessarily needs both. Some institutional theorists seem to acknowledge this 
interrelation and suggest that material objects are more than ‘just’ material. 
Scholars such as Barley (1986), Friedland and Alford (1991) or Scott (2008) 
mention - although in passing - that material objects also convey meaning, 
implying they are material and symbolic at the same time. For instance 
Friedland and Alford (1991: 247) gave the illustrative example of the inability 
of non-Western societies to incorporate the material goods or technologies of 
the West without radical cultural transformations – and the other way around 
– the inability of the West to absorb non-Western values, without the necessary 
material transformations. Thornton and Ocasio (2008: 105) also refer to both 
material and cultural explanations of institutions. They argue that institutional 
orders in society have both material and ideational characteristics and that 
institutions develop and change as a result of their interplay. Like Friedland and 
Alford (1991), they argue that talking about institutions requires looking at the 
ideational and material world simultaneously. However, the work of Friedland 
and Alford (1991) and Thornton and Ocasio (2008) primarily stays at the societal 
level of analysis, giving less clues on how material and ideational aspects 
are interrelated in daily organizational life and shape the conditions - either 
constraining or enabling - that influence the responses of actors to institutional 
pressures. 
Barley (1986) focused on this lower level of analysis in his study on the 
exploitation of CT scanners in radiological departments at two hospitals. 
He showed how similar technologies lead to different social outcomes when 
embedded into different social or institutional systems. Although his study 
takes a clear material object at the organizational level of analysis as its point 
of departure, it predominantly shows how an ‘identical’ technology generates 
different reactions and divergent changes among organizations due to a 
difference in social fabric. What we do not know from this study, is the manner 
in which different material conditions would generate different responses. Like 
most institutional accounts, the different cultural and cognitive components are 
32 One should note that this is not true for engineers, who as opposed to the social scientists, always attended 
to the intimate intertwining of both worlds (like ‘heterogeneous engineering’ refers to the engineering of social 
relations as well as of physical things) (Law & Mol, 1995; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999; Orlikowski & Barley, 
2001).
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depicted as the main explanatory factors, moving the role of materiality into the 
background. This is also evident in the work of Zilber (2006), where she studies 
the translation of myths in the Israeli high-tech industry. Like Barley (1986), she 
focused on a clear technology and showed how meanings attached to high-tech 
where reconstructed and adapted to suit the local context. In her discussion 
she called for more research into the interaction between the symbolic and the 
material dimensions and the need to rethink of institutionalization as “dealing 
with transformations of ideational and material objects in the process of their 
movement and adoption” (Zilber, 2006: 283, italics added). 
So, despite the fact that some institutional scholars provided a compelling 
case that talking about institutions requires looking at the ideational and 
material world simultaneously, a clear focus on material conditions and changes 
in tangible objects remains largely under-theorized within neo-institutional 
research. Institutional theorists have predominantly focused upon cognitive 
and culture explanations for organizational behavior and “have foregrounded 
the role that interpretation and symbolism play in the emergence and diffusion 
of organizational structures and practices” (Leonardi & Barley, 2010: 39). 
However, next to ‘symbolic carriers’ - such as norms, values, rules and taken-
for granted beliefs – which are generally considered to be the most important 
carriers of institutions, institutions are also reflected in ‘material carriers’ - 
such as technologies, artifacts, buildings, past contracts and investments – that 
materialize and reproduce them (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012: 286; Scott, 2008; 
Friedland & Alford, 1991). 
4.2.2 Material/ideational configurations and 
organizational responses to institutional 
pressures
In line with the ideas discussed above, we postulate that the enactment of 
institutional rules and norms is interwoven with the materially embodied world, 
where tangible objects embody the social knowledge underlying institutions 
(cf., Barley, 1986; Scott, 2001; Zilber 2006). As such, ideational and material 
components are intermingled in organizations. Institutionalized ideas evolve 
in response to their confrontation with material reality, and material objects 
are shaped by institutions and human agency that influenced its design, use 
and meaning (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). Hence, we argue that organizations 
are comprised of configurations of ideational and material components 
that together shape organizational life by providing guidance and discipline 
151Chapter 4
(Orlikowski, 2006). However, by privileging the symbolic over the substantive 
or merely looking at the material-ideational interplay from a societal level of 
analysis, we have less understanding of how the interplay of both aspects may 
shape the conditions under which individual organizations respond to new 
institutional demands (Pache & Santos, 2010; Lepoutre & Valente, 2012). We 
argue that a focus on this interrelation can enhance our understanding of the 
underlying processes and dynamics by which organizations ultimately decide 
how to respond to institutional pressures. 
Institutional theory has developed as a theory that predominately focused 
on explaining organizational homogeneity and stability over time. Passive 
compliance seemed to be the implicit answer of organizations to the regulatory, 
normative and cognitive institutional demands stemming from their 
environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This narrow focus on the ‘constraining 
side’ of institutions rendered critique (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988) and developed into 
a growing interest for agency and heterogeneity and the conditions that foster 
change or deviation from institutional prescriptions (Oliver, 1991; Hirsch & 
Lounsbury, 1997; Seo & Creed, 2002). This resulted in a growing recognition that 
organizations do not always respond uniformly to institutional processes. 
Oliver (1991: 145) declared that notably lacking from the institutional 
literature was “explicit attention to the strategic behaviors that organizations 
employ in direct response to the institutional processes that affect them”. 
According to Oliver, organizations subject to institutional processes are capable 
of responding in a variety of ways and organizational responses may vary 
depending on the nature and context of the pressures themselves (Oliver, 1991: 
146), for instance: what the source of the pressure is, whether the pressure 
is legally enforced or voluntary diffused, whether the pressure can be aligned 
with organizational goals, whether complying will result in increased social 
and/or economic fitness, or how uncertain the context is in which the pressure 
is being exerted (Oliver, 1990: 160). By linking institutional theory with resource 
dependency arguments, Oliver (1991) proposed a range of possible strategic 
responses besides acquiescence. Organizations may strategically search for 
compromises, consisting of tactics like balancing, pacifying or bargaining with 
constituents. Organizations can use avoidance strategies, where they attempt to 
preclude the necessity of conformity for instance by concealing non-conformity, 
a response which was earlier addressed in notions of ‘ceremonial behavior’ 
(e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977: 356-357). Organizations may defy institutional 
pressures, which involves dismissing or ignoring institutional pressures, 
challenging them, or attacking the source of the pressure. Finally, organizations 
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may manipulate the content or source of the pressure (for instance via influence 
or controlling tactics). Oliver (1991) thereby identified a repertoire of strategic 
responses that organizations could deploy in the face of institutional pressures 
and expectations towards conformity. If organizations are unwilling or unable 
to acquiesce, they will resort to more resistant responses. 
Oliver’s work countered some of the criticisms concerning institutional 
theory’s narrow focus on conformity and stability, and triggered valuable 
subsequent studies that focused on actors’ agency and interests (e.g., Goodstein, 
1994; Greening & Gray, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995; Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Studies have investigated a variety of factors which may influence how actors 
respond to institutional pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011). For instance, actors’ 
field position may influence how institutional pressures are experienced (e.g., 
Leblebici, Salancik, Copay & King, 1991; Westphal & Zajac, 2001) or intra-
organizational factors may shape responses to institutional pressures (e.g., 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Kim, Shin, Oh & Jeong, 2007; Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Despite the valuable contributions of these approaches, none has brought 
material factors nor its interrelations with ideational aspects to the fore 
(Leonardi & Barley, 2010). 
 According to the above, pressures arising from the institutional environment 
do not affect all organizations equally, and organizations can differ in the 
responses they deploy (Greenwood et al., 2008). One critical actor in this 
process is the key decision maker who needs to interpret new institutional 
demands and translate those into organizational actions (George et al., 2006). 
After all, decision makers experience, assess and need to manage the various 
institutional expectations that confront the organization (George et al., 2006; 
Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Pache & Santos, 2010; Lepoutre & Valente, 2012). We 
postulate that when key decision makers are confronted with new institutional 
pressures, they are urged to interpret the alignment of these new demands and 
their existing organizational situation. Consequently, the impact of a pressure 
is a decision makers’ specific evaluation of the size of incongruence between 
new requirements and the existing organizational situation. 
Provided that institutional pressures can have both material as well as 
ideational implications, this can render two possible sources of (mis)alignment, 
namely: ideational (mis)alignment and material (mis)alignment. Ideational 
(mis)alignment refers to a situation where the ideational demands generated 
by a new institutional pressure are easy (difficult) to integrate in the existing 
norms, meanings, values and taken-for-granted beliefs within the organization 
(cf. Seo & Creed, 2002). Material (mis)alignment, refers to a situation where the 
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material demands of the new institutional pressure are (not) in sync with the 
existing material make-up of the organization, such as buildings, technologies, or 
equipment, which are difficult to align with the new institutional expectations.
Sources of misalignment may render tensions or institutional contradictions 
for the organization involved, because conformity to the new macro institutional 
requirement conflicts with the existing notions, norms, values, daily practices 
or material interests within the organization (Seo & Creed, 2002; Powell & 
Colyvas, 2008). In such situations, organizations are likely to exercise some level 
of strategic choice, because more than one course of action may be considered 
‘appropriate’, which challenges the taken-for-granted character of institutional 
mandates and makes actors aware of alternative courses of actions (Clemens 
& Cook, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002; Dorado, 2005; Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & 
Lounsbury, 2011; Lepoutre & Valente, 2012). Faced with contradictions between 
macro pressures and the specific local situation within the organization, 
key decision makers are required “to make decisions as to what demand to 
prioritize, satisfy, alter or neglect” while at the same time secure support and 
ensure survival (Pache & Santos, 2010: 462). 
Even though ideational contradictions received most research attention, we 
belief that a fundamental misalignment on both ideational and/or material 
grounds may give rise to organizational actions which challenge or transcend 
macro institutional constraints (Oliver, 1991; Seo & Creed, 2002). Our main 
proposition is that a greater level of misalignment probably yields greater 
chances of problems, ambiguities or tensions, making full compliance less 
likely (Edelman 1992; Edelman, Petterson, Chambliss & Erlanger, 1991; Seo & 
Creed, 2002; Zald, Morrill & Rao, 2005). However, how a specific configuration 
of material and ideational (mis)alignments shapes the nature of organizational 
responses remains unexplored, and thereby limits our understanding of the 
complex relationship between institutions, meanings and ultimately actions 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991). 
The perceived alignment or misalignment created by a new pressure on 
both material and ideational grounds – yielding four possible configurations - 
will probably shape the decision maker’s interpretation and evaluation of the 
consequences of (non)conformity and the breath of organizational responses 
available (George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Oliver, 1991; Lepoutre 
& Valente, 2012). In the remainder of this paper we will explore how such 
configurations influence organizational responses. 
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4.3 Methods
4.3.1 Research Context  
To minimize external variation beyond the phenomenon of interest (Eisenhardt, 
1989), we carried out this research in one particular field, namely the Dutch 
childcare field, and focused upon one macro institutional pressure (the 
introduction of a new law) which impacts all childcare organizations in this 
field. The activities carried out by childcare organizations concern the care, 
supervision and development of children between the ages of 0 and 12. We 
believe two factors make this field an appropriate context to explore our 
research ideas. First, as it involves children, a vulnerable group, this field is 
rife with strong normative and regulatory pressures, which influence both the 
meaning of the work carried out and its various material aspects (think about 
safe furniture, ‘approved’ toys). Secondly, childcare organizations deal with the 
same governmental context and regularly face new or changing regulatory 
mandates. Regulatory changes can lead to radical transformations and 
reconfigurations in organizational fields (Scott, 2008) and consequently provide 
a good opportunity to study actors’ responses. The regulatory change we focus 
on in this paper, was the introduction of the new Act on Childcare in the Dutch 
childcare field in 2005 (also see chapter 2), which besides a new financial system 
introduced a uniform system of quality rules, which regulates the safety, health, 
and wellbeing of children in institutionalized childcare. Before explaining our 
research approach, we will first provide more information about this sector and 
the macro institutional pressure of interest in this study. 
4.3.1.1 A dynamic sector 
Currently, early childhood care is a heavily contested issue in many countries 
all over the world. An important issue focuses on the question ‘who should 
be in the business of childcare, so who is responsible for providing childcare 
(government, parents or businesses)?’ Another issue concerns the quality of 
childcare, where safety often has the highest priority (OECD, 2000). Children 
are vulnerable and therefore need special protection and care, where they have 
to depend on the adult world to look after them and defend their rights. As a 
result, the childcare sector faces strong normative expectations of society. In 
the Netherlands, the widespread provision of formal childcare is a rather recent 
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phenomenon and has been subject to intense social and political debates over 
the last couple of years (we refer the reader to chapter two for an elaborate 
review of the evolution of this field). The debates are shaped by competing 
values and norms of various constituents, including the question whether 
raising children is a family’s responsibility or a shared social responsibility 
involving other stakeholders outside the home. For a long time there was 
a strong belief - supported by the Dutch government and the church - that 
a child should be with its mother during the early stages of life. Influenced 
by women’s emancipation in 1970s and changing societal beliefs, maternal 
employment increased significantly during the 1980s and 1990s. Accordingly, 
households in which both parents worked became the norm and the demand 
for childcare grew enormously; daycare placements (i.e., up to 4 years old) grew 
from around 66,000 in 1998 to more than 114,000 in 2003 and the out-of-school 
care placements (i.e., from 4 to 12 years old) doubled in this period as well 
(Netwerkbureau Uitbreiding Kinderopvang, 2003). As such, the Dutch childcare 
sector is largely in transition. Rife with (changing) normative and regulatory 
pressures, this field provided us with a good setting to examine organizational 
responses to new institutional pressures and the contradictions these pressures 
may elicit. 
4.3.1.2 Safety, health and well-being of children 
Around the millennium change, the Dutch childcare sector faced some major 
problems; there was a severe shortage of childcare places (one out of three 
children was on a waiting list at the time), the subsidized organizations lacked 
incentives to work efficient, and the sector had no basic quality system. 
Therefore a transformation of the sector was perceived as necessary (Hillen 
et al., 2001; SZW, 2004; 2005). To ensure accessibility, availability and uniform 
quality in the sector, the Dutch government enacted the Act on Childcare in 
2005, which gave the sector its own regulatory framework. This law changed 
the financial structure of the sector, from supply towards demand oriented. 
Governmental subsides were no longer allocated to the municipality, but parents 
were compensated via income-related tax deductions, aimed at making parents 
‘demanding customers’ in a ‘childcare market’ (Kremer, 2007; Plantenga, 2004; 
Kok et al., 2005). Besides this change in the financial structure, the law resulted 
in a uniform set of quality rules. From then on, childcare organizations were 
held responsible for ensuring good quality, instead of their municipality. It is 
this part of the law, that constitutes the institutional pressure of interest in this 
study.
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The basic and general quality rule (described in article 49 of the Act on 
Childcare) regulates that the “childcare provider has to guarantee that he/she 
offers responsible childcare, which means childcare that contributes to a good 
and healthy development of the child in a safe and sound environment”. This 
implies the childcare provider needs “both personnel and material of sufficient 
quantity and quality to take this responsibility” (described in article 50 of 
the Act on Childcare) and “develops organizational policy that ensures to the 
greatest extent possible the safety and health of the children in each of the 
rooms” (described in article 51 of the Act on Childcare). 
These general quality rules concerning children’s safety, health and well-
being, are further specified into a larger number of specific rules, prescriptions 
and guidelines, which are summarized in the ‘Beleidsregels Kwaliteit 
Kinderopvang’ (Policy Rules Quality in Childcare) (Verschuur et al., 2006; Hol 
& Vaes, 2012). This elaborate framework of rules has several purposes. First of 
all, it gives childcare providers a policy guide on how to implement the legal 
quality requirements of the Childcare Act. Secondly, it serves as a guideline for 
the quality inspectors during quality controls. Thirdly, it specifies what parents 
can expect concerning the quality of care in a childcare center. The Policy Rules 
are divided into a number of categories, and inspected by the inspectors of the 
GGD, which is the municipal health care service institute in The Netherlands 
(Staatscourant 2004, 17 november nr. 222)33. We refer the reader to Table 4.1 for 
an overview of these rules. 
Next to the quality rules which follow from the Childcare Act and Policy 
Rules specified above, childcare organizations also need to comply with a 
substantial set of - partially interrelated and sometimes conflicting - rules 
and norms related to: building regulations and building permits (Bouwbesluit 
en Gebruikersbesluit); fire regulations; rules concerning food and food safety; 
norms and rules related to the safety of commodities such as toys and 
playground equipment (governed by the Commodities Act); and the Work 
Conditions Act (ARBO) which for childcare has specific rules about the height 
of changing tables for instance. As such, quality in childcare is governed by a 
variety of actors (e.g., GGD inspectors, arbo inspectors, fire departments, the 
food and consumer product safety authority) (Hol & Vaes, 2012: 229, 300)34. 
33 Besides the categories mentioned here there is a category concerning parents’ voice and a category 
regarding complaints. However, these categories are more indirectly related to the safety and health of 
children (as opposed to the other categories) and therefore not explained in detail here. 
34 For more information see http://www.antwoordvoorbedrijven.nl/branche/kinderopvang. 
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TABLE 4.1 Policy rules childcarea
Category Description
Childcare employees Prescriptions regarding employees’ qualifications and their 
requirement to hand over a criminal record check. 
The content of the risk evaluation report Norms regarding children’s safety and health as laid down in 
the risk-evaluation report, that each childcare organization 
must develop. In this report the organization describes all 
the possible safety risks (e.g., related to burning, poisoning, 
drowning, falling, cutting, crashing) and health risks (e.g. 
related to bacteria, germs, illnesses, air quality and medical 
prevention) in each the room of the childcare center. The 
organization has to prove that it has taken all the necessary 
steps (in the right time) to prevent each of these risks from 
happening. Moreover, this risk evaluation report should 
include a record of all the accidents happened in the 
childcare center (i.e., what exactly happened, what did the 
employees do, and what steps have been taken to prevent 
this in the future). 
Group size Rules and norms regarding the maximum number of 
children in a group, the teacher-to-child ratio, and the 
stability/continuity of the groups (depending on the age of 
the children in a group).
Accommodation and design Rules regarding inside rooms, sleeping rooms and 
outside playgrounds. (For example there has to be a 
separate sleeping room for the children under 1.5 years 
old. The rooms inside the building need to have a space 
with a minimum of 3.5 square meters per child, with safe 
equipment, and tailored to child’s age). 
Pedagogical plan A pedagogical plan has to be designed by each childcare 
center in which it lays down norms and practices regarding 
four pedagogical goals: how the childcare centers ensures 
the emotional safety of children, how the childcare centers 
stimulates the development of children’s personal and 
social skills, and the transmission of norms and values 
a Staatscourant 2004, 17 november nr. 222
The GGD inspectors are primarily responsible for the quality controls in 
childcare centers. At least once a year they visit the childcare organizations in 
their municipality, rate them according to a list of quality indicators (derived 
from the categories which we presented above), and create an inspection 
report. As such GGD inspectors are responsible for the interpretation of the 
rules. Their inspection report goes to a municipal officer, who is responsible for 
the enforcement of the childcare rules. He/she evaluates the inspection report 
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and decides which further steps are necessary. Possible sanctions include 
warnings, fines, the withdrawal of the childcare provider’s operating license, or 
legal steps. Moreover, the inspections report is publicly available for parents. As 
such, parents can pressure the organization to comply with the rules as well. 
This set of norms and rules regarding children’s health, safety and wellbeing 
within childcare centers, together with their inspection and enforcement, 
constitute the institutional pressure of interest in this study. As the above 
illustrates, this institutional pressure is rather complex in its nature, consisting 
of numerous smaller rules, norms or guidelines, some of which are more specific 
than others, and which involve many constituents. 
4.3.2 Research Approach
In this paper, we draw on a qualitative methodology to understand the strategic 
responses of childcare organizations to the changing regulatory pressure in 
their field. Our objective was to understand the way pressures simultaneously 
affect both the material and ideational worlds of the individual childcare 
organizations, as a way to better understand why responses to the same pressure 
might differ. We believe a qualitative methodology is most appropriate in this 
case, as it suits the explorative nature of this study. Especially for examining 
poorly understood and complex phenomena – studying ‘what is occurring’ and 
‘why this is occurring’ (i.e., in our case, how the interrelation between material 
and ideational aspects of institutions shapes decision makers’ interpretations 
and subsequent organizational actions) – qualitative approaches hold great 
promise (Lee, Mitchell & Sablynski, 1999; Gephart, 2004). Moreover, a qualitative 
approach can grasp actors’ interpretations of events/situations and provide 
us with their own accounts and justifications for their responses (Lee, 1999)35. 
As such, this provides us with a micro-level understanding of the variety in 
interpretations and responses that a seemingly similar pressures may trigger 
(George et al., 2006). Although we acknowledge that a decision maker’s 
interpretations of institutional pressures and an organizational response may 
represent different levels of analyses, a vast majority of childcare organizations 
has only one key decision maker who determines the course of organizational 
action. “As such, the conditions of homogeneity of decision makers within a 
firm necessary to relate individual-level constructs to organizational level 
constructs was satisfied” (cf. Lepoutre & Valente, 2012: 291; Hitt, Beamish, 
35 Note that we are not interested in the subjective experiences of these actors per se, but in what it can 
learn us about the conditions for differential strategic responses (i.e., how it can be abstracted into theoretical 
ideas) (Suddaby, 2006).
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Jackson & Mathieu, 2007). 
4.3.3 Data collection
In order to investigate the organizational responses of childcare organizations 
to the new macro institutional pressure in their field, we selected childcare 
managers (i.e., the key decision maker of the childcare organization36) as our 
interview respondents. In line with George et al. (2006) we belief these key-
decision makers constitute key actors in understanding the process behind 
organizational responses. In total we conducted 33 semi-structured interviews.
In order to prepare for the interviews and become acquainted with the 
childcare field, its history and regulation, we analyzed key documents. These 
documents included the new Act on childcare and its policy rules, newspaper 
articles related to the new Act and OECD reports. Moreover, we took a close look 
at the inspection reports of the GGD (municipal service institute) that carries 
out the quality inspections within the childcare sector. 
On the one hand, we aimed to get a better understanding of how these 
decision makers made sense of the regulatory changes and perceived the 
manner in which rules impacted upon their organization (and the sector). On 
the other hand, we wanted to know how they strategically responded to these 
safety, health and hygiene rules (and its inspection and enforcement) and why 
they choose to respond the way they did (Oliver, 1991). 
For the selection of our respondents we used a purposive sampling strategy. 
In an early stage of the project we acquired a list of organizations provided 
by a large professional association in the field (the MO-group, which at that 
time represented 46% of all child care organizations and 80% of all childcare 
placements in the Netherlands). Our respondents were managers of childcare 
organizations that were located across the Netherlands, ranging from large 
cities to small rural areas and villages. We also wanted to include organizations 
from various sizes (i.e., number of childcare places, employees and number 
of locations), organizations that differed in their degree of dependence on 
government subsidies prior to the law, organizations which vary in legal status. 
Next to these factors, the managers in our sample had different backgrounds 
(ranging from a whole career in the childcare sector or welfare sectors, to 
broad commercial experience). This variety in organizational and individual 
attributes is important, since it may relate to variance in material and ideational 
conditions, shape respondents’ vision on the new law and their perceived ‘room 
36 We spoke to the top-level manager. In the Netherlands, these childcare managers are often referred to as 
childcare directors (kinderopvang directeur/bestuurder in Dutch). 
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to manoeuvre’ (in terms of relations and assets for example). 
The in-depth interviews were semi-structured and ranged from about 45 
minutes to over two hours, with an average length of about one hour. The 
interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and subsequently coded. We 
started the interviews by asking about the manager’s vision on childcare and 
the mission of their organization in delivering care. Furthermore, we were 
interested in the manager’s professional background, how long they had been 
active in the field, and how they experienced the introduction of the new Act 
on Childcare. To explore the role of materiality and ideational interrelations we 
asked questions regarding topics such as; building and playground design, how 
they choose a childcare site/location, and what issues where important to such 
kinds of decisions. Moreover, we asked questions about their pedagogical vision, 
and what in their opinion ‘good’ childcare entails. 
We asked the decision makers to reflect on how the rules regarding 
children’s safety, health and well-being impacted upon the playground, the 
building, and the activities within the childcare center and we grasped how 
they perceived and experienced the rules, its inspection and enforcement. For 
example, we asked if they ever encountered a situation in which they weren’t 
able or willing to follow the rules, and ‘if so’ why this was the case. Next, to 
capture organizational responses, we wanted to know which decisions they 
had made regarding the rules. Sometimes these came up ‘naturally’ during the 
interviews. For instance, when respondents indicated how they dealt with a 
particular implication of a safety or health rule or how they handled mandates 
from the inspector or municipal officer. If these did not come up during the 
interview, we explicitly asked the respondent “what they did” or “which steps 
had been taken” when confronted with the rules. For example, if respondents 
indicated they did not agree with (some of) the rules – so they gave their opinion 
but did not indicate how they responded - we asked explicitly what they did at 
the moment a conflict over the rules surfaced. 
4.3.4 Data analysis
We analyzed the transcribed interviews in several stages. After initial readings 
of the data we started with a basic coding procedure, in which we manually 
assigned labels to relatively small text units (like sentences or paragraphs). 
During this initial stage, we mainly used descriptive codes. These codes 
closely resemble the text and respondent wording, since the labels represent 
issues mentioned by the respondents (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Examples of 
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these codes include; playground design, harsh inspections, adaptation costs, 
negotiate with inspector, convince GGD, safety rules, parents voice, learning 
opportunities, ridiculous rule, age of building. After coding each interview in 
this way, we indicated the most salient points and made a summary of our 
impressions. On the basis of this first step we learned that material aspects 
and pedagogical notions could be strongly interrelated. For instance one 
organization had a farm at their playground which was an integral part of their 
pedagogical plan (e.g., learn to take care for others). Moreover, we learned that 
the safety and hygiene rules could have some far-reaching consequences for 
the material make-up of the organization, ranging from children’s beds, toys at 
the playground to the temperature of the fridge. 
We continued in two steps. First, we tried to better identify organizational 
responses by marking those codes and related data segments which referred 
to actions of managers in dealing with the rules in a particular situation. We 
clustered similar actions together into first-order-codes. In doing so we moved 
iteratively between Oliver’s response tactics and our data. In general, Oliver’s 
framework (1991) fitted well with the responses we observed in our data (see 
also Table 4.2). Second, to gain insight into what had influenced the managers 
in mobilizing particular actions, we focused on their description of a particular 
incident/situation and identified their justification in generating a particular 
response. After that we clustered codes which referred to the same underlying 
rationale. These categories represented several influences: managers’ opinion 
about the rules and the inspectors; managers’ perceived impact of the rules 
on the pedagogical plan of the organization/their own pedagogical vision; 
managers’ perceived impact of the rules on work activities and material aspects. 
4.4 Findings
In this section we show how material objects and ideational aspects together 
act to filter and translate institutional pressures for safety and health that flow 
from the governmental level. We illustrate the intermingling of these aspects 
within childcare organizations and show that actors in the Dutch childcare 
field responded in a variety of ways to the same coercive institutional pressure. 
Finally, we explain this variety by pointing to the impact of this coercive pressure 
on both material and ideational aspects of the organization, and how decision 
makers’ perception of (mis)alignment shaped organizational responses in 
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different ways. 
4.4.1 The intermingling of the material and 
ideational world in childcare 
From our data it became clear that the institutional pressures concerning 
children’s safety and health directly impacted upon the material world of the 
childcare organizations, like the rooms, toys, chairs, tables, and the daycare 
building and playground at large. 
“In childcare we think and design in terms of ‘rooms’, like classrooms 
in a school. In a large part this is due to the regulatory demands. The 
maximum number of children in a group is prescribed, as well as the 
number of squared meters per child in known….a simple calculation 
teaches you how much in- and outside space you need. Besides this, 
numerous safety and health prescriptions exist….like the plastering of 
walls, covers for the heaters, the height of the tables, the temperature 
of the fridge, the green on the playground, toy requirements …..”
New rules concerning health and safety prescribed or influenced the design, 
building, construction and usage of buildings, playgrounds, toys and furniture. 
As such, some objects were no longer qualified as ‘safe’ and needed to be 
adapted or replaced. Depending on the existing material situation within 
the organization, the organizations needed either minor or more rigorous 
adaptations in order to conform to the new rules. For some organizations this 
had sweeping implications, for instance where the space available in the in- 
and outside rooms was too small given the number of children. This material 
misalignment implied the need for a different construction of the rooms to 
meet the requirements, or the need to lower the number of children they took 
care for per day: 
“At one of our locations we have 70 children on the list. The GGD 
[responsible for inspection] measured the available space and it turned 
out we lacked 5 square centimeters per child….so we need to go down 
from 70 to 68 available childcare places.” 
But besides these material implications, managers also indicated how the rules 
created a heavy administrative workload for themselves and their childcare 
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employees. The registration of all the possible risks (related to children’s 
health and safety) that could be present in all the in- and outside rooms, and 
the development of a policy to prevent such risks from happening, consumed 
much of their time and energy. The childcare professionals needed to learn 
much more about safety and health regulations and how to document this in 
a risk-evaluation report, which indicates that the new rules also influenced the 
activities and routines of the childcare employees. One interesting example 
comes from an organization with a small children’s farm in its backyard, where 
children took care of rabbits and goats. However, numerous precautions related 
to all the possible hygiene risks made this practice almost unmanageable: 
“The factors that influence the safety and health of children are 
immense…they are everywhere. And taking care of children in a safe 
and healthy environment entails a lot more than preventing children 
diseases, you know. Think about the air, dust that swirls around…there 
are risks in every corner. Even while we take all kind of precautions - 
we have boots for all the children if they go to the animals - the GGD 
[responsible for inspection] is still giving us a hard time.”
This manager indicated that the farm constituted a very important part of their 
childcare philosophy. On the one hand, the animals were ‘little friends’ for the 
children, and on the other hand it educated the children about the responsibility 
of taking care of animals. Because of the immense safety and health rules and 
strict inspection, they had to close the farm in the backyard. Here we see that 
besides having material implications, the rules concerning safety and health 
also touched upon the ideational world of pedagogical norms and values within 
the organization. 
Material objects turn out to be more than ‘just material’ and embody 
pedagogical ideas and carry meaning (cf. Scott, 2008). The way in which 
material artifacts are endowed with pedagogical meaning becomes very clear 
in the following quote, where a manager nicely illustrates what a chair can 
mean to children: 
“For children a chair is not just a chair it can also be a table or a place 
to hide or something to jump from. It can also be part of their play, it 
can be a train, a truck..looking at objects through the eyes of children 
shows multiple purposes of just one simple matter. Every child can play 
the drums with a pot. So I do not want pots and I do not want drums, 
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but things that could be pot and drum at the same time […..] This is the 
way we look at material and want to design our rooms. I do not want 
fancy equipment at the playground, just keep it simple and leave it to 
their imagination.” 
The above illustrates that a pedagogical vision produces its own requirements 
or wishes for the material objects and surroundings. Once established, the 
material and ideational reinforce each other (Orlikowski, 2006; 2007). For 
example the vision that a daycare should be a “home-away-from-home” or a 
“place where children constantly explore their world and learn from mistakes”, 
comes attached with different design requirements. Different pedagogical 
visions on learning and playing or what constitutes ‘good childcare’ are 
likely to result in different in- and outside rooms. The following quote nicely 
illustrates how ideational and material components in the childcare rooms are 
intertwined: 
“I always say that 80 percent of the product we deliver is done by our 
childcare employees, the one or two professionals they know, another 5 
percent is delivered by our customer advisor, 10 percent by the building 
and 5 percent is the stuff we talk about in the management meetings….
So although it seems less important than the childcare employees…
it is still ranked secondly…stressing the importance of a clear vision 
on the building that was not yet developed here. When I entered this 
organization I changed the buildings, the rooms were messy with too 
many things on the wall, toys all around…I said we need rest, this is not 
a pedagogical environment where children learn to explore or learn 
to deal with situations if the toys are not around and they need to be 
creative in designing their own play…We need to think differently about 
the inside and outside space of our daycares centers…it should be a 
pedagogical environment that suits a certain pedagogical vision.” 
The playground constitutes another good example of where the symbolic and 
material meet. Whereas some organizations stressed that the playground should 
mainly be a “safe place to play”, others stressed it should be an environment 
where children can “explore the world and grow confident”. Consequently, their 
playgrounds looked rather different as well. Where some organizations had 
rubber floors and plastic toys, others used sand and trees in the playground. 
However, all the organizations where confronted with the same institutional 
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pressures flowing from the government that prescribed certain safety, health 
and hygiene rules. Accordingly, the same rule could have vastly different 
material and ideational implications for the various organizations involved. 
In the following paragraph we show the various responses of organizations 
towards the same set of safety and hygiene rules. 
4.4.2 Various organizational responses 
As shown in the research context, the institutional pressure consisted of 
numerous smaller rules, norms and requirements. To a large extent organizations 
needed to comply to these rules in order to attain their social legitimacy and 
keep their license to operate. All our respondents stressed the vulnerability of 
children and the importance of parents’ trust in the organization; ‘parents need 
to feel their child is in good hands’. In that sense they were all positive about 
the fact that the new law resulted in a basic framework of rules and inspections 
concerning safety, health and hygiene (which the sector lacked in the past) and 
they understood the underlying rational (Oliver, 1991) of a uniform regulatory 
quality system: 
“The government needs to interfere in that respect….We are working 
with children. Although sometimes …as a manager I would like to work 
in a less strict regime, we need those rules and we normally live up 
to them. Children are just too vulnerable to be completely left to the 
market.” 
So to some extent all actors needed at least a general level of compliance 
in order to keep their license to operate and sustain the ‘logic of confidence’ 
necessary to ‘keep’ (or attract new) parents and to continue their business (cf. 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Roberts, 2011). However, many organizations in our study 
indicated that they did not live up to all the rules. Depending on their particular 
situation, they differed in the degree of active resistance they showed. We 
were able to discern a great variety of different forms of organizational non-
conformity, ranging from symbolic forms of compliance to fierce resistance. 
Table 4.2 provides some exemplary quotes for each type of organizational 
response (as pointed out by Oliver (1991)) we were able to discern from our 
interview data. This table clearly shows that we indeed see a great variety of 
organizational responses to the same set of safety and health pressures. In the 
following paragraph we show how these responses relate to the interpretation 
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of the new institutional pressure in terms of its (mis)alignment between the 
required and existing organizational situation on both material and ideational 
dimensions. 
4.4.3. Material / ideational configurations and 
organizational responses 
As explained in the theory section four different configurations of material and 
ideational (mis)alignments are possible. In the remainder of this section we will 
show what such a configuration entails for the managers and organizations 
involved and which responses were likely to be used. This may give us further 
insight into how material and ideational aspects of institutions together shape 
response strategies.
TABLE 4.2 Various strategic responses
Type of strategic response 
(Oliver)
Exemplary quotations 
Acquiescence: whenever organizations 
obey/ accede to the institutional 
requirements. For example the 
case of pure compliance, which 
is the conscious obedience to all 
institutional requirements (Oliver, 
1991)
Compliance: “We obey strictly to the rules and I think everyone 
should. At the moment rules are in place you need to fulfill these. 
Although my employees sometimes tell me that is too much 
work…it is our responsibility and our duty. The consequences of a 
negative evaluation …could be severe damage. [….] The only way to 
guarantee ‘responsible and quality’ care is to obey to the rules. Due 
to the rules quality is made measurable.” 
Compromise: strategic responses 
that lead to partial conformity, where 
minor forms of resistance prevail. 
For example balancing tactics, 
these refer to the accommodation 
of multiple constituent demands in 
response to institutional pressures. 
Other compromise tactics could be 
bargaining, where the organization 
tries to obtain/negotiate some 
concessions from the demands of 
external constituents (Oliver, 1991).
Balancing: “I sometimes think it is a pity….the inspection is very 
strict and quickly gives negative evaluations. I certainly do not 
always agree with them…. then I adapt some things and for other 
things I do not change. You need to balance between the GGD, the 
parents and your own vision. It should fit the organization!” 
Bargaining, negotiating: “After a negative evaluation of the inspection 
on some aspects, you receive a letter from the municipal officer. 
Then I explain to him why I did or didn’t do something and then 
he can accept that or not. That is where we discuss and negotiate. 
Depending on the municipal officer you have, sometimes they 
think you’re right and they do not take any further steps. However, 
at the moment a municipal officer would threaten me with a risk of 
shutdown, my room to manoeuvre is gone.”  
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TABLE 4.2 Various strategic responses (continued)
Type of strategic response 
(Oliver)
Exemplary quotations 
Avoidance tactics: attempts to 
preclude the necessity of conformity. 
For example by concealment 
strategies, like ceremonial conformity, 
where deliberately a distinction 
between appearance and reality is 
made. Escape is another avoidance 
tactic, where an organization may exit 
the domain within a pressure was 
exerted (Oliver, 1991). 
Ceremonial conformity: “My childcare employees think some of the 
rules are just ridiculous, and they will not conform to them. Some 
of the things they do, other things they still refuse. And to be very 
honest …in anticipation of the scheduled site inspections by the 
GGD, my employees do show the ‘appropriate’ behaviors. I could 
tell you, this does not happen, but it does….that’s the result of site 
inspections that are announced in advance. So on that day, they 
do it and that’s fine with me….and that happens in the majority of 
organizations I bet you.” 
Escape: “If we are talking about out of school care, we have this 
ridiculous situation that during school hours another, and less 
strict regime applies. As soon as school is over, the stricter rules of 
the Act on Childcare applies to this exactly same group of children.
[…] What we could do is ask the school if some of our out-of-
school activities (like fieldtrips) could fall under their responsibility, 
because their regulatory framework is more lenient.” 
Defiance tactics: active forms of 
organizational departure from 
institutional pressures (e.g. 
resistance). For example dismissal, 
where actors choose to ignore 
institutional rules or challenge or 
attack tactics, more active forms of 
resistance (where actors go on the 
offensive in defiance of pressures) 
(Oliver, 1991)
Dismissal: “The things I do, regardless of that law..is the question 
that comes first and that is.. ‘what is good for children’, ‘when do 
children grow to their fullest capacity?’ After that we will see if the 
inspection has something to nag about. If they [inspection] want 
to label that as ‘insufficient’…let them….I don’t bother and I tell 
my personnel not to bother. If I think some rules are in nobody’s 
interest…I just leave their evaluation for what it is. We know what 
we do is right..and that is assisting children to become independent 
citizens’. If the inspection want to “moves around thumbtacks”, let 
them…I really do not care.”
Challenge: “I grasp my responsibility and say in our organization 
every child ‘could fall out of a tree once’. Of course we take a few 
safety precautions, but we will not cut down that tree….I refuse. 
You need very strong arguments in arguing with those GGD 
inspectors…illustrating why you do otherwise. But it is worth the 
fight.”
Manipulation tactics: organizations 
opportunistic attempts to actively 
change or exert power over the 
content or source of the pressure. 
For example influencing tactics, 
where actors try to manipulate 
the belief- & value systems or its 
definitions & criteria (Oliver, 1991)
Influence tactics: “Together with colleagues in the field we try to 
convince the GGD, the legislator…national government, that we 
need adaptations on some rules and their enforcement. We are 
backed up by the parents-association in this lobby…and we publish 
about this. We reach a convenant with colleagues and give that to 
the ministery on childcare..it will be in policy making….I’m confident 
it will improve.” 
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4.4.3.1 Ideational alignment and material (mis)
alignment 
The first configuration is material alignment combined with ideational 
alignment. This is the situation were the new rules concerning safety and health 
could be easily aligned within the childcare organization on both material 
and symbolic grounds. Organizations facing such situations, faced only minor 
implications of the rules and in order to conform, and they did not have to 
change much. In such cases managers indicated a willingness and ability to 
comply with the rules to the greatest extent possible. These managers argued 
that the new institutional rules governing safety and health were strongly 
aligned with their pedagogical ideas about good childcare. This is illustrated by 
the following quote:
“I do not have any problems with the rules, but I know a lot of 
organizations that do…for example if they have other ideas about the 
way children should grow up. The GGD [responsible for inspection] 
tries to abandon as much risk as possible…..that doesn’t suit everyone. 
For us it has never been a problem. I would not want the children here 
walking around in bandages all day.” 
For many of these organizations safety and health issues have always been 
their top priority and as a result their material environment was already 
designed in such a way that it prevented a lot of risks from happening. Some of 
them indicated a proactive response in order to prevent future changes to the 
material make-up of the organization:
“Before we start with a new building project we always ask the GGD if 
they could give a pre-evaluation before we start building. I always send 
the blue prints, I send everything. So I involve them in advance….in this 
way you do not have to change much afterwards.” 
Hence this situation of material and symbolic alignment resulted in hardly 
any changes making these decision makers both willing and able to conform 
to the new rules. They mainly stressed the benefits of full compliance. One of 
the benefits of compliance, according to these managers, was related to the 
visibility of acquiesce in inspection reports. The new regulatory system made 
it possible to make quality more visible to parents. This made the inspection 
reports a critical tool for these managers to show that ‘safety is a number one 
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priority’ in their organization. In this sense, compliance to the rules directly 
materializes: 
“To the parents the inspection reports represent a quality-test. Then 
you are able to show how good you are...If you argue that you provide 
safe and good childcare….it should also show off in the report. It clearly 
shows which organizations guarantee quality and which not.” 
These managers stressed that safety is parents’ major concern. Therefore 
parents’ criteria in evaluating the daycare (i.e., safety and health), also became 
the criteria for these managers to evaluate their own business. Other benefits 
of compliance that these managers mentioned, were related to the ‘guidance’ 
resulting from the safety and health rules. Since everything has to be written 
down and policy must be developed, employees have ‘something to fall back on’ 
and can show they acted appropriately in case anything might happen. As such, 
from a liability perspective, full compliance to rules was important as well. 
The second configuration entails a situation of material misalignment 
combined with ideational alignment. In this case, respondents described 
situations where the new law has resulted in a discrepancy between their 
existing material situation and the required situation as prescribed by the 
pressure. However, similar to the situation discussed above, beliefs and ideas 
about good childcare were in general aligned with the governmental mandates 
governing safety and health. Above all - these managers argued - childcare 
organizations ‘should guarantee a safe and sound environment for children’ 
and good quality evaluations are crucial for gaining/maintaining parents’ social 
support: 
 “As a parent you need to be sure that when you bring your child to 
daycare, the law is not violated, that it is meeting all the criteria. If you 
are able to show that, you have a chance of succeeding.” 
Although they had no ideological objections to the new set of safety and health 
pressures, their existing material situation sometimes could prevent them from 
full compliance with the rules. For instance, some respondents indicated that 
the costs associated with the new rules were simply too large. Seemingly the 
new law activated a contradiction with internal efficiency criteria (Seo & Creed, 
2002; DiMaggio, 1988). One organization told us about the need to replace all the 
children’s beds since the distance between the bars was too large:
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“The safety rules prescribe the distance between the bars in a child’s 
bed, ours are too large. So that would mean we have to buy other beds. 
However, we just recently bought new beds and we did not got the 
chance to write off our investment yet. And that is expensive you know. 
We talked to the inspectors and explained the situation - we are talking 
about a few millimeters here – in the hope they would understand.” 
For other organizations compliance was rendered difficult due to the existing 
construction of their building. Especially in old buildings these organizations 
ran into problems, for example with fire regulation. 
“We have different locations across the city. In the newer areas we never 
run into problems, these are modern buildings that already live up to 
that standard. For the construction of some of our new buildings we 
sat around the table with the architect, someone of the fire department 
and one of the GGD inspectors, so we prevented potential problems 
from happening. Our problem concerns the older buildings, especially 
in the impoverished areas in the city. They have been there for years 
and with the new rules we run into all kinds of problems…”
Because these material discrepancies were easy to observe, these managers 
indicated that in such situations they were totally dependent upon a ‘friendly 
inspector’ or ‘a municipal officer that would understand’. Hence these 
organizations mobilized all kinds of compromise tactics in order to prevent 
the negative consequences of a bad evaluation, and they tried to bargain and 
negotiate with their inspector or municipal official: 
“A good relationship with the inspectors could save your life! Some of 
them are very reasonable and as long as the risks are not too high 
they will understand why you are sometimes not able to meet all their 
criteria. But you need to explain them and show that you did everything 
you can. Others could give you a hard time. In that case I phone the 
municipal officer and explain the situation. I know the guy for years 
and we get along very well. The key is to have good relations in your 
municipality.” 
Another situation of material misalignment (combined with ideational 
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alignment) we came across during the interviews was related to the outside 
space of the childcare organization. Organizations need a certain amount of 
square meters per child, but in cities like Amsterdam or Rotterdam outside 
space is very difficult to find and some organizations do not meet the amount 
of square meters prescribed. Although many organizations loved to have more 
outside space for the children, and hence completely understood the idea 
behind that rule, due to the population density in the city they were not able to 
acquire it. One of the managers told us how he tried to convince the inspectors: 
“Here in Amsterdam we lack outside space and on a lot of the locations in 
the middle of the city there is no possibility to enlarge the playground…
we just lack the space. Then you need to be creative. At one of my 
locations we have this municipal playground across the street, so I’m 
negotiating with the municipal officer and the inspectors to count that 
as outside space.” 
Beside negotiating, some managers talked about the ways to bargain with the 
municipal officer as well. One manager told us about the request of municipal 
officers to adopt special pre-schools education programs for children with 
special needs. The manager promised to provide these programs and bargained 
with the officer that they would be less restrictive in enforcing some of the 
rules. 
To wrap it up, although in these situations organizations faced a situation of 
ideational alignment (like the first configuration we described), the misalignment 
created by their material conditions, made full compliance impossible, making 
these organizations show all kinds of compromise tactics instead. 
4.4.3.2 Ideational misalignment and material (mis)
alignment
A third possible configuration for organizations faced with new institutional 
mandates, concerns a situation of ideational misalignment combined with 
material misalignment. These were the situations where managers talked 
about the incompatibility of some of the rules with both their ideologies as well 
as the related material aspects. In these situations the institutional pressures 
for safety and health could result in completely different - or even opposite 
- demands on the organizations than from a pedagogical perspective of the 
manager was considered desirable. In this case, managers stressed that the 
strong focus on safety induced by the law conflicted with their pedagogical 
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values and ideas about children’s learning and development, and the way that 
the childcare organization should guide children: 
“Children are not allowed anything anymore. If we have a table here 
with a sharp edge or a chair that is too high, so there is the risk of 
falling, we get a ‘below average’ in the inspection report. Apart from the 
investment in the materials, I think it is irresponsible to raise children in 
such a riskless environment. When they grow up, they cannot handle 
anything ..they did not learn.. if we treat them that way. I do not say we 
should encourage children to do extremely dangerous things, but if we 
do not have children walking around with bandages once in a while..we 
do something terribly wrong.” 
Because their pedagogical ideas were reflected in the material surrounding 
of their childcare center, the new macro institutional pressure prompted a 
contradiction of both aspects, creating a complex situation for the managers 
involved. For instance, these managers claimed that a playground is a place 
where children should run and fall, explore and learn while playing with each 
other. According to them, the way the playground is designed determines the 
degree of excitement and challenges posed to children. The safety rules were 
prohibiting a lot of objects that contributed to such a rich learning environment:
“I want my playgrounds to consist of water and large hills of sand…that 
is what children love, they create their own play. But the rules prohibit 
the hill and the water would be too dangerous as well.”
Many organizations that experienced this discrepancy between the new 
requirements and their own beliefs and organizational routines, were concerned 
that the strict safety and health requirements could hinder children’s natural 
development: “since children learn from their mistakes”. Although valuing 
safety they were afraid that the strict rules resulted in situations where children 
were overly protected. These managers thought it was irresponsible to raise 
children in such a risk-averse environment, proclaiming that children should 
have the right of making mistakes: “Every child has the right of bumps and 
bruises. That is the way they grow up.”
“It is every child’s right to fall out of a tree once in its childhood…if they 
do, they won’t do it again….that is the way we learn….children learn from 
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trial and error. Of course there is a possibility they will fall and break 
their arm. However, we should not put such a dense web of safety rules 
around the children, that it even protects them from smallest scratch.” 
The strong emphasis on safety prescribed by the new rules, was claimed to 
hamper the development of children: If children are not surrounded by risks, 
they would not get a chance of taking any and consequently learn how to 
recognize these risks in the ‘real world’. Since their pedagogical ideas about 
children’s learning and playing were clearly reflected in their material objects 
(like the playgrounds or toys) their deviation from the rules was highly visible as 
well. Confronted with a situation of both material and ideational misalignment, 
we found that childcare organizations showed substantive defiant and 
persuasive responses to some of the safety and health prescriptions. Many 
organizations argued that they tried to persuade and challenge the inspectors 
or the municipal officer that the rules were not doing any good and that they 
should trust the professionals who work with the children: 
“There are some tricks so to speak. In any case you need to convince 
the inspectors that you know what you are doing…… I tell them ‘we’ 
[pedagogical workers] are the experts…we work with these children 
all day long and know what is good for them. We have the proper 
pedagogical background so you can leave things to our judgment. 
Besides….I tell them that children are not stupid. Especially with the 
older ones you reach agreements and you tell them what is allowed 
and what is not. In this way they learn responsibility, which is way 
better than having all these rules in place……You need to convince the 
inspectors that this way of working is better.” 
One organization told us about the order he got from the inspection to cut down 
a tree at his playground, due to the risks of falling. Since this tree was infused 
with pedagogical meaning – the value of children’s contact with nature, the 
possibility to learn from risks, the joy children had of climbing in the tree, and 
the shadow it provided them at sunny days – the manager refused to cut down 
the tree and actively challenged the GGD inspectors:  
 “I take my responsibility and say in our organization every child ‘could 
fall out of a tree once’. Of course we take a few safety precautions, 
but we will not cut down that tree….I refuse. You need very strong 
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arguments in arguing with those GGD inspectors…illustrating why you 
do otherwise. But it is worth the fight”
The response of this organization is highly substantive, as the tree (that was 
still standing at the playground) materialized this organization’s response. 
One organization had decided to bring a similar situation to court. Other 
organizations also showed active resistance and were deploying manipulation 
tactics by lobbying towards professional bodies and the government that the 
rules and inspection procedures needed to be changed, since the current 
situation was not in the child’s interests. 
“The Ministry does not have a clue about pedagogical principles or what 
is good for children. The same holds for the inspectors....they mainly 
have a medical background and are only concerned with illness, health 
or safety. This creates some ridiculous situations, where they make 
a fuss of every little piece of dust. Me and my colleagues in the field 
have set up a lobby to convince The Hague [the residence of Dutch 
parliament, authors added] that this needs to stop. They have to take 
that seriously since we hold the expertise if it comes down to childcare” 
In situations of both material and ideational misalignment, managers feared 
that complete obedience to all the rules would hinder children’s development. 
They stressed their social responsibility in “raising the next society” and 
indicated that childcare has the task of raising a strong generation of confident 
people, which does not fit with the image of avoiding all risks. In situations 
where that discrepancy was felt to be too large, these organizations deviated 
from the rules. Hence, due to the interaction of material objects and pedagogical 
ideas, non-compliance was highly visible and therefore ceremonial responses 
were less likely. In these situations the managers considered the ‘risks’ of full 
compliance (i.e., hinder children’s development and creating a riskless society) 
to be bigger than the risks of non-compliance, such as getting fines. 
The last situation we will discuss is the case of ideational misalignment 
combined with material alignment. These were the situations where managers 
talked about the incompatibility of some of the rules with their ideologies or 
pedagogical plans while lacking ‘hard’ material implications. For instance when 
they talked about rules that did not match their ideology (similar to the situation 
discussed above), but did not result in clear material and visible discrepancies 
either. Such situations refer to what we call ‘soft cues in soft worlds’, making 
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things a “matter of opinions”: 
“The government thinks safety and health equals quality. We think 
quality is providing each child with the possibilities to learn and grow 
up as independent citizens.” 
 
Some of the respondents talked about rules that prescribed certain procedures 
- ranging from hand washing policies, rules for cleaning toys, to policies 
concerning changing diapers - which were so strict that it would render the 
work of the childcare professionals almost completely unmanageable: 
“Just imagine a group of children with running noses or messy faces 
after lunch. The policy rules prescribe to have a different washcloth 
for each child. But that doesn’t make any sense and takes a lot of time. 
Besides kids need to be able to build up immunity.” 
In these cases the managers claimed that such routines prescribed by law 
distracted attention from their core business, which should be talking to and 
playing with the children. As such these rules did not align with their existing 
beliefs or ideas about ‘good’ childcare. Many managers complained that the 
rules consumed time which could no longer be spent with the children. For this 
reason they indicated that they “worked around the rules whenever possible”: 
“Each time a childcare professional changes a diaper they should 
clean the changing table before changing another baby. But instead of 
wasting time with all this cleaning I would rather have them talking to 
the babies a little longer, since that is so important for the development 
of language skills.” 
Most of them indicated that for these instances they have symbolically written 
down these routines in their policy handbooks, but in reality the childcare 
professionals are not using them. However, in anticipation of the scheduled 
site inspections these organizations would display these expected activities. An 
example of such a symbolic response is shown in the following quote: 
 
“My childcare employees think some rules are just ridiculous, and they 
will not conform to them. Some of the things they do, other things they 
still refuse. And to be very honest …in anticipation of the scheduled site 
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inspections by the GGD [responsible for inspection], my employees do 
show the ‘appropriate’ behaviors. I could tell you, this does not happen, 
but it does….that’s the result of site inspections that are announced in 
advance. So on that day, they do it and that’s fine with me….and that 
happens in the majority of organizations I bet you.” 
Escape tactics (see Table 4.2), were also mentioned by managers to deal with 
a situation of ideational misalignment combined with none or rather small 
material incongruence. Although we see avoidance tactics in situations of 
material alignment coupled with ideational misalignment, these avoidance 
tactics seem to be less likely in situations where the demands created a clear 
observable material misfit (such as a tree on a playground, too little square 
meters, or the space between bars in children’ beds). As such, the possibility for 
more symbolic responses seem to be related to the degree of visibility of non-
compliance. 




Material alignment combined with 
ideational alignment
Compliance is the most likely strategy 
Material misalignment combined with 
ideational alignment
Compromise is the most likely strategy 
Ideational misalignment combined with 
material alignment
Avoidance is the most likely strategy
Ideational misalignment combined with 
material misalignment
Defiance or manipulation are the 
most likely strategies
In Table 4.3 we summarize our findings by showing how different configurations 
of material and ideational (mis)alignment of new institutional pressures with 
existing organizational situations make certain responses more likely than 
others. 
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4.5 Conclusion and Discussion
We set out to investigate the interrelationship between material and ideational 
aspects of institutions as a way to better understand why responses to a same 
institutional mandate can differ. This is a contribution to the institutional 
literature, because institutional studies have predominately emphasized 
cultural or symbolic aspects, while neglecting material aspects of institutions. 
We showed the underlying conditions under which different response strategies 
are used by decision makers, depending on their perception of the material 
and ideational (mis)alignments. Hence we showed how a similar coercive 
institutional pressure impacted differently on the material and ideational 
worlds of the individual childcare organizations, thereby triggering a variety of 
responses (as shown in Table 4.3). 
Our study in the Dutch childcare field underlines the notion that material 
and ideational worlds are intertwined, or to speak with Orlikowski, ‘are 
constitutive’ of the day-to-day activities inside organizations. Various material 
artifacts (such as the building, the playground and the toys) determine the joy 
and learning possibilities for children, and shape the daily work of childcare 
professionals. Moreover, these same material artifacts can be infused with 
pedagogical meaning and beliefs, and together these aspects delineate 
important enabling as well as constraining conditions as organizations face 
new institutional expectations. 
We saw a clear divide between a group of childcare managers who largely 
supported the new pressures for greater safety and health versus a group of 
managers for whom the rules created a misfit with their existing pedagogical 
beliefs and norms about ‘good’ childcare. The former group predominantly 
stressed the benefits of compliance and faced with material enabling 
conditions they fully complied. In situations of material misalignment, they 
relied on compromise tactics as a way to reduce this misalignment. The latter 
group stressed the downsides of the strict safety and health regime, warning 
for ‘a world full of children without bruised knees’. If combined with material 
misfits, these decision makers used active forms of resistance, like defiance 
or manipulation. In situations where this ideational misalignment coexisted 
with material congruence however, we saw instances of avoidance, such as 
ceremonial responses. Thus, our results point out that although organizations 
can respond based on purely material grounds, in the absence of ideational 
incongruence (active) resistance is less likely. In a similar vein, although 
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organizations could show resistance based on purely ideational grounds, the 
combination with material incongruence seems to matter most for active 
resistance.
Hence, in line with recent calls of scholars to take materiality into account 
we showed what role material aspects – in relation to the symbolic aspects 
which traditionally have gained prominence among institutional scholars - 
could play in shaping institutional conditions and effects. We showed how the 
interpretations of key decision makers faced with a new macro institutional 
pressure, reflect both material and ideational considerations as they grapple 
with the institutional contradictions or complexities new institutional 
expectations may elicit (Seo & Creed, 2002; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Pache 
& Santos, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011). Once established, the material and 
ideational aspects of organizations act to filter institutional pressures that flow 
from the governmental level (Scott, 2008; Lepoutre & Valente, 2008). Limiting our 
focus to ‘the ideational or symbolic’ at the expense of ‘the material’ necessarily 
limits a thorough understanding of the underlying motivations which drive 
organizational actors to portray differential responses. Hence, looking at 
both material and symbolic aspects of institutions gives us more leads in 
understanding and predicting which strategic responses decision makers will 
mobilize when faced with institutional pressures and contradictions. 
Next to better understanding the variety of organizational responses which 
can be used following a similar institutional mandate in a field, this study might 
have some broader implications. 
First, our study clearly points out that even a single institutional pressure can 
prompt strong effects for organizational life, as it simultaneously and (possibly) 
differentially impacts upon ideational and material aspects of organizing. 
Currently, many institutional scholars turned their attention to institutional 
complexity and its effects upon individuals and organizations (e.g., Greenwood 
et al., 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013; McPherson & Saunders, 2013). Institutional 
complexity exists when institutional constituents, adhering to different logics, 
generate conflicting demands upon an organization (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
This conflict will likely cause confusion to organizations because satisfying 
one demand may require defying another (Heimer, 1999; Pache & Santos, 
2010). However, as our results point out, even a demand stemming from one 
constituent - in our case the government - can elicit complex institutional 
situations for organizations, due to the effects on both material and ideational 
aspects of organizing (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012). By privileging the symbolic 
over the material, institutional scholars have largely overlooked this potential 
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source of complexity. Hence we underscore that even a single institutional 
pressure is often not monolithic, making compliance to a single demand already 
quite a challenging task (Scott, 2008). 
Second, our results point out that the extent to which (non)conformity is 
clearly visible for institutional referents may directly matter to the strategic 
leeway organizations have in responding to institutional requirements 
(Lawrence, 2008). For instance, the act of resisting a mandate to cut down a tree 
at a playground is likely to be clearly visible to institutional referents (among 
them inspectors and parents). In the institutional literature ‘ceremonial 
strategies’ have long been put forward as a manner for organizations to deal 
with the tension which arises as macro institutional demands are not aligned 
with organizational goals or local work activities (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1994; 1998; Oliver, 1991). In such cases, organizations may 
disguise nonconformity behind a facade of acquiescence (Oliver, 1991: 154). 
However, an implicit theoretical assumption is that institutional referents 
would be largely unaware of the misalignment ‘between the walk and the talk’ 
(Greenwood et al., 2011: 351; Pache & Santos, 2013). Yet, in situations where 
institutional pressures have clear material implications, ceremonial strategies 
may be risky or nearly impossible, because deviating from the requirements is 
easily observed. 
It is important to investigate if our findings hold any external validly in 
other contexts than this specific childcare industry. The context of our case 
and the methodology deployed may limit the generalizability of our findings 
and call for further research as well. The childcare industry is characterized by 
strong regulatory and normative undertones, because it ultimately concerns 
the safety and well-being of children. This raises the question if the type of 
tension that we identified in our case is specific to industries with strong 
normative associations. Similar dynamics may exist in fields such as education 
and healthcare (cf., Heimer, 1999; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Hallett, 2010; Quirke 
forthcoming), but future research can explore how specific our case may 
be. That is, to what extent our results are influenced by the specifics of the 
childcare sector and/or the institutional context in the Netherlands. Moreover, 
a potential boundary condition of this study is that we have solely focused 
on the institutional demands generated by one key actor, namely the state. 
Even though coercive pressures can be complex enough in itself, we did not 
investigate the responses of other constituents such as those raised by parents 
or employees (Turco, 2012), who simultaneously might also influence the leeway 
organizations have in responding to new pressures. Recently, in a research 
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context somewhat comparable to ours, Quirke (forthcoming) investigated the 
conditions under which private schools may sidestep institutional pressures. 
She found that in the fragmented institutional field of Toronto private schools, 
with multiple prescriptions for legitimacy and rather weak regulative forces, 
school leaders could make a virtue out of deviating from norms as long as 
they found a large enough audience of parents that appreciated that deviation. 
Even though in our study the regulatory environment is quite strong, parents 
reactions could likewise be important in defining and shaping the leeway or 
childcare organizations in responding to new regulatory demands. 
According to Friedland and Alford (1991), there is not a one way relationship 
between an institution and its meaning. However, we can add to their notion 
that turning to both material and ideational aspects of institutions is important 




a At the time of printing, a revised version of this paper is in the 4th round of review at Academy of Management 
Journal as Raaijmakers, A.G.M., Vermeulen P.A.M., Meeus M.T.H., & Zietsma, C. (2013). I need time! Exploring 
pathways to compliance under institutional complexity. A previous version of this paper was included in 
Academy of Management conference Proceedings (OMT division) 2011 as Raaijmakers, A.G.M., Vermeulen 
P.A.M., & Meeus M.T.H. (2011). A matter of time: Micro mechanisms and the timing of managers’ strategic 
responses to institutional pressures. Previous versions were presented at the DIT meeting November 
2010 (Amsterdam), the Academy of Management conference August 2011 (San Antonio), the Academy of 
Management conference August 2012 (Boston), and the OTREG workshop in February 2012 (London). 
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opponents and their own normative 
orientation (partial compliance), 
and/or waiting to see how the 
situation would unfold as multiple 
parties influenced one another. 
We found three factors influenced 
decision-makers choice of responses: 
their interpretation of constituents’ 
demands, their normative orien-
tation toward the practice itself, 
and the complexity conditions 
they faced. Our findings contribute 
to an emerging understanding of 
how decision makers interpret and 
respond to institutional complexity, 
and complement recent studies in 
the institutional diffusion literature 
that focus on how decision makers’ 
interpretations affect organizational 
response.
How and why do organizations 
respond differently to a coercive 
institutional demand under con-
ditions of institutional complexity? 
We experimentally manipulated 
institutional complexity and 
gauged the time to compliance 
of 100 childcare managers in the 
Netherlands, then asked them 
to describe and explain their 
anticipated responses to multiple 
pressures. We found that institutional 
complexity leads decision makers to 
delay compliance, but usually not 
passively: decision makers used the 
time before compliance to attempt 
to reduce institutional complexity 
by neutralizing opposing pressures, 
challenging the coercive pressure, 
adapting the practice to suit 
Exploring the timing and 






The diffusion and adoption of new practices has been a central topic in 
institutional theory. While previous studies have inferred that early adopters 
adopt to enhance efficiency, whereas later adopters merely conform to 
isomorphic pressures (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 
1997), Kennedy and Fiss (2009) found that the adoptions of both early and 
later adopters are motivated by both efficiency and legitimacy considerations. 
These scholars, along with George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin and Barden (2006), 
identify the need to study decision makers’ interpretations of institutional 
pressures directly (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009) in order to explain the heterogeneity 
of organizational responses. Both George et al., (2006) and Kennedy and Fiss 
(2009) focused on whether decision makers perceive pressures as threats or 
opportunities, and how that perception affects their adoption decisions.
Recently, diffusion scholars have begun to acknowledge that “adoption 
decisions are embedded in a web of conflicting interests”, and the interests 
of other actors in the field may shape the spread of new practices (Briscoe & 
Murphy, 2012: 553). Previous diffusion studies have explained heterogeneity in 
organizational responses by incorporating the role of social movements (Briscoe 
& Safford, 2008), competing stakeholder expectations (Purdy & Gray, 2009) and 
the influence of functional departments (Delmas & Toffel, 2008). However, the 
interpretation of multiple constituents’ pressures, and their effect on decision 
makers’ adoption decisions, are left implicit in previous work. In situations 
featuring complexity, where institutional constituents generate conflicting 
demands upon organizations (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & 
Lounsbury, 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010), or when pressures 
are not easily compatible with organizational interests (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver 
1991), organizational responses are not straightforward. Adoption decisions 
may involve both threats and opportunities, depending on the views of other 
constituents. Thus, for a robust explanation of heterogeneous responses we 
need to understand how decision makers take constituents’ demands into 
account when determining organizational responses. 
In this research, we focus on decision makers’ interpretations of complexity, 
asking when and how organizations respond differently to the same coercive 
institutional pressure under conditions of institutional complexity. In a vignette 
experiment and follow-up interviews, we ‘introduced’ a coercive pressure in 
Dutch childcare under various conditions of institutional complexity and asked 
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childcare managers if and when they would comply with the coercive pressure, 
how they interpreted complex pressures and how they would respond to them.
We review research on institutional diffusion and institutional complexity 
to develop hypotheses about the timing of compliance decisions under 
several institutional complexity conditions, and test these experimentally 
in Study 1. Our experimental results revealed that decision makers varied in 
the timing of compliance with coercive pressures depending on the level of 
institutional complexity they faced. In Study 2, we review the literature on 
organizational responses to institutional pressures, in particular the literature 
on decision makers’ interpretation of these pressures, and present the results 
of our analysis of the qualitative data. Our data illustrate how decision makers 
interpreted institutional pressures and how they planned to delay compliance 
while either targeting strategic responses at multiple constituents to reduce 
the complexity in their environment, or waiting for the complexity to resolve 
as other institutional actors influenced each other. Three factors influenced 
anticipated37 responses: the normative orientation of the decision maker, 
the decision-maker’s interpretation of constituents’ demands (including 
expectations about whether divergent constituent interests could become 
more aligned prior to coerced adoption), and the complexity conditions, defined 
as the mix of constituent pressures the decision maker experienced. Decision 
makers who were normatively opposed to the mandated practice, for example, 
were more likely to engage in institutional work to challenge the practice when 
powerful constituents were also opposed, yet and more likely to plan to exit 
the childcare field to escape the pressure when other constituents supported 
the practice. Those with more neutral or undecided normative orientations 
about the practice were more likely to use a mix of pro-compliant and resistant 
strategies, particularly when constituent pressures were also mixed. Decision 
makers who were normatively in agreement with the practice were more likely 
to comply earlier and work to neutralize constituent opposition to the practice. 
Our study contributes to institutional theory by opening the black box of 
decision makers’ interpretations of institutional complexity, identifying first the 
effect of complexity on the timing of adoption, and then its effect on the range 
of strategies directed at various targets to attempt to resolve complexity. Our 
results thus shed unprecedented light on the effects of institutional complexity 
on individual decision makers and the organizational responses they choose. 
We formulate propositions and conclude by discussing the implications of the 
37 Given the nature of our experimental study, we have not studied actual responses, but anticipated 
responses. Whenever we refer to strategic responses related to our study, we refer to these anticipated 
responses. For reasons of parsimony we sometimes refrain from actually using the word ‘anticipated’.
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results for institutional theory.
5.2 Study 1: The timing of compliance 
decisions under institutional complexity 
In study 1, we focus on the time organizational makers anticipate to comply with 
coercive pressures to adopt new practices. Two main literatures have bearing on 
the timing of adoption and compliance decisions: the diffusion literature, and 
the emerging literature on institutional complexity. We review these in turn. 
5.2.1 Institutional diffusion
From the publication of the seminal work in organizational institutionalism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), the early years of the field 
focused predominantly on the means by which organizations became more 
similar to one another. Coercive, normative and mimetic pressures (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983) are seen to be the mechanisms of isomorphism by which 
“practices spread from one organization to another following a process of 
institutionalization driven by resource dependence, social comparison, or 
network ties linking potential adopters” (Guler, Guillén, Muir Macpherson, 2002: 
207). 
Although field-level diffusion studies have incorporated organizational-
level variables to predict time to adoption (e.g. Lounsbury, 2001; Palmer, 
Jennings & Zhou, 1993; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007), they have rarely captured the 
underlying motivations of organizations to respond either quickly or with delay 
(Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). Yet, underlying all diffusion 
and institutionalization processes are organizational decisions concerning the 
adoption of new practices (Ansari, Fiss & Zajac, 2010). As such, timing is crucial 
for our “understanding of the evolution of institutional fields and the sets of 
institutions within them” (Lawrence, Winn & Jennings, 2001: 625).
With some exceptions, the timing of individual organizational responses is 
left largely implicit in institutional research (Lawrence et al., 2001). Tolbert and 
Zucker (1983), in their seminal study of the diffusion of civil service reforms 
among cities, showed that cumulative diffusion followed an S-shaped curve 
when cities were not coerced into civil service reforms, where few adopt the 
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practice at the beginning, but the rate of adoption increased significantly over 
time. These authors also found that characteristics of the cities mattered for early 
adoption decisions, but were irrelevant to later adoption decisions, suggesting 
that by then, the legitimacy of the practice itself drove its own adoption. These 
patterns have been shown to apply in other studies (Barron, Dobbin & Jennings, 
1986; Westphal & Zajac, 1994), and have typically been interpreted to mean 
that economic gains dominate early adoption decisions while legitimacy 
gains dominate later adoption decisions. Yet other studies have not supported 
this interpretation (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Sherer & Lee, 2002), and Lounsbury 
(2007) has argued first, that it is problematic to separate economic and social 
logics since economic benefits are determined through social processes, and 
second, that we need to attend to the finer-grained mechanisms that underlie 
apparent conformity in the context of heterogeneous actors and activities. 
George et al., (2006), similarly call for the connection of microlevel cognitive 
and motivational factors to macrosocial phenomena including diffusion. 
Kennedy and Fiss (2009) further argued that interpretations of economic and 
social motivations in diffusion research were open to alterative explanations. 
In examining hospitals’ adoption of TQM practices, they directly examined the 
motivations of organizational decision-makers and found that both economic 
and social motives applied in all phases of adoption, but that early adopters 
perceived opportunities associated with TQM adoption while later adopters 
perceived threats. 
Furthermore, the timing differences in many diffusion studies relate to 
mimetic pressures rather than coercive pressures. Tolbert and Zucker (1983) 
found, for example, that when civil service reforms were mandated by the 
state, practice adoption was rapid, exhibiting more of a “landslide” effect 
than an S-curve. Yet, even when practice adoption is coercively mandated, 
organizations may have some discretion in compliance, at least in timing. While 
organizational research on the topic is scant, studies in the comparative political 
studies literature have shown that nation states have delayed compliance with 
EU-mandated regulations despite financial penalties for delays (Kaeding, 2008; 
Linos, 2007). Capacity limitations, that is when states do not have internal 
systems and structures which are consistent with the regulations (Linos, 2007), 
and bargaining challenges among political and bureaucratic actors regarding the 
timing and form of compliance (Kaeding, 2008) are key variables that influence 
delays. In fact, the more actors there are with veto power over implementation 
of a regulation, the longer the delays in compliance (Kaeding, 2008). The lack of 
fit with existing regimes and the divergent views of the relevant constituents 
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create a situation of institutional complexity for adopters.
5.2.2 Institutional complexity 
Organizations face institutional complexity whenever they are confronted with 
incompatible prescriptions from constituents holding multiple institutional 
logics (Greenwood et al., 2011: 317). Institutional complexity may emerge from 
a multiplicity of institutional demands (Oliver, 1991), conflicting demands, the 
misalignment of means and ends in the demands, and a lack of specificity 
of the institutional demands, which generates ambivalence in interpreting 
them (Greenwood et al., 2011). Pache and Santos (2010) note that conflicting 
institutional demands may differ with regard to either the ideological goals 
they deem legitimate, or the means or courses of action they prescribe. They 
suggest that conflicts or disagreements over goals are particularly challenging, 
since their resolution requires “organizational members to overtly recognize 
the incompatibility of the demands on goals, which may, in turn, jeopardize 
institutional support” (Pache & Santos, 2010: 466). Greenwood et al. (2011: 333) 
plead for researchers to be more specific about the sources and the degree 
of incompatibility of the demands they present, and Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury (2012: 175) argue that we “need to get inside organizations and 
understand …how strategic responses to such complexity are conceptualized 
and implemented” (see also, George et al., 2006). While institutional scholars 
have acknowledged that organizations are exposed to varying levels of 
institutional complexity, there is no systematic understanding of when and how 
organizations will respond to incompatible demands (Pache & Santos, 2010). 
It is likely, though untested, that higher levels of institutional complexity 
lead to delayed compliance, and to a larger variety of strategic responses. 
Decision makers in organizations must interpret the pressures they see 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), and determine how to act. Complexity creates 
uncertainty about what is the appropriate way to act in a situation and how 
the organization should adapt. Decision makers’ interpretations of appropriate 
action will depend on the thickness of ties they have to constituents, and the 
extent to which they are dependent on constituents (Greenwood et al., 2011), 
and decision makers may take time to consult or bargain with important 
referents. As such, a higher degree of institutional complexity requires more 
behavioral, structural, and normative adjustments from organizations that 
perceive institutional contradictions (Ansari et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011), 
adding time to decision making. Our hypotheses presented in the next sections 
189Chapter 5
tie in with this line of reasoning. In particular, we suggest that differences in 
the timing of compliance among organizations will depend especially on both 
the support of powerful constituents (Bartley & Child, 2011; Briscoe & Murphy, 
2012), and the support of organization members (Ferlie, Fitzgerald, Wood & 
Hawkins, 2005). 
5.2.2.1 The support of powerful constituents for new 
practices
An important source of institutional complexity is the support for new practices 
by a powerful constituent. When a powerful constituent does not support an 
organization’s adoption of a new practice, the organization may risk increased 
scrutiny and decreased access to resources from that constituent (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Suchman, 1995). 
Organizations face institutional complexity when a new practice mandated 
by the State is contested by another powerful constituent of the organization 
(in our research context, the parents, on whom daycares depend for business). 
When the support of a key constituent is lacking, time becomes an increasingly 
important resource. To avoid immediate legitimacy loss, an organization 
can “buy time” by delaying compliance. Organizations might use this time 
to influence its powerful constituents (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Oliver 
& Holzinger, 2008; Sutton & Dobbin, 1996), or lobby the State to abandon or 
change the mandated practice (cf. Oliver, 1991). Organizations might also adopt 
a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude (Sharma, Pablo & Vredenburg, 1991), hoping how their 
peer organizations will respond, or that the State and the powerful constituent 
may influence each other, resolving the complexity (Jonsson, Greve & Fuijwara-
Greve, 2009; Desai, 2011). These considerations lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. A low level of support for a new practice by a powerful constituent 
induces organizations to delay compliance with a new coercive pressure. 
5.2.2.2 The support of organization members for a new 
practice
A second source of institutional complexity comes from members of the 
organization (in this case, daycare employees). Organizational members will 
be charged with implementing new practices, and if institutional demands are 
incompatible with existing organizational practices and beliefs (Oliver, 1991; 
Pache & Santos, 2010), implementation is likely to be both resisted and difficult. 
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Employees have close ties with managers and have significant access to them. 
When practices do not fit with employees’ ways of doing things and/or their 
normative beliefs, they are likely to voice their concerns frequently and with 
some force to their manager, the decision makers in our study. Decision makers 
may be unduly swayed by the interpretations of these closely connected 
internal constituents (Greenwood et al., 2011), and if employees are opposed 
to a mandated practice, decision makers may choose to delay adoption, using 
the time to influence employees to accept the practice (Detert & Pollock, 
2008; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), or alternatively, to lobby the government 
to withdraw the mandated practice. In addition, the organization will have to 
make more adjustments in such situations in order to adopt the new practice, 
as it is inconsistent with existing norms and practices. This incompatibility 
will also delay compliance (Linos, 2007; Kaeding, 2008). As such, we expect that 
low support by organizational members will lead to delays in compliance. This 
leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A low level of support for a new practice by organizational 
members induces organizations to delay compliance with a new coercive 
pressure.
In line with Oliver’s (1991) suggestions regarding the possible interaction effect 
of institutional antecedents on strategic responses, it follows logically that 
both sources of institutional complexity could reinforce each other, affecting 
time to compliance. Decision makers who face opposition from both a powerful 
constituent and organizational members are likely to delay compliance even 
further, attempting to retain legitimacy with both parties as long as possible, 
and with the hope that negative opinions of the practice will fade over time. 
If a decision maker initially has the support of both powerful constituents 
and organizational members, we would expect relatively faster compliance 
since neither cue seems to push actors towards delay. We formulate our third 
hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: High support from powerful constituents and organizational 




The Dutch childcare industry has long been characterized by its contradictory 
stances on issues related to childcare in public or private spheres (Bussemaker, 
1998). In the 1960s, there were thirty state-funded daycare centers and only 
a few privately sponsored childcare facilities. In 1990, there were about 300 
registered state-funded facilities and 300 private daycare centers (Pelzer and 
Miedema, 1990). 
Early forms of childcare were based on charity initiatives or funded by 
churches to care for the children of parents who lacked financial means. 
Childcare was formally first acknowledged in the Poor Act of 1911. In the 
early 1960s, most daycare centers were state-funded social welfare facilities 
intended for ‘neglected’ children or those from single-parent families in which 
the mother had to work. The General Welfare Act in 1965 formally regulated 
childcare as a municipal responsibility, primarily in aid of single mothers, the 
largest group of childcare recipients. However, a growing number of highly-
educated women wanted to continue working and required childcare services 
(Van Rijswijk-Clerkx, 1981). At the same time, there was a strong consensus in 
Dutch society that women should stay at home to take care of their children. 
At the end of the 1960s, this began to change. A new emphasis on the social 
development of children provided a legitimate reason for placing children in 
playgroups. A working group on childcare policy publicly acknowledged in 1974 
that child development should be central to childcare, yet it did not see much 
value in full-time childcare, even though increasing numbers of women were 
entering the labor market (Bussemaker, 1998).
With the childcare industry expanding rapidly in the years to come, a 
plethora of rules and regulations were enforced upon childcare organizations. 
For example, in 2005, a new law privatized the childcare sector to stimulate 
competition, increase quality and lower prices. This legislation was contested 
among politicians, which eventually resulted in a compromise. Shortly after the 
introduction, the government partly reregulated the sector, and also created a 
long list of safety and health regulations, to which organizations had to comply.
This context is suitable for our research aims for three reasons. First, 
childcare is a socially contested practice in political and public debate in the 
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Netherlands due to a historical and commonly held belief that children should 
be taken care of by their mothers (Bussemaker, 1998). This sector has had to 
cope with a great divergence in normative pressures throughout its history. 
Second, childcare is for children – parents’ most precious treasure – and thus 
decisions about childcare are subject to pressures arising from the deeply-felt 
normative and emotional opinions of parents, childcare organizations, their 
employees and governmental authorities. Third, the childcare sector has to 
deal with an increasing number of rules and regulations, making our vignette 
experiment quite realistic in the managers’ eyes.
5.3.2 Study 1 research approach
We conducted an experimental vignette study with managers38 of childcare 
organizations in the Netherlands. Vignettes are short stories about hypothetical 
persons or situations. Participants are asked to respond as if they had experienced 
the events described (Finch, 1987). An experimental vignette study allows 
the controlled manipulation of relevant variables, yet it retains contextual 
realism, acknowledging that meaning and cognition are situationally-specific. 
This approach yields findings that possess good internal validity, and avoids 
retrospective biases (e.g., Finch, 1987; Hughes, 1998). When vignettes seem 
real and plausible to the respondent, and reflect their personal experience, 
external validity is also high (Finch, 1987). As macro-institutional pressures are 
difficult to research in real-time, the use of a vignette allowed us to ‘introduce 
a new coercive pressure’, to manipulate different institutional demands and to 
causally trace the subsequent effects on anticipated compliance. This allowed 
us to filter the effects of our two independent variables and to assess their 
impact in situ, and not in a vacuum. 
5.3.2.1 Sample
We chose to conduct the vignette experiment in the Dutch childcare sector 
because we have acquired extensive insight into the sector through 10 years 
of research in this field, and because the sector has experienced a number of 
controversial regulatory changes in recent history, increasing our study’s face 
validity. Hence, by studying real childcare managers with vignettes that closely 
mirrored their real-life experiences, we could largely retain the institutional 
context the actors would normally operate in, yet we could specify and control 
38 Whenever we refer to childcare managers in this chapter, we are referring to the key decision maker in the 
childcare organization (hence, top-level management). In the Netherlands, these childcare managers are often 
referred to as childcare directors (kinderopvang directeur/bestuurder in Dutch). 
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the conditions much more than we could have done in a real-life field study. 
In total, 100 respondents participated in the experiment. We used a list of 
1800 childcare organizations (the most up-to-date database available covering 
the whole population) to select managers and to request their participation, 
and randomly sampled 200 participants from the total population. We called 
organizations on the list until 100 organizations agreed to participate (only 9 
organizations refused). Most respondents were female (63.6%), reflecting the 
distribution within the population of Dutch childcare providers. On average, 
participants had worked in the Dutch childcare field for over 13 years (SD = 
7.5), with 10 years’ average experience as a childcare manager (SD = 6.3). One 
participant failed to correctly answer items in the manipulation check, and this 
person was excluded from the analyses, yielding a total of 99 participants. A 
box plot of the 99 cases showed three visible outliers, which were excluded 
from the quantitative analysis, but were analyzed qualitatively in study 2 as 
extreme cases. 
5.3.2.2 Design and procedures 
Informed by two pilot studies, we developed four versions of the vignette, each 
consisting of a baseline vignette and manipulations (described in Appendix A). 
The baseline vignette gave a complete description of the content and context 
of a new law that would be enforced in the childcare sector in exactly five 
years. This law would require childcare centers to have a ‘digital wall’ (a touch-
sensitive, web-connected, interactive learning and play tool) for each group 
within the center, designed to stimulate early learning among children. This 
example connects to contemporary debates in the childcare sector about what 
the aim of childcare in Dutch society should be: learning and preparing for 
school or engaging in natural play. Respondents perceived the vignette as real 
and plausible because of its close link to current policy topics. Two independent 
variables were manipulated: support of a powerful constituent and support 
of organization members for the mandated digital wall, yielding a two-by-two 
design with four conditions of institutional complexity reflecting our hypotheses 
(as illustrated in Table 5.1). 
194
TABLE 5.1 Conditions that affect the timing of anticipated compliance










Fastest compliance Delayed compliance 
Low parental 
support
Delayed compliance Slowest compliance 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. We visited 
childcare managers at their organizations to ensure our respondents were 
in their natural decision-making environment. After reading the vignette, 
respondents completed a brief questionnaire consisting of manipulation checks 
and measures of dependent and control variables and were subsequently 
interviewed. 
5.3.2.3 Variables
Independent variable: support of a powerful constituent. To manipulate the first 
independent variable, vignettes indicated either a high or low level of support 
by parents for the law. Parents are a key source of legitimacy in this sector, 
as they judge whether childcare centers provide ‘good’ care and guidance for 
children, and choose a center for their children based on these judgments. We 
manipulated parent support in two ways, indicating whether both the parent 
advisory committee at the specific childcare center, and Boink, the national 
parent association for the Dutch childcare field, supported the law. In the high 
support condition, parents considered the new law appropriate and acceptable, 
providing opportunities for children and the sector as a whole. In the low support 
condition, parents considered the law inappropriate and, unacceptable, threatening 
child development and the childcare sector. The manipulation check inquired 
whether the parents in the vignette favored or opposed the new law. 
Independent variable: support of organization members. To operationalize 
the support of organizational members, we investigated the literature on 
professionals’ responses to institutional change (e.g., Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996; Scott, Ruef, Mendel & Caronna, 2000; Townley, 2002; Zilber, 2002). The 
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vignette described the former way of working in the organization as either 
similar or radically different from the way of working required by the new law. 
Moreover, it described the norms and interests of the employees (i.e., what they 
think is good and proper for the children) and whether their view on how the 
work should be done is in line with or at odds with the new requirements. Finally, 
it described the degree to which the childcare workers are able to acquire the 
requested skills (quite easily versus with much difficulty). The manipulation check 
inquired whether the vignette described a situation in which employees could 
easily integrate the new way of working or whether employees would find it 
very difficult to integrate the digital wall with the existing way of working. 
Dependent variable: timing of compliance. The dependent variable, the timing 
of compliance with the new law, was measured directly by asking respondents 
to mark on a five year time scale the time at which they would comply with 
the new law, changing their practices and installing the technology, given that 
inspection and enforcement would begin in five years. We chose a coercive 
pressure with enforcement to focus on the timing of compliance, rather than 
compliance itself. We used a five-year transition period to allow for variation 
in response. Our respondents considered the five-year period to be realistic, 
as previous legislative changes in the Dutch childcare field featured similar 
transition periods. 
Control variables. We controlled some of the ‘standard’ covariates in 
organizational research, including gender of the decision maker, size of the 
organization and its legal structure (profit or non-profit). We also included the 
number of years of experience working in the childcare field as a childcare 
manager. Experience in the field could, for example, signal the degree of field 
embeddedness and as a result, impact the manner in which they responded 
to changing institutional conditions. We included three other factors which 
might influence the managers’ mindsets and thus impact their responses to 
institutional pressures: trade association membership of the organization, 
the manager’s commercial background prior to entering the field of childcare, 
and the manager’s normative orientation. This latter variable came from 
our interviews. We asked whether the digital wall that was mandated in the 
vignettes was considered appropriate by the managers themselves. Some felt 
the wall was normatively inappropriate, in which case the code ‘normative 
misfit’ was applied, while others were neutral about it, or supported it (coded 
‘normative neutral’ and ‘normative fit’). 
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5.3.2.4 Analyses
Analysis of variance. We tested our hypotheses using analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA). We used a Scheffé test to examine planned comparisons between 
the four treatment conditions. 
5.4 Results Study 1 
5.4.1 Quantitative results 
The descriptive statistics and the mean scores for timing across the four 
treatment groups have been summarized in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. As expected, the 
sample means have gone in the predicted direction with the fastest compliance 
being found in the case of high support by both powerful constituents and 
organization members and the most delayed compliance in the ‘opposite’ 
situation of low support by both powerful constituents and organization 
members. 
TABLE 5.2 Descriptive statistics and pearson correlations coefficients a
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Parental support .51 .50    
2. Employee support .50 .50 -.02
3.Timing 2.95 1.20 .48 .45
4. Normative (mis)fit .14 .78 -.04 -.15 -.23
5. Commercial background .30 .46 -.17 -.11 -.32 .09
6. Gender .65 .48 .15 .04 .23 -.04 -.32
7.Trade association membership .86 .34 -.02 .15 .01 .15 -.07 -.10
8. Legal structure .51 .50 .04 .27 .17 -.02 -.13 -.12 .22
9. Size (no. of locations) 23.76 39.35 .03 -.07 -.05 .20 .06 -.22 .22 .24
10. Experience in field (yrs.) 13.26 7.59 .06 .09 .25 -.05 -.08 .10 .08 -.06 .31
11. Experience as a director (yrs.) 10.04 6.40 .12 .03 .22 -.07 -.22 .10 -.01 .02 .19 .69 
 a n = 96. Correlations with an absolute magnitude of .20 or greater are significant at the <.05 level
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High parental support 1.62 (23, 0.65) 3.07 (24, 0.86) 2.36
Low parental support 3.14 (25, 1.18) 3.92 (24, 0.76) 3.52
Employee support means 2.41 3.49 2.95
a Values are means for timing of anticipated compliance. Numbers in parentheses indicate cell size and 
standard deviation for the cell
We performed a two-way ANCOVA (n = 96) to analyze the data. Hypothesis 1, 
predicting that decision makers facing low support for a new practice from 
powerful constituents will respond more slowly, was supported. Our results 
show a significant main effect of parental support on the timing of compliance 
(F 1,82 = 33.34, p < .01). Hypothesis 2, predicting that a low degree of support from 
organizational members would lead to delayed compliance, was supported. 
Employee support has a significant main effect on the timing of compliance 
(F 1,82 = 29.01, p < .01). Our Findings pertaining to hypothesis 3 showed no 
significant interaction effect (F 1,82 = 2.06 , p > .05), which means that we cannot 
conclude that the effects of powerful constituents and organization members 
reinforce each other. 
To test the additive effect between the treatments, follow-up post-hoc 
comparisons with Scheffé’s method were conducted in order to specifically 
contrast the four different conditions. Our results confirm that high support 
from both sets of constituents result in the fastest compliance compared to 
the three other conditions. The condition of high social support from both sets 
of constituents showed significant differences with the other conditions (vs. 
high parental support/ low employee support, p < .01; vs. low parental support/
high employee support, p < .01, low parental support/low employee support, 
p < .01 ). In addition, low support from both sets of constituents resulted in 
the most delayed compliance, as this condition showed significantly different 
compliance times relative to the other three conditions (vs. low parent support/
high employee support, p < .05; vs. high parent support/low employee support, 
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p < .05, vs. high parent support/high employee support, p < .01). No significant 
differences were found when comparing the two conditions in which the 
information cues veered in an ‘opposite’ direction (low parental support/high 
employee support vs. high parental support/low employee support, p = 0.995). 
TABLE 5.4 Parameter estimates predicting timing of anticipated compliance a
Parameter b Std Error t p
Intercept 1.675 .376 4.461 .000
Parental support 1.250 .248 5.033 .000
Employee support 1.232 .264 4.661 .000
Low parental support x low employee support -.509 .355 -1.434 .155
Normative misfit (-1)a .432 .230 1.879 .064
Normative neutral (0)a -.096 .201 -.476 .635
Commercial background -.572 .212 -2.693 .009
Gender .109 .197 .553 .582
Trade association membership -.324 .270 -1.200 .234
Legal structure .204 .189 1.080 .283
Size (no. of locations) -.002 .003 -.615 .540
Experience in the field (yrs) .036 .017 2.111 .038
Experience as a director (yrs) -.010 .019 -.531 .597
a Reference category is normative fit (1)
In Table 5.4 we present the coefficients for both the independent and control 
variables. Most covariates did not yield a significant effect on timing of 
compliance. We did find that managers who have a commercial background 
tend to comply significantly more quickly than those who do not have a 
commercial background. (F = 7.25, p < .01), and those who had more experience 
in the field are significantly more likely to delay compliance (F = 4.46, p < .05). 
5.4.2 Conclusions
Our quantitative results from the vignette experiment allow us to conclude 
that institutional complexity causes decision makers to anticipate delaying 
compliance with mandated new practice adoption, and more complexity leads 
to longer anticipated delays. Competing demands from both organizational 
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members and powerful external constituents were found to independently 
affect the time to compliance, and delays were longest when both constituents 
issued competing demands.
These findings are interesting in themselves, yet to this point, we can only 
speculate as to what decision makers plan to do with the additional time they 
are buying with such delays. Fortunately, the follow up interviews we conducted 
with the daycare managers provide further insight into how organizations 
respond differently under various conditions of institutional complexity. We 
present our findings in Study 2.
5.5 Study 2: Multiple responses prior to 
compliance 
In Study 2, we go beyond the timing issues identified in Study 1 to identify 
what organizations plan to do with the time they take before compliance. In 
interviewing our respondents, we noted that, for the most part, they did not 
intend to sit by passively while waiting to comply. With the same broad research 
question – how and why do organizations respond differently to the same 
coercive institutional pressure under conditions of institutional complexity 
– we investigated more deeply the actors’ anticipated response strategies to 
multiple targets during the time before compliance. 
While early work in institutional theory focused more on the conditions 
of conformity to institutional pressures, Oliver (1991) suggested that 
organizations could respond more strategically, relaxing the assumption of 
homogeneity of response. She identified five possible responses to institutional 
pressures (acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation), 
and predicted their likely use depending on organizational, contextual and 
pressure-specific conditions. Predictive factors of organizational response 
include whether complying will result in increased social or economic fitness, 
how dependent the organization is on the constituent exerting institutional 
pressures, whether there are many competing demands, how consistent 
the pressure is with organizational goals, whether the pressure will impose 
constraints on the organization, whether the demand is legally coerced or 
voluntary, and how uncertain and interconnected the context is (Oliver, 1991: 
160). This seminal work has dominated ideas of institutional response for many 
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years, however Oliver’s model focused on the single response of an organization 
to a particular institutional pressure. 
More recent work has called attention to the interpretations of the 
organizational decision maker when considering organizational response to 
institutional pressures (Barr & Huff, 1997; George et al., 2006). Barr & Huff (1997) 
for example, suggested that decision makers interpret their environments via 
schema, or mental models of interrelated and largely unquestioned assumptions 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). These authors suggest that changes in the environment 
that contradict a schema will result in organizational response when decision 
makers become stressed enough to overcome inertia. Importantly, this inertia 
comes from the commitments made to multiple constituents as actors build 
relationships, structures and routines to institutionalize ways of acting (Barr & 
Huff, 1997). These authors contend that responding is thus likely to “reflect the 
constellation of external stakeholders who are making their own interpretation 
of these events” (Barr & Huff, 1997: 363), though these concerns were outside 
the scope of their study. 
George et al. (2006) also focused on decision makers’ interpretations and 
their decisions to act isomorphically or non-isomorphically relative to the other 
actors in their environment in response to mimetic pressures. They argued 
theoretically that decision makers will respond isomorphically when they 
perceive that their organization faces either threats to legitimacy-related loss 
of control or opportunities for gains in resources (including legitimacy). On the 
other hand, decision makers are expected to act non-isomorphically when they 
perceive opportunities for gains in control, or threats of losses of resources. 
When decision makers are ambiguous about whether threats or opportunities 
are related to resources or control, they are likely to take multiple, decoupled 
actions to minimize cognitive dissonance and retain legitimacy. Building on this 
work, Kennedy & Fiss (2009) also studied threat and opportunity perceptions of 
organizational decision-makers, finding that these factors affected timing of 
adoption, though these authors did not study other types of responses. Neither 
of these articles applied to coercive and competing pressures under conditions 
of institutional complexity, which is the focus of the current study.
 As concepts such as institutional contradictions (Seo & Creed, 2002), 
competing logics within fields (Thornton et al., 2012), pluralistic environments 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008), and institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011), 
have permeated the literature, we believe it is time to investigate how actors 
respond to multiple and often inconsistent pressures in their environments. 
Institutional arrangements are settlements among multiple actors that have 
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been negotiated or evolved over time (Barr & Huff, 1997; Zietsma & Lawrence, 
2010). The pressure by one constituent to introduce a new practice will often 
require adjustments by other constituents, which may require renegotiation 
among multiple constituents. This process may require multiple response 
strategies directed toward multiple targets for any given institutional actor. Yet 
most empirical studies focus on a single response only, as if actors do not even 
consider alternative responses (Tilcsik, 2010), and in diffusion studies, the only 
response usually considered is adoption. However, the delays in anticipated 
compliance we noted in Study 1 create space for alternative responses, 
allowing organizations to maneuver before compliance. In his case study of 
a post-Communist government agency, Tilcsik (2010: 1493) provided evidence 
that strategic responses shifted over time from circumventing an institutional 
mandate to complying with it. He argued that the “relationship between 
institutional pressures and organizational behavior is more complex because, 
over time, an organization may adopt several different responses to the same 
institutional mandate” (2010:1493). Yet we know very little about how actors go 
about responding to multiple institutional constituents in response to multiple 
institutional pressures. 
Because there is little guidance from prior literature on how organizations 
respond under conditions of institutional complexity, and because prior work 
on organizational response to institutional pressures has used primarily 
a deductive logic to focus on specific variables (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & 
Simons, 1995), we instead chose an inductive approach to understand what 
decision makers themselves deem important. Such an approach is called for in 
an area in which little is known, ensuring theoretical advances are grounded in 
the deliberations of managers who must respond to situations of complexity. 
5.5.1 Research design 
We used the same sample in this part of our study as we had with the vignette 
study. After respondents completed the questionnaire, we conducted a one-
hour semi-structured interview with each childcare manager. The interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. We asked general questions concerning their 
opinion on the case as well as their pedagogical vision. This allowed us to 
explore their interpretation of the ‘new’ law. We also asked them to reflect 
on the reasons they had chosen a certain response time and what steps and 
actions they anticipated taking if they themselves were confronted with such 
a situation. As such we were able to go beyond the experimental results in two 
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ways. First, the interviews informed us about the response strategies managers 
considered before complying with a ‘new’ coercive pressure. Secondly, the 
interviews revealed the respondents’ lines of reasoning and their justification 
underlying their intended decisions. 
Qualitative analysis. Before the coding procedure started, three authors had 
in-depth knowledge of the interview data. Two authors had collected the data, 
and one author carefully read many of the interview transcripts. We progressed 
from a detailed reading of the interview transcripts to greater generality by 
iteratively moving from data reduction and display to conclusion drawing 
and verification. Although one of the authors coded all the interviews, during 
the process two other authors questioned, challenged and cross-examined 
the coding and categorization. We collectively discussed recurring themes 
and ideas. For instance we all independently observed that respondents used 
multiple tactics before compliance, and that many referenced an unreliable 
government. Having these joint discussions fostered debate and dialogue and 
helped refine our coding and theorizing. As a final check, the last author read 
interview summaries in English and cross-checked the codes.
We pursued two lines of inquiry: identifying strategic responses, and 
seeking insights into what influenced decision makers’ anticipated responses. 
To identify strategic responses, we coded our interviews by first marking data 
segments that referred to anticipated actions with a master “strategic response” 
code. We focused on responses up to and including compliance, and excluded 
pragmatic concerns such as ‘finding a supplier’ or ‘installing the digital wall’. 
Subsequently, for each transcript we used codes to describe a particular 
action (for example ‘show parents the benefits received by the child’, ‘send a 
letter to the municipal officer’) (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In the next step we 
refined and grouped these codes to generate our first-order-codes. Next, we 
moved iteratively between these first order codes and Oliver’s (1991) strategy 
response framework. This framework is well supported in the literature 
(Greenwood et al., 2011: 348-351), and for the most part, it seemed to reflect 
well the strategies we observed in our data. Acquiescence refers to compliance 
in our context. Compromise refers to bargaining with institutional constituents, 
attempting to balance multiple constituents and pacifying constituents with 
partial conformance. Avoidance refers to concealing nonconformity (such 
as through symbolic adoption), buffering itself from scrutiny, or exiting 
the domain to escape the need to conform. Defiance involves dismissing or 
ignoring institutional pressures, challenging them, or attacking the source of 
the pressures. Manipulation is “the purposeful and opportunistic attempt to co-
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opt, influence or control institutional pressures and evaluations” (Oliver, 1991: 
157), which may be achieved by persuasion, coalition-building, public relations, 
lobbying or attempts to control and dominate sources of pressure. 
In examining these categories and the rationales that decision makers 
gave for their responses, we found that some responses that fell into distinct 
categories in Oliver’s framework were actually used by decision makers to 
accomplish the same goals. For example, respondents mentioned persuading 
and influencing parents and employees (manipulation response) and working 
together with them in implementation to make the practice fit their needs 
(compromise). Both strategies were designed to ‘neutralize’ parent and employee 
concerns about using the digital wall, and thus can be interpreted as pro-
compliance strategies. As this was a very common response anticipated by 
managers, we created a category for ‘neutralize’ and included it in our analysis. 
We also found that respondents used manipulation tactics to challenge the 
government to reverse its policy. We call this latter response ‘challenge’. Thus, 
manipulating employees and parents (mainly pro-compliance) was coded in a 
separate category from manipulating the government (mainly anti-compliance). 
Similarly, we found that many managers intended to comply partially with 
the coercive pressure by adapting or limiting the use of the technology, or using 
pilot projects and adapting over time as a means to fit their own and their 
constituents’ pedagogical beliefs. This strategy is directed both at compliance, 
and at limiting compliance to what is acceptable to the organization and its 
constituents. We labeled this response ‘partially comply’. 
An additional category was identified which we called ‘delay’. A number of 
decision makers indicated they would postpone compliance in order to learn: 
to find out more about the practice, to see if parents or other groups would 
lobby the government and have the law rescinded, and/or to learn from the 
implementation experience of other daycares. Others indicated they would 
delay because they were skeptical the government would actually begin 
enforcement. In Oliver’s framework this overlaps with defiance, which includes 
the tactic dismiss/ignore. However, in our case it is a more passive response to 
the pressure in order to deal with ambiguity. It is not permanent defiance, but 
deciding to decide later. 
To reflect the multiple pressures in the environment, we coded each strategy 
according to its target where possible. Table 5.5 shows the response category 
data structure. We ended with six response categories: neutralize, comply, 
partially comply, delay, challenge and avoid. 
Secondly, to gain insight into what influenced managers’ decisions regarding 
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when and how to respond, we coded small data fragments which described a 
particular incident, staying very close to the data, then used a focused coding 
procedure to group codes with similar properties into second order categories 
(Charmaz, 2006). These categories represented three different influences on 
respondents’ decisions concerning when and how they would respond to the new 
law: 1) decision makers’ interpretations of constituents’ pressures; 2) decision 
makers’ normative orientation toward the practice, and 3) the complexity 
condition the decision maker faced. The decision makers’ interpretations of 
constituents’ pressures refers to how decision makers viewed the relevancy, 
legitimacy and importance of the pressures coming from the government, 
the employees, and the parents. When decision makers indicated they did not 
find a group’s pressure to be relevant, we adjusted their complexity condition 
code (described below) to remove that group’s influence. The decision makers’ 
normative orientation refers to how the managers interpreted the practice 
described in the vignette text (the digital wall), based on their pedagogical 
beliefs. Those who supported early learning for children tended to favor the 
digital wall, and we coded them as ‘normative fit’. Others were not yet certain 
about this new requirement, and we coded them as ‘neutral’. Others strongly 
opposed this new requirement, stressing that young children should be allowed 
to play freely and that they should not yet be pressured to learn. We coded 
these as ‘normative misfit’. Together, these three categories formed the aggregate 
theme ‘normative orientation toward the new regulatory pressure’. In line with 
other inductive research we present representative quotations supporting the 
categories of decision makers’ interpretations of constituent pressures and 
normative orientation in Table 5.6. 
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TABLE 5.5 Response categories in the data
The third factor, the complexity condition that decision makers faced, reflected 
the conditions in the vignette to which the participant was assigned. We 
assigned the code ‘Supporting’ when parents and employees supported the 
government’s coercive pressure, ‘Opposing’ when parents and employees 
opposed the government’s coercive pressure, and ‘Mixed’ when either parents 
supported the pressure but employees opposed it, or employees supported it 
• Control employees 
• Persuade parents ; reduce their fears
• Work together with parents 
(employees) in implementation and 
find a way to make it work
• Persuade parents and employees and 
compromise on hours used




Reduce complexity by 
reducing opposition
(pro-compliance)
• Reap rewards of quick compliance




Respond to aligned 
pressures
(pro-compliance)
• Seek fit with pedagogy, not just 
implement
• Implement to fit pedagogy
• Obey the rules but limit the time used
• Start a pilot or test project
• Ceremonial adoption (install but don’t 
turn it on or put a blackboard over it)






To balance constituent 
demands and own 
normative orientation
(mixed pro- and anti-
compliance)
• Delay and learn from others’ mistakes
• Ignore and delay – wait for research 
results and parents’ lobby
• Assess technology Defy
Delay 
Wait until complexity 
resolves
(neither pro- or anti-
compliance)
• Postpone (while pursuing another 
strategy)
• Postpone but surrender
• Dismiss to see if it goes away
• Form a coalition to lobby
• Challenge the government 
• Get parents and employees on board
• Take political action
• Support the parents’ lobby








• Quit if I have to implement
• Leave as Director
• Change my business to something else
Avoid
Avoid
Exit the site of 
complexity
(non-compliance)
First order categories Oliver’s categories Revised categories with
rationale
Friday, October 25, 13
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but parents opposed it.
In the final stages of the analysis, we developed a spreadsheet listing 
each participant and the codes relevant to them for normative orientation, 
complexity condition, and their organization’s responses. When decision makers’ 
interpretations of pressures indicated they did not consider the pressures from 
one group to be relevant, we assumed the decision maker thus faced a less 
complex environment featuring only its relevant constituents, and we adjusted 
the complexity condition code accordingly. We then sorted the spreadsheet by 
complexity condition and normative orientation to list responses under each 
set of conditions, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. 






































Neutralize; Partially Comply; Delay
Neutralize; Partially Comply; Challenge; Delay
Comply or Delay
Partially Comply & Neutralize or 
Delay; Partially Comply
Challenge &Neutralize; Delay & Neutralize; 




Avoid; Challenge; Partially Comply & Neutralize; 
Delay; Comply
Challenge; Neutralize & Partially Comply; Delay








TABLE 5.6 Deciding when and how to respond: Empirical examples  
 
of our main themes




• Employees can/cannot easily 
adjust 
• Employees fear the unknown
• Law deeply affects daily work 
• Employees must obey the law
“Employees are key; they determine the vision parents and 
children have. One should not force this but create room for 
mutual respect. Start with conversations, not instructions. 
The problem here is not so much their [employees] lack of 
competencies. One can fix that by training. But it is key that 
employees experience some emotional safety, otherwise they 
cannot adapt to the new situation and cannot convey this to 
the children” (Manager 71).
“I would respond to this quickly because parents want this...
How I would deal with employees? Well…they will have to, 
no matter how difficult it might be. If I decide we are going 
to go in this direction, then they must follow. I’m their boss” 
(Manager 60). 
Judging parents’ demands
• Reap benefits of parents’ 
support 
• Keeping parents’ trust is 
crucial 
• Parents’ opinions are/ are not 
central to the organization
But parents’ trust is of vital importance, so you cannot just do 
something. That would be ridiculous. It is crucial for parents 
to be totally comfortable with bringing their children to us” 
(Manager 34).
“We have the pedagogical training to work with children, 
not the parents. So I will convince parents if I believe in this 
practice. And what the government concerns… I wish they 
would leave the childcare up to the professionals… give us the 
freedom to determine the pedagogical content of the work 
and not enforce these kinds of things all the time” (Manager 
10).
Judging government demands:
• Governmental interference 
with pedagogical policy is 
right/wrong 
• Government may change in 
five years
• Government makes the law 
and we comply
“I choose 4.5 years because I think by then they [the 
government] will have come up with something else. We 
saw the same if it comes to the mobility tax. …that never 
reached a final stage. Especially if there is so much turmoil 
among parents and Boink…then this law might be adapted or 
canceled” (Manager 89).
“I might want to implement something quickly but my 
experience here taught me adaptations take a long time and 
some things can be dramatically postponed.” (Manager 11). 
“If this is the law we will have to adhere to. Then we will just 
have to find a way to make the best of it. We might not always 
like it, but we deal with regulatory demands on a day-to-day 
basis” (Manager 35).
“I guess we would be very suspicious if the government should 
start to decide what is good for children and that apparently 
parents no longer have a say in this. Then we’d really have to 
challenge this because it threatens our basic rights…we are 
talking about the freedom of childcare and the freedom of 
education in this country” (Manager 7). 
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TABLE 5.6 Deciding when and how to respond: Empirical examples  
 
of our main themes (continued)
Aggregate Themes Second Order and First Order Categories Sample Quotes 
Normative orientation 
toward the new 
regulatory pressure
Normative misfit: 
• Children are ‘forced’ to learn/ 
Let them play freely
• Too narrow view on child 
development
• Beliefs about childcare in 
serious jeopardy 
• Law poses a threat to child, 
organization and/or sector
“I shrug when I read this….this exaggerated attention given 
to early education. My opinion is that children should have 
the freedom to develop without any force. We should not be 
pressuring children to perform and reach all these targets. 
We should not tell a two year-old what he or she should learn. 
They should just be happy and play with each other. Eventually 
they will learn anyway, but naturally and not because we tell 
them what to do” (Manager 11).
“I’m strongly opposed to everything that has to do with 
preschool. Could we please just stop interfering….these 
children are just 4 years old or even younger?! I think all this 
interference and early learning programs are a threat to the 
natural and spontaneous development of children” (Manager 
23). 
Normative fit: 
• Great development (novel, 
timely, nice) 
• Fits the future and what we 
want to give to children
• Children will be better 
prepared for school 
• Encourage early learning 
“My first thought is that this [law described in the vignette] is 
a very nice idea. Very exciting. Our pedagogical vision is very 
much focused on cooperation with other organizations in this 
region…we work together with the preschools, elementary 
schools, the sport schools...To see how we can fit in to what 
children learn once they start school. We want to enable an 
ongoing learning curve so this totally fits our vision. (Manager 
19). 
“I wish this would happen. I think this is a good development 
which prepares children for what will be asked from them 
at school. As a childcare organization you should have 
added value in raising children and this contributes to their 
development. Such a digital wall also proves the value of 
childcare” (Manager 97).
Normative neutral: 
• There are both positives and 
negatives
• Not sure yet whether this 
would be good or bad
• Might complement current 
practices but never replace 
them
• Be aware of the difference 
between learning and playing
I cannot really make a judgment yet. I do not really know 
whether or not this would be good for children. On the one 
hand, a stronger link with schools is ok but on the other hand, 
you might be asking a lot from children already. So to be 
honest I would not yet know really what to say...In any case 
this rule is all encompassing, it would really change the way we 
work with children (Manager 33). 
“My first thought is ‘Oh my gosh’ not another rule again. But 
I guess this digital wall could be nice…but that depends on 
how it is used. I can understand we need to support children 
during their development, but we should not lose sight of our 
most important goal; to have a safe and sound environment 
for children. A place where they can be cuddled… Of course 




5.5.2 Responses to coercive pressures under 
institutional complexity 
About 85 percent of our respondents plan more strategic responses than solely 
compliance (i.e., neutralizing, delaying, partially complying, challenging and/
or avoiding), suggesting quite active attempts by decision makers to resolve 
institutional complexity before committing to compliance. Around 36 percent 
considered two other responses, ten percent anticipated three active responses 
and one respondent considered four active strategies before complying with 
the new law. See Table 5.7 for empirical examples of respondents’ strategic 
response choices. Interestingly many of the combined responses were both 
steps toward compliance (such as neutralizing opposition from parents) and 
steps against compliance (such lobbying the government).






Solely compliance “Well if the subsidies are directly available. I assume that suppliers have the 
digi-wall as well. Then it’s just a matter of making arrangements and training 
people. That could happen in 4 or 7 months – I’m not exactly sure – but in any 
case it’s soon.[….] If you have a positive attitude towards implementing such a 
system, than I wouldn’t know why you should wait until it has been enforced. In 
my opinion and from my reading of the text, there is no reason to wait. There 
are no complex trajectories you need to follow here” (Manager 1). 
Partial compliance “I would plead for a separate room to use this digital wall and to supervise its 
use. Especially the hyperactive or hypersensitive children should be protected…
there is the danger they will be overstimulated” (Manager 67).
Challenge, Neutralize, 
Partial Compliance 
“My approach would be two-pronged. On the one hand – in my role of manager 
– I will report my misgivings about this development to the sector association, 
and join others in seeking ways to get this law modified. So to really put an 
effort into lobbying the government. But, at the same time, you need to prepare 
for a situation that it will be enforced after all. So then you need to examine 
again what is actually required of you, and how you feel about that. You need 
to sort out what the added value of this new practice might be for children, in 
order to engage the parents in dialogue about this. You also need to figure out 
how to incorporate this in your organization, that's part of what you need to 
plan. And you need to do that very gradually and carefully, especially if there's 
still a lot of turmoil and resistance, among employees and among parents. You 
just need to give it a go -- let the people who believe in it test it out on a small 
scale, for example in one location” (Manager 21).
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“Eventually you must comply because inspections are harsh...But I noticed it 
will be enforced after 5 years so I will be very careful as we experienced before 
things can change all of a sudden or they [the government] will come up with 
something else. Thus I will wait for a while. It might even be that they discover 
this digi-wall is not so good after all. So I want to protect my organization 
because these things cost a lot of energy…..We could use some peace because 
we have trouble keeping up with the pace at which new regulations are being 
implemented…….On the other hand, I will need the time to prepare for all these 
changes…. I want to know what kind of research is being done regarding the 
effects on children. You need to know what this law really entails because it 
could change our whole way of working. I need to know this information for 
my explanation to parents…..First I want to know where parents’ resistance is 
coming from. If I discover that they keep being negative even after our talks, I 
will need to go back to the government. We can form a kind of coalition with 
other daycare centers to take a stronger stance when opposing the local 
government and we need to be able to present our alternative ideas. We expect 
them to communicate all our worries to the national government….. We might 
adapt this very gradually if parents’ resistance remains. Maybe start by placing 
a small computer on a table and then slowly expand. I need to balance all their 
expectations in the whole picture when running this organization. Listen to 
parents, to employees and to the children as well and try to be somewhere in 
the middle” (Manager 17).
Across all complexity and normative orientation conditions, partial compliance, 
was a very frequent strategy, used by about 30 percent of the respondents. 
The partial compliance strategy, especially when paired with neutralizing, is 
the organizational attempt to accommodate multiple institutional demands 
partially through the minor to moderate alteration of the demands and/or 
responses (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). The managers indicated that 
they would discuss and bargain with their employees and parents on how the 
new practice could be adopted in such a way that it would complement - instead 
of replace - existing practices. This could, for example, be achieved by agreeing 
that the digital wall would not interfere with the time spent playing outdoors, 
or that it would be used for limited times, or in limited places. Managers would 
search for a common goal (i.e., what is in the children’s best interest), balance 
the legal demands with constituent demands and their own pedagogical vision 
(influencing their normative orientation), and agree to adapt the practice. Many 
managers stressed that they would prefer to tailor the practice in such a way 
that they could act consistently with their beliefs. Similarly, there is the idea 
that this practice should be made to match the children’s individual needs. 
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 “There are some positive aspects, but we will not confront children 
with this new practice all the time. So instead of having this wall in each 
group in the centre, we could opt for having one wall in a central room 
in the centre. And then not everybody has to be able to work with it...
But to find that balance, that’s what counts. Do not follow blindly, but 
instead use what works for you and seek a good translation of this 
practice for your own organization” (Manager 79). 
At the extreme, partial compliance involved ceremonial adoption only. Managers 
anticipated this ceremonial behavior when they could not find a balance 
between the new regulatory demand and the existing pedagogical beliefs of the 
organization, or if they could not reach an agreement with parents:
“If parents continue to be negative about this digital wall it could be that 
we will have this wall but that we will never use it. Or we will replace it 
for a blackboard and change that when the inspection visits” (Manager 
3).
Neutralizing was also a frequently anticipated response among the managers, 
used by approximately 25 percent of our respondents. Neutralizing involved 
reducing complexity by selectively reducing opposition through what Oliver 
(1991: 157) called manipulation (co-optation, influence and control) and 
compromising (balancing, pacifying and bargaining with external constituents) 
(Oliver, 1991: 153). Managers anticipated persuading parents and/or employees 
to reconsider their opposition if the added value of the practice for the children 
could be demonstrated. For example, managers would invite experts who 
could persuade parents of the beneficial effects of the digital wall, or would 
present their experiences from pilot projects. In addition, managers mentioned 
more coercively controlling employees: “it’s part of their job and eventually 
they would be forced to comply” (Manager 52). Respondents also mentioned 
consulting with and involving parents and employees and working together 
with them in implementation to make sure the practice fit their needs. As such, 
they tried to take away any concerns about the use of the digital wall. 
“I think that parents as such are open for this type of modernization 
(referring to digital wall) and if you can explain properly why you do it 
and how you will facilitate this, my experience is that parents can be 
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convinced. When all parents would resist, I would send a proposal to 
the parent committee, suggest a pilot in collaboration with the parent 
committee at a location, and then start there, see how it goes. I would 
expect that that would work” (Manager 81). 
Neutralizing opposed constituents like employees and parents is supportive of 
compliance with the institution, as it attempts to subvert disruption efforts.
While neutralizing involves pro-compliance manipulation, manipulation in 
the form of lobbying may also be used in the most active form of resistance 
we observed: challenging the source of the coercive pressure, in this case, the 
government. Challenging overlaps the defiance category in Oliver’s framework, 
as it involves going “on the offensive” against institutional pressures, and 
making a “virtue” out of resistance (Oliver, 1991). Challenging involves the active 
intent to alter the content of institutional requirements and to influence their 
promoters (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010), and as such, it is institutional 
work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). For instance, 28 of our respondents indicated 
that they would lobby governmental agencies to change or redefine the norms 
and criteria for evaluation or to completely abandon the new law (cf. Oliver, 
1991). In addition, they would look for peers with a similar point of view and 
form a collective, publish in trade journals or publish articles in newspapers 
to challenge the government and to stimulate a debate. Besides targeting the 
source of the new law directly, some managers encouraged parents to start 
their own lobby. 
“I will mobilize other organizations in this region to see how we can 
cooperate and stand up to this development, first by informing the 
municipal officer and arguing that this is not the way to go and that we 
will resist” (Manager 51). 
Delay was coded when decision makers indicated they would wait to decide 
on compliance until complexity resolves. Just under twenty percent of our 
respondents envisioned this strategy. We observed that organizations planned to 
delay their response for quite some time, remarking that in 5 years’ time, much 
could happen, given resistance from parents and/or employees. The government 
could also change before implementation. The uncertainty associated with 
institutional complexity appears to make waiting a wise strategy. 
“It’s a hypothetical future situation that will take place in five years. 
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If I consider parents’ reactions and that of Boink [national parent 
association] then it is highly probable that this process will take an 
entirely different turn. If they have a strong voice and pedagogical 
research demonstrates that this is not desirable for children… then 
why would I anticipate a new rule that might not be implemented?” 
(Manager 27).
They also indicated they would adopt a wait and see attitude in order to 
learn from the mistakes of the first movers. When organizations lacked an 
understanding of the rationale behind the pressure, and they were unsure of 
the value of the practice, the temptation to delay appeared to be strong. 
Less than ten percent of the managers envisioned an avoidance strategy. 
Avoidance refers to the attempts of organizations to circumvent compliance 
in certain ways (Oliver, 1991: Pache & Santos, 2010). In our case, respondents 
indicated that they would quit their job as a kind of ‘final escape’ if the other 
anticipated responses such as neutralizing resistance or challenging the law 
would not result in an acceptable situation for them.
To conclude, we found that decision makers anticipate multiple response 
strategies prior to complying with new regulatory demands. We now describe 
our findings specific to the decision maker’s normative orientation and the 
complexity conditions in the order of their presentation in Figure 5.1. 
Normative fit orientation
When the decision maker felt the proposed practice fit their normative 
orientation, we saw fewer responses overall, and more compliant responses. 
When decision makers interpreted that constituents were supportive, they 
indicated they would adopt the practice rather quickly, though some indicated 
cautiously that they would comply only partially until the law was fully 
enforced. Those that responded quickly justified their response with the idea 
that early adoption would bring opportunities (e.g. gaining and maintaining 
parents’ trust and support; attracting new customers, creating goodwill among 
inspectors) and that barriers were largely absent:
“It’s a positive story. A new way of working, with a bit of technology. That 
interests me and I want to be ahead of the others. The usual reasons 
why you wouldn’t pursue such a change do not apply in this case. Is 
there money? Yes there is, I read there are subsidies which are directly 
available. Is there resistance among employees? No, there isn’t. They 
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would like to work in this new manner and it’s possible to integrate it 
with their existing ways of working. Is there resistance among parents? 
No, there isn’t. They certainly assess the matter carefully. What do we 
think of the content of this new law? Stimulating early learning among 
children is a high priority for us... so it fits in with our approach. So as 
there are no factors holding us back, well great…Let’s start immediately. 
It can be done quickly” (Manager 14).
When decision makers interpreted constituent pressures as mixed, most 
indicated they would attempt to neutralize opposition to the practice by 
persuading, influencing or controlling their constituents, also consistent with 
a pro-compliance orientation. Only employees were the targets of control 
responses – respondents took a lighter touch with the more powerful parents. 
In this category, respondents also mentioned that they would partially comply 
as they worked to get parents or employees onside, and to ensure they adapted 
the practice to fit their pedagogical vision. A few respondents indicated they 
would delay their compliance to assess the effect of the parent lobby (under 
the condition where the parents were opposed). While the same responses 
were observed when both parents and employees opposed the practice, three 
respondents of the six in this category indicated they would also support parents 
in opposing the practice, challenging the government through lobbying. Thus, 
even when respondents themselves supported a coercively mandated practice, 
they were sensitive to pressure from constituents. 
Normative neutral orientation 
What is immediately noticeable when examining the responses of decision 
makers that are normatively neutral with respect to the practice is that 
there are more responses, and more responses in the same category that are 
simultaneously resistant and pro-compliant with the pressure. Decision makers 
seemed to face more ambiguity when they themselves were not sure if they 
supported the practice. 
When constituents were supportive of the new practice, most decision 
makers indicated they would comply rather quickly. Two of eight respondents 
indicated they would comply only partially and two would delay their response 
to learn from other organizations. When constituent pressures were mixed, 
respondents predominantly indicated they would partially comply with the 
practice, often combined with a neutralize response. They would bargain with 
parents, try to compromise on the implementation of the new wall by using it 
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less extensively or take a step-by-step approach in involving employees. They 
would also argue that time was needed in order to reach a workable situation 
and it did not make sense “to introduce this all of a sudden”. 
“I always start by gathering information, taking positions, and I would 
also discuss this with management. See where it [the new law] can fit 
in with our pedagogical vision. Although I have the impression it will 
largely deviate from our vision, try to look for some connections. You 
need to show employees that we do try to stay true to that vision, 
but on the other hand we need to implement this new approach. 
Perhaps start with a pilot to see what the first experiences are and to 
discuss the obstacles, before implementing this throughout the whole 
organization” (Manager 47).
Managers indicated they would balance different expectations and negotiate 
with constituents. In that sense they tried to buffer the organization from 
unnecessary losses, such as losing parental support or employee commitment. 
Two respondents indicated they would delay the implementation in order to 
wait and see what would happen and only one would fully comply. In addition, 
four respondents would try to reduce complexity by influencing parents or 
employees to neutralize their concerns: 
“If one is confronted with a new development, in this case a law, but 
your customer has this negative view, so then you need to invest in 
communication. Talk about the positive sides of the change and try to 
explain that whatever it is that frightens him, will not happen. […] To 
postpone something that needs to happen anyway is not an option. 
You can slow down the pace at which you implement changes, to give 
yourself enough time to influence and change that negative view, and 
turn it into a positive attitude. You shouldn’t push things through within 
a month” (Manager 49).
In the condition when both parents and employees opposed the mandate from 
the government, we see respondents mainly delaying or challenging the new 
legislation. In their attempts to delay implementation we find respondents 
who plan to buffer their organization and wait for research results about the 
effectiveness of the new digital wall. Respondents that challenge the new 
legislation try to influence parents, support parents’ lobby efforts or try to build 
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support among parents. Surprisingly, they less frequently mention influencing 
or persuading their employees. Some of our respondents claimed that employees 
feared any unknown situation but also that employees just had to obey the law.
Normative misfit orientation
About 30 percent of all managers experienced a normative misfit between their 
own pedagogical beliefs and the new regulatory pressure. These managers 
stressed that, for instance, children should be allowed to develop gradually and 
at their own pace instead of being forced to learn or that the digital wall would 
destroy a child’s creativity. They were afraid that this ‘new’ law would put too 
much emphasis on early learning, whereas they strongly believed children 
should be allowed to play freely and explore the world around them without 
too much interference. 
For some of the managers this normative misfit was so strong that it seemed 
to cause an overriding effect towards delay, in which they argued “I won’t sell a 
service I don’t believe in”, or more actively, towards challenge and exit. This is 
vividly illustrated by the following quote from a manager who was confronted 
with the most ‘positive situation’ where employees and parents were supportive 
of the change: 
“It makes me furious. These politicians do not have a clue about our 
business! They do not understand how children develop in the early 
stages. They cannot and should not learn in the same way as older 
children in classrooms…. I would do everything within my power to stop 
this. I would look for other organizations that share my concerns. Start 
a lobby and publish in opinion journals….But once this becomes reality 
I’m gone. It is that simple. This is just an impossible situation for me to 
work in” (Manager 36).
Other decision makers with normative misfit facing only supportive constituents 
planned both resistant responses, including challenge or delay then exit (3), and 
pro-compliance responses, including one compliance response, and two partial 
compliance and neutralizing responses, involving adapting implementation 
with parents and employees to fit the preferred pedagogy.  
When the interpretation of the decision maker resulted in a condition of 
mixed pressures, our respondents anticipated using responses that mixed pro-
compliance with resistance behavior. Most respondents indicated they planned 
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to challenge the government (8 of 12 managers), by forming a collective 
and lobbying the government. This strategy was often used with more pro-
compliance strategies like attempting to neutralize parents’ or employees’ 
resistance by involving them in the implementation (5) and partially complying 
(4). Plans to delay (3) and exit (1) were also noted. 
We also note that parental support appeared to have a stronger effect than 
employee support in the mixed support/normative misfit condition. A lack of 
parental support seems to ‘confirm’ the initial resistance of a manager, thereby 
stimulating delay or more resistant strategies. Parents’ support on the other 
hand, could mitigate or ‘tone down’ the effects of normative misfit, especially if 
the parents are judged to have a very important voice: 
“We believe children should play freely…do what they like to do. We 
absolutely cannot support the focus on early learning. You should not 
pressure these children…they learn from each other and their play. 
And it also worries me that a lot of children play video games and get 
addicted to that…I think it is more important they play outside. But if 
parents really want this, then who am I to judge? Then we can say we 
do not want this…but then they might go to another center. And they 
might convince us….I think the parents’ opinions are more important 
than those of my employees, because we are taking care of their 
children” (Manager 54).
When only employees resisted the legislation, decision makers were more likely 
to attempt to neutralize the employees’ pressures through partial compliance, 
though several also planned to fight as well. Interestingly, the time to 
compliance was substantially lower in the condition where parents supported 
the legislation and employees did not (3.1 years) vs. when the conditions were 
reversed (4.25 years). In line with this finding, one of our respondents would 
actually use parents to convince her employees. 
In the condition when both parents and employees opposed the mandate 
from the government, we see respondents challenging the new law. They could 
not make sense of this new law, which was not supported by parents and 
employees nor did it fit their own pedagogical ideas. They would try everything 
within their power to fight and manipulate the government. They would form 
coalitions and support the parents’ lobby. 
“… I think parents are raising an important issue. These children shouldn’t 
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be pushed to learn at such a young age. Let them play. I would put it 
off for as long as possible. Especially since the childcare workers will 
have their own problems as well, which I think is a realistic scenario...
They will be in complete shock…This is something really essential, and 
if faced with such strong attitudes of parents against it -- I think I have 
my reasons to not go along with it…If other organizations share similar 
ideas we can join forces and fight this. I would certainly join a lobby and 
voice my concerns. It is ridiculous something is imposed if so many 
people are against it” (Manager 8). 
Some would compromise by partially complying. Two respondents indicated 
that they would seriously consider an exit strategy from the field of childcare.
To sum up, our interview data has provided us with insights concerning 
the differential response strategies decision makers anticipate as they attempt 
to reconcile multiple constituents’ demands. In addition to the way in which 
managers initially interpreted and evaluated these demands (as described 
in the vignette), their normative interpretation of the new law shaped their 
response. We refer the reader to Table 5.6 and 5.7 for more exemplary quotes 
supporting our analysis. Together, our statistical data and interview results 
illustrate how a similar coercive pressure can impact organizations in a variety 
of ways, triggering different processes within an organization and leading to 
different response strategies under different complexity and normative fit 
conditions. In the next section we derive propositions from these findings and 
discuss the implications of our study. 
5.6 A Process Model of Responses to 
Institutional Complexity 
Like Oliver (1991), we found contextual, organizational and pressure-specific 
conditions, which influenced responses. In this study, however, we extended 
our focus to consider responses to multiple pressures in institutionally complex 
environments. Going beyond prior studies, we dug deeper into managers’ own 
stated concerns to find out how they responded to complex pressures in their 
environments, and the reasons they chose their responses. Our study suggests 
a process model of responses to institutional complexity (summarized in Figure 
5.1) that connects decision makers’ interpretations of constituents’ pressures, 
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decision makers’ normative orientation toward the practice, and the complexity 
condition the decision maker faced, which together affect decision makers’ 
responses to multiple targets. We derive propositions from our findings. 
Decision makers’ interpretations of constituents’ pressures. 
Our study reinforces the notion that decision makers’ interpretations are 
critical when determining organizational responses (Barr & Huff, 1997; George 
et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). Adding nuance to resource dependence 
arguments (Oliver, 1991), we found that decision makers considered both power 
and legitimacy when considering constituent pressures, consistent with the 
stakeholder perspective advanced by Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997). They 
interpreted which constituents in their environment they felt they needed to 
pay attention to, discounting even some powerful actors’ pressures because 
they felt their influence on this issue was normatively inappropriate, or because 
they felt the pressures might change before they were compelled to comply. 
These judgments seemed to originate from managers’ pre-existing schemas 
(Barr & Huff, 1997; Fiske & Taylor, 1991), as the managers’ initial interpretation 
of the importance of the different constituents’ demands (as described in the 
vignette) were judged differently. Whereas many managers stressed parental 
support as crucial, others felt that parents do not always know what is best 
pedagogically, with similar arguments applied to employees. These differences 
impacted managers’ intended responses. For example, some managers would 
invest a great deal of time in convincing their employees about the added 
value of the mandatory practice, while others intended to coercively control 
employees. On balance, the more powerful external constituents appeared to 
have more influence than the internal constituents who have regular access 
to organizational decision makers. In the condition where both employees and 
parents were opposed to the practice, decision makers referred primarily to 
their concerns about parents and their plans to respond to them, and when 
decision makers experienced a normative misfit with the practice, compliance 
was delayed much longer when only parents opposed the legislation than 
when only employees opposed the legislation. In part, these observations can 
be explained by the role parents could play with government as well. If parents 
were really unhappy with the practice, it might be politically untenable for the 
government to enforce it. Employees didn’t have that more public voice, and 
they could be more easily controlled by their managers.  
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Normative orientation
Decision makers also interpreted the legitimacy of the practice they were 
required to introduce, and many had their own (strong) opinions about whether 
or not the practice was beneficial for children, and would thus allow them 
to achieve their organizational goals. The fit of constituent pressures with a 
decision maker’s normative orientation was an important factor affecting 
response. Though our study 1 results showed that normative orientation did 
not significantly affect the timing of response, it did affect the nature of their 
responses. When the practice fit their normative orientation, decision makers 
were disposed to choose pro-compliance responses, ceteris paribus. When the 
practice did not fit the decision maker’s normative orientation, the decision 
maker tended to choose resistant responses, especially challenging the coercive 
pressure. When the decision maker’s normative orientation was neutral or 
unknown, the decision-maker was more likely to delay, often with the intention 
to learn more through research or through watching the situation unfold. 
While we not many decision makers identified the coercive pressure as either a 
threat or opportunity, the key variables in George et al.’s (2006) framework, like 
George et al., we did find that ambiguity in the decision maker’s interpretation 
of the practice led to the use of multiple strategies, some of which were pro-
compliance, and some of which were more resistant.
Proposition 1: Decision makers interpret the coercive practice via their 
normative orientation, tending toward pro-compliance responses when 
they experience a normative fit, resistant responses when they experience 
a normative misfit and mixed or delay responses when their normative 
orientation is neutral. 
We found it interesting to note that even when responding to a hypothetical 
vignette, decision makers brought their own strong opinions about what was 
normatively appropriate and what was not. Of course we cannot interpret 
these as merely individual differences – these opinions have been formed by 
the experiences of decision makers in their organizations and in their field. Yet 
it reinforces that decision makers are not completely free to comply with the 
demands of their powerful constituents – they are institutionally embedded 
agents with norms of legitimacy, and they will be driven to resistance when 
those norms are violated. 
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Complexity condition
Decision makers’ response decisions were also affected by the mix of pressures 
that they faced, which we call complexity conditions. While research is 
increasingly beginning to identify institutional complexity, contradictions 
and pluralism as a key concern for institutional theory (Greenwood et al., 
2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Seo & Creed, 2002), we still have only a limited 
understanding of how decision makers navigate complex environments. In our 
study, most decision makers facing all supportive constituents tended toward 
compliance, even when they themselves disagreed. Decision makers facing 
powerful, or predominantly, opposed constituents tended to use more resistant 
responses, sometimes pairing these with more pro-compliance attempts to 
neutralize constituent pressures. Decision makers facing mixed constituent 
pressures used delays or attempted to balance demands through partial 
compliance and neutralizing. 
Proposition 2: Decision makers will tend toward pro-compliance responses 
when they face supportive constituents, resistant responses when they face 
opposing constituents, and mixed or delay responses when pressures are 
conflicting. 
The interaction of complexity conditions and normative 
orientation. 
We also found that complexity conditions and normative orientation interacted 
quite substantially. When a decision maker’s normative misfit was reinforced 
by a powerful external constituent, or to a lesser extent, by organization 
members, the decision maker nearly always resisted the institutional pressure. 
Conversely, when the decision maker felt the practice was a normative fit, and 
constituents were universally supportive, decision makers primarily chose to 
comply, and quickly. When complexity conditions and normative orientation 
were misaligned, however, and when decision makers experienced more 
ambiguity (normative neutral orientation and mixed constituent pressures), 
decision makers used a mix of pro–compliance and resistance responses, or 
just delayed the decision until things became clearer. 
Proposition 3. Aligned complexity and normative orientation conditions 
reinforce one another such that decision makers will choose more resistant 
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responses if they face resistant constituents and view the practice as a 
normative misfit, and they will choose more compliant responses if they face 
supportive constituents and view the practice as a normative fit.  
Proposition 4. Misaligned complexity and normative orientation conditions 
lead decision makers to use a mix of active pro-compliance and resistance 
strategies aimed at reducing institutional complexity, or passive delay 
strategies. 
Together, these factors (interpretation of constituent pressures, normative 
orientation toward the practice and the complexity conditions) conditioned 
decision makers’ response strategies, and the timing of their compliance. 
Our study extends existing research by identifying that interpretations 
of constituents’ importance are not all or nothing, directing actors simply to 
comply with the most important constituent. Instead, organizational actors can 
simultaneously enact different responses to different targets in ways that are 
aimed at reducing the complexity they face. By compromising with opposing 
constituents through partially complying with coercive pressures, or reducing 
their concerns through neutralizing efforts, and/or challenging the views of 
supporting constituents, decision makers can moderate competing pressures 
to resolve institutional complexity. By delaying compliance, they can buy time 
to hope that competing pressures resolve either through their own efforts, or 
through the efforts of others. 
Proposition 5: Based on their interpretations of all constituent pressures, 
decision makers will enact different responses with different constituents 
designed to moderate and align institutional demands in order to resolve 
institutional complexity. 
5.7 Discussion 
In this research we open up the black box of decision makers’ interpretations 
of institutional complexity, identifying first the effect of complexity on the 
timing of adoption, and then its effect on the range of strategies directed at 
various targets. We show how decision makers weigh competing demands 
and interests, and how they decide to respond under various conditions. By 
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improving our understanding of why decision makers choose when and how to 
respond, we showed that actors sometimes deliberately and strategically choose 
to delay compliance with coercive pressures in the hope that complexity will 
resolve. New institutional pressures often take time to fully materialize, which 
means that potential adopters need time to assess the strength, persistence 
and consequences of these forces (Ritchie & Melnyk, 2012), possibly to avoid 
or disguise the adoption of measures which may decrease their legitimacy 
with key constituents (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012). Furthermore, they need time 
for their own and others’ influence strategies to work, moderating both the 
demands themselves and the opposition to them in order to resolve complexity. 
Delaying compliance can become a strategic response that ultimately yields 
more benefits (cf. Ritchie & Melnyk, 2012).
Our results also show that decision makers may try to neutralize opposing 
pressures or challenge constituents. Importantly, our results also demonstrate 
that prior to compliance, decision makers consider a series of distinct responses 
depending on the degree of institutional complexity they experience, their 
interpretation of constituent pressures and their normative orientation.
5.7.1 Theoretical implications
In this research we have focused our attention on decision makers’ 
interpretations of, and response to, institutional complexity to understand 
heterogeneous responses to coercive pressures for practice adoption. 
While many prior studies of practice diffusion have inferred motives for 
adoption (Barron, et al., 1986; Palmer, et al., 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1994), few studies have examined such motives directly. 
Recent efforts take laudable steps in this direction by theorizing (George et al., 
2006) and testing (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), how decision makers’ interpretations 
of new practices as opportunities or threats influence the timing of their 
adoptions. 
In this study, we take a novel methodological approach that provides some 
key theoretical benefits. We manipulated conditions of institutional complexity, 
specifically the support of powerful external constituents and organization 
members, yet respondents made their own interpretations of institutional 
pressures, and we were able to observe these directly as they described them 
in interviews. While other studies have identified cognitive conditions and 
responses in advance (threat and opportunity framing), our direct observations 
of decision makers’ own concerns regarding both pressures and responses 
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is appropriate at this early stage of investigations into how decision makers 
respond to institutional complexity. We also go beyond the single responses 
of adoption or compliance directed at single pressures (Tilcsik, 2010) that 
are usually the focus of diffusion studies to examine how decision makers 
interpret and respond to multiple institutional pressures, in what often appear 
to be coordinated strategies to resolve institutional complexity. Such strategies 
enable the renegotiation of arrangements among multiple constituents. Our 
findings of delayed compliance, and multiple responses targeted at multiple 
constituents, open new avenues of research in institutional theory and provide 
a valuable early empirical look at organizations’ responses to institutional 
complexity.  
Oliver (1991) was among the first to explicitly theorize about the variability 
of strategic responses within institutional contexts and the conditions under 
which organizations resist institutional demands. We extend her work by 
showing that under conditions of institutional complexity, the target of the 
response is also an important consideration, as is the set of responses an 
organization is using with multiple organizations at any time. Organizations 
face pressures to go in multiple directions, and they may collaborate to jointly 
lobby or pressure others to take specific actions. They may work to reduce the 
institutional pressures that they and others face or they may delay compliance 
until the last possible moment, predicting that pressures will change over 
time, and compliance efforts may be wasted. It is likely that the strategies that 
specific organizations take vary based on their status within the institutional 
environment, a variable we did not study. Elite organizations facing pressures 
which do not fit their normative orientations, for example, may be more likely 
to undertake the institutional work of challenging the demands than peripheral 
actors, for whom such work may have little chance of success. Future research 
is needed to examine the effects of variables such as status, network position 
and resources on institutional responses.
In addition to the variety in the nature of responses that organizations display 
when confronted with institutional pressures, the timing of these responses 
also varies quite considerably, as our experimental results demonstrate. Since 
institutional pressures often take time to materialize and stabilize, potential 
adopters need time to assess these forces, envision their consequences, 
develop their strategies and wait for them to bear fruit. As our interviews show, 
these organizations had good reason to postpone their response. As long as 
key constituents do not support a new practice or there is a chance that a 
(coercive) pressure might change, the inertia bias ‘pays off’ and the incentive 
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to postpone can be substantial for organizations. Moreover, these respondents 
were engaged in active influence tactics such as lobbying the government. Our 
interview results therefore do not ‘fit’ the notion of late adopters as ‘passive’, 
a notion that has remained dominant in institutional theorizing (e.g., Hirsch & 
Lounsbury, 1997; Lounsbury, 2007: 289; Strang & Macy, 2001). Our results point 
to the possibility that late adopters can be very ‘active’ as well, especially in 
their attempts to resolve complexity. Our qualitative results show that such 
time before compliance is often invested in activities that help decision makers 
to learn more about the practice itself, about others’ reactions to it, and about 
potential ways to reduce complexity by adapting the practice to balance 
opponents’ interests.
In our study, partial compliance was a commonly used strategy to help 
decision makers engage in learning and solution seeking. Pilot projects, 
experimental exposure, or implementation done with, and adapted to, key 
constituents were both means of learning through partial adoption. The large 
number of partial adoptions in our data suggested this is a very common 
strategy, and a means by which institutional pressures can be custom-fit to 
different environments. Yet adoption that appeared to be strictly ceremonial 
was also mentioned as an option, if decision makers couldn’t find a way to 
balance constituents’ needs and their own normative orientation. Partial 
adoption thus appears to be on a continuum, and while researchers may see 
ceremonial adoption as a strategy of resistance (Oliver, 1991), it may also be 
a learning experiment that failed to successfully resolve complexity through 
adaptation, and was thus abandoned. Further research into the idea of partial 
compliance would shed light on these issues. 
Our data showed that ambiguity in either normative orientation toward the 
practice, or in constituents’ demands caused delays in responses and the use of 
more mixed responses. Our findings underscored how even seemingly objective 
situations, such as the introduction of a new law, often result in a complex 
or ambiguous situation when multiple constituents start to give meaning and 
voice to new legal demands (Edelman, 1991, 1992; Heimer 1999). Future research 
could investigate the role of ambiguity. Highly ambiguous cues of constituents 
and a lack of specificity of the institutional demands might give so little 
guidance to the timing of compliance that, as a consequence, varying levels of 
institutional complexity might not affect timing of compliance anymore.
It is likely such ambiguity generates stress for decision-makers, which can 
be a significant prompt for action (Barr and Huff, 1997). In line with recent work 
beginning to investigate emotions in institutional work (Voronov &Vince, 2012), 
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it would be interesting to track decision makers’ emotions as they face and 
respond to institutional pressures. Are those who delay experiencing significant 
ambivalence, or are they merely biding their time until it is appropriate to 
act? How do decision makers respond emotionally to mixed pressures? If the 
normative misfit of a practice is a strong stimulus for challenging institutional 
work, is any violation of normative expectations likely to stimulate institutional 
work? Further research into the role of emotions and institutional agency seems 
very promising.  
5.7.2 Methodological implications
Our study demonstrates the value of using experimental approaches within 
institutional theory, as a way to complement existing research methodologies 
and to overcome some of its main problems. Recently, several scholars in the 
field recommended that experimental approaches in institutional theory be 
used (David & Bitektine, 2009; George, et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). 
At present, many of the theoretical insights of institutional theory go 
untested and researchers are warning that the theory might lose its momentum 
due to ambiguity in meaning. A few researchers have even stressed the need to 
return to some of the core theoretical statements and proposed relationships 
(e.g., David & Bitektine, 2009; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; 
Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Suddaby, 2010; Zucker, 1991). From this perspective, we 
deem the key advantage of an experimental approach is its ability to actually 
test previously posited relationships and to extend theorizing on important 
mechanisms that are at work. If we take Zucker’s call seriously, there is a need to 
re-discover some of the roots of institutional theory by devoting careful attention 
to some of its micro-foundations, instead of treating institutionalization as a 
‘black box’ at the organizational level (Zucker, 1991: 105). 
We believe that when tackling questions concerning these micro-level 
underpinnings – thus, to understand how macro-institutional pressures 
‘work through’ and are enacted by individuals in concrete social situations – 
experimental approaches in particular hold great promise. If designed properly, 
experimental designs can effectively confirm (or disconfirm) cause and effect 
relationships that are often suggested, but difficult to isolate in context-rich 
case studies (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009: 38; David & Bitektine, 2009: 171). In this 
way one can increase internal validity of the outcomes and simultaneously 
avoid the problems of retrospection. Moreover, experimental work could 
deepen our understanding of the links between cognition, motivation and 
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organizational decision-making (George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009: 914). 
It is critical, however, that such work has high external validity to ensure it is 
really capturing institutional processes. Our use of complementary qualitative 
interview data allowed us to ensure that decision makers felt the vignettes 
we used had high external validity, and that decision makers took the study 
seriously. More importantly, we were able to assess the reasoning behind 
decision makers’ choices of how to respond to complex institutional pressures 
from multiple targets, yielding a unique set of insights to contribute to our 
theoretical understanding of strategic responses. 
Another way of expanding the theoretical model would be to make vignettes 
even more realistic, for instance by adding information on the timing of adoption 
by competitors in the field. Incorporating such information would increase 
realism as many organizations use benchmarks for their strategies based on 
the behavior of competitors. Theoretically, such a design also enables a test of 
the simultaneous effect of institutional complexity and mimetic isomorphism, 
and can reveal which factor has the strongest effect on timing of anticipated 
compliance. A second way of making the research model more realistic is to 
introduce multiple events and switch to a so-called within-subjects design. In 
that case one schedules multiple events on a time line, with a certain amount 
of time separating each event. One can let the events unfold in such a way 
that gradually the normative impacts of institutional demands become clear, 
whereas initially the impacts looked quite straightforward and objective. 
Theoretically this would enable dynamic modeling of the timing of compliance 
as normative issues would come to the fore gradually. This could possibly create 
disappointment, frustration and therefore gradually more delay, challenge and 
avoidance could occur.
5.7.3 Limitations 
We see four main limitations of our study. First, our model imposes a coercive 
pressure, namely a new law that would be enforced in the childcare sector. 
This implies that our findings cannot be generalized to normative and cognitive 
institutional pressures. Second, to make this coercive pressure salient we added 
a fixed time window of five years within which respondents needed to schedule 
their intended compliance, which implies that our findings are not valid for 
institutional pressures that cover longer time spans or for situations where 
compliance is required immediately. Third, regarding the timing of strategic 
responses, we only measured timing of anticipated compliance, and ignored 
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the timing and sequencing of alternative responses. These represent promising 
areas for future research. Finally, our experimental design did not allow us to 
investigate actual organizational responses, which implies that we have to be 
cautious about generalizing our findings. 
5.8 Conclusion
We believe this study takes a significant step forward in providing an 
understanding of how organizational decision makers respond to complex 
and competing pressures in their institutional environments. Our study 
contributes to recent studies on institutional complexity by examining decision 
makers’ interpretations of complex situations and their subsequent range and 
combinations of responses. We demonstrate how decision makers interpret 
institutional pressures and how they target strategic responses at multiple 
constituents to reduce complexity. Three main factors influenced organizational 
responses: the normative orientation of the decision maker, the decision-
maker’s interpretation of constituents’ demands, and the configuration of 
constituent pressures the decision maker experienced. We invite scholars of 
institutional complexity to further specify the causal mechanisms underlying 
organizational responses.
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APPENDIX A VIGNETTE DEVELOPMENT
We developed four vignettes corresponding to the following conditions:
Vignette 1: High support from both a powerful constituent and   
  organization members.
Vignette 2: Low support from a powerful constituent and High support  
  from organization members.
Vignette 3: High support from a powerful constituent and Low support  
  from organization members.
Vignette 4: Low support from both a powerful constituent and   
  organization members.
To test the vignettes prior to the actual experiment we conducted two pilot 
studies. In the first pilot study, we asked seven managers to read the vignette and 
comment on the case. This resulted in lively discussions with the respondents, 
leading us to believe the vignette was sufficiently realistic. Some of the 
respondents asked questions about the costs of implementation, so we made 
minor adjustments to our description of the vignette in order to control for this 
cost aspect, so that social and normative issues would dominate deliberations 
of how and when to respond. 
In the second pilot, we tested all four versions of the vignette and the 
questionnaire. We asked 16 respondents to read a version of the vignette and to 
complete a brief questionnaire. Overall, the findings showed enough variance 
between the four groups. Moreover, it turned out that the short interviews we 
had with the respondents after the completion of the questionnaire allowed for 
further in-depth analyses of the reasoning used in formulating their responses. 
The vignette texts are shown below.
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VIGNETTE TEXTS
Childcare has become an important topic in Dutch politics. 
Therefore, as the director of a daycare organization, you are 
frequently confronted by regulatory changes. Such changes 
could, for example, affect buildings, playgrounds and pedagogical 
practices. Included among these developments, we can find a 
number of initiatives which seem to signal a shift from a solely 
playing environment towards a learning environment. Suppose 
the government – in line with these developments – introduces 
a new law that prescribes new tools and working methods 
to stimulate early learning in daycare centers. This new law 
prescribes a digital wall for each group in the childcare center, 
which is an augmented blackboard that integrates several 
technological features to serve as an interactive play and learning 
tool. As this technology can be integrated in the wall, no space 
is lost. The costs of modifications will be covered by government 
subsidies. This new law will become effective in exactly 5 years 
from now. By that time your building and work methods need 
to have been adapted to conform to this law. Inspections will be 
carried out to enforce the use of the digi-wall.
Baseline vignette 
(Applies to all vignettes)
Adopting this digital wall will not really affect the nature of the 
daily work of your employees. They merely need to learn how to 
work with a bit of new technology, but on the whole their way 
of working will not change much. The majority of your childcare 
workers were recently given a training course by a digital wall 
manufacturer. It turns out that they acquire the skills required 
quite easily and that they are able to integrate these ideas in their 
work. Moreover, this prescribed way of working (with a greater 
focus on learning) closely matches their norms and ideas about 
what good childcare is and should be. They were already used to a 
greater focus on early learning.
High support of 
organization members 
(vignette 1 & 2)
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By adopting this digital wall, the daily work of your employees will 
change a great deal. Besides having to learn how to work with this 
new technology, the newly prescribed way of working is radically 
different from the manner in which they used to work. The 
majority of your childcare workers were recently given a training 
course by a digital wall manufacturer. It turns out that they have 
great difficulty in acquiring the skills required and in integrating 
these ideas in their work. Moreover, this prescribed way of working 
(with a greater focus on learning) very much runs counter to their 
norms and ideas about what good childcare is and should be. They 
see their role primarily as taking care of the children instead of 
teaching them.
Low support of 
organization members
(vignette 3 & 4 )
Soon after the announcement of this new law, Boink issues 
a response. Boink believes that this new law is a favourable 
development. They see this regulatory change as a unique 
opportunity, as the greater focus on early learning in daycare will 
ultimately help children get off to a quick start in elementary 
school. Boink, moreover, argues that this new law demonstrates that 
the childcare field as a whole is taken seriously. Boink, therefore, 
encourages all childcare organizations to implement the changes. 
Your parents’ committee completely supports Boink’s view. It, too, 
believes that their children will have better chances in elementary 
school if they follow this regulatory change. 
High support of powerful 
constituents
(vignette 1 & 3)
Soon after the announcement of this new law, Boink issues a 
response. Boink believes that this new law is not a favourable 
development. They see this regulatory change as a huge threat 
because children should not be pushed to learn at such a young 
age and that they should be allowed the freedom to play. Boink, 
moreover, argues that under this new law, the childcare field as a 
whole is at stake. Boink warns all childcare organizations to be very 
cautious in implementing the changes. Your parents’ committee 
completely supports Boink’s view. It, too, believes that the focus 
on learning under this new law would be detrimental to their 
children’s enjoyment and play.
Low support of powerful 
constituents 
(vignette 2 & 4)

6
General discussion and 
conclusion
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6.1 Summary of Main Findings 
While institutional scholars are increasingly focusing on institutional complexity 
as a major concern in institutional theory, we are only just beginning to identify 
how decision makers navigate in complex institutional environments and how 
they decide on the appropriate course of organizational action. Torn between 
different and often competing institutional demands, it is neither an easy nor 
a straightforward task to render organizational responses. In this dissertation 
we have tried to gain a better understanding of the heterogeneity of responses 
organizations employ in the light of institutional complexity and we have 
focused on the central role that key decision makers play in this regard. Below 
we provide a short summary of our main findings.
A dynamic interplay among multiple logics in Dutch childcare 
In Chapter 2 we began by tracing the sources of institutional complexity in 
the Dutch childcare field. Based on a historical narrative of childcare in the 
Netherlands that spans more than a century, we have pointed out how childcare 
issues have been continuously affected by multiple societal level logics. A 
dynamic interplay of the family logic, the state logic, the logic of religion and 
the market logic, shaped the preconditions for the emergence and growth of 
the Dutch childcare field. We have advanced a typology depicting the distinct 
types of interplay among these logics and we have described how they have 
been aligned, reinforced and have competed with one another during the past 
century (Greenwood et al., 2010; Goodrick & Reay, 2011).
Sustained by strong family, state and religious logics, we have shown that 
childcare has been a contested practice from its very onset. It is only due to 
the concurrent changes within and across multiple logics that formal childcare 
could become a legitimate solution. Yet, with the ideal of self-care still greatly 
embedded in Dutch society and with a state that strictly regulates the field, 
but which has also left it to perils of the market, childcare organizations 
are situated between strong and competing institutional demands. In the 
preceding chapters we have subsequently traced how organizations in turn 
have responded to various manifestations of institutional complexity.
A field-wide legitimacy threatening event
Chapter 3 investigated the institutional complexities that were triggered by 
a disruptive event that occurred in the Dutch childcare sector in 2010. The 
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Robert M. case - this is how the event has been labelled by the Dutch national 
press - has set in motion unprecedented and complex institutional pressures. 
The case hit the very heart of childcare services, namely children’s safety, and 
parents’ trust, soon after the event took place. Moreover, this breach in the 
trustworthiness of the field was exacerbated due to a two-year stream of media 
attention and field-wide scrutiny. 
Previous research has pointed out that legitimacy losses can spill over and 
affect ‘other’ organizations in the same field, because institutional constituents 
incorporate the possibility of such events into their general knowledge about 
a group of organizations (e.g., Jonsson et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2008; Barnett & 
King, 2008). Hence, childcare organizations have faced the negative effects of an 
event that has occurred largely beyond their span of control. In Chapter 3 we 
have investigated how organizations subsequently deal with disruptive events 
in their field and the contagion of legitimacy loss it triggers (Jonsson et al., 2009; 
Desai, 2011). 
The results of our survey have shown that even though the field as a whole 
has been greatly scrutinized after this event, childcare decision makers have 
experienced the event rather differently on both emotional (negative affect) and 
cognitive dimensions (legitimacy loss perceptions). Some decision makers seem 
to have distanced themselves or buffered themselves from the event, whereas 
others have been more deeply affected by it. Our findings have shown that 
childcare managers who possess higher levels of field identification (signaling 
the importance of the childcare field for their social identity) have given more 
elaborate responses to the event; they have adopted more control measures, 
such as tightening safety protocols and implementing responses related to 
the organization’s culture (for instance, the creation of an open culture). In 
particular, the decision makers’ perceptions regarding the extent to which their 
own organization has lost legitimacy, have turned out to be consequential in 
terms of the frequency of organizational responses. Even though we have found 
that decision makers with higher levels of field identification experienced more 
negative emotions following the event, these emotions were not directly related 
to organizational responsiveness. On the whole, our results have underscored 
that whether and how field-wide legitimacy threatening events raise actors’ 
reflexivity, and create possibilities for institutional change, is partially answered 
at the micro-level of analysis. Especially the perceived legitimacy losses 
appeared to explain the responsiveness to the institutional complexity that was 
caused by Robert M.’s acts of violation.
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The material and ideational side of institutions 
In Chapter 4, we explored a largely overlooked topic, the material side of 
institutions. Although institutional pressures often relate to both material and 
ideational aspects of organizing (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott, 2008; Thornton 
et al., 2012), little attention has been paid to the material side of institutions; 
such as the way in which institutional requirements can include prescriptions 
to material objects (such as buildings, technologies, or artifacts) or shape the 
repertoire of responses available to actors (Lepoutre & Valante, 2012; Leonardi 
& Barely, 2010). Nonetheless, material objects do matter to organizations and 
they influence their responses to new institutional requirements, especially 
because they are often intermingled with symbolic aspects (Orlikowski, 
2007). Based on the interviews held with childcare managers, we have shown 
how a new coercive pressure in the Dutch childcare field, which generated 
new requirements concerning children’s safety, health and well-being, have 
impacted simultaneously on both material objects (such as the daycare 
building, toys, furniture and the playground) as well as the ideational aspects 
of childcare organizations (beliefs about what constitutes ‘good’ childcare or 
normative beliefs about how children should grow up). We illustrated how the 
interpretation of the new institutional mandate by childcare decision makers 
reflects both material and ideational considerations. Our findings show that 
their perceptions of the degree of (mis)alignment of the new requirements 
with the existing organizational situation have shaped their evaluation of the 
consequences of (non)conformity and the breadth of responses available to 
them. When material misalignment combined with ideational misalignment 
occurred, this turned out to be most challenging for the decision makers; it 
generated high levels of institutional contradiction and triggered the most 
resistant responses. Moreover, since material discrepancies were clearly visible 
to inspectors, this precluded opportunities for organizations to mobilize more 
ceremonial responses. 
Exploring the timing and nature of responses to institutional 
complexity 
In Chapter 5 we presented a vignette experiment and follow-up interviews with 
childcare managers and traced decision makers’ interpretations of complexity. 
We focused on the complex institutional situation which arises when a powerful 
actor (such as the state) mandates organizations to adopt a new practice, while 
at the same time other important constituents do not support this practice. 
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Hence, a situation of institutional complexity is created as organizations 
face conflicting demands from multiple constituents (Greenwood et al., 2011; 
Briscoe & Murphy, 2012). Yet, whereas institutional scholars have acknowledged 
that organizations are exposed to varying levels of institutional complexity, 
there is no systematic understanding of when and how organizations 
respond to incompatible demands (Pache & Santos, 2010). In the vignette we 
‘introduced’ a coercive demand to adopt a new practice in Dutch childcare (the 
digital wall) under conditions in which employees and parents either did or 
did not support the practice. We asked childcare managers when they would 
comply with the coercive demand (Study 1) and how they would respond to 
pressures from their constituents prior to compliance (Study 2). We found that 
institutional complexity leads decision makers to delay their compliance; the 
delays were longer when both of the constituents issued competing demands. 
We also found that decision makers usually did not intend ‘to sit by passively’ 
but anticipated various response strategies directed toward multiple targets. 
Decision makers used the time before compliance in their attempts to reduce 
institutional complexity by resorting to the following solutions: neutralizing 
opposing pressures, challenging the coercive pressure, waiting to see how 
the situation would unfold as constituents influenced one another, and/
or by adapting the practice to suit the opponents and their own normative 
orientation (partial compliance). We found three factors influenced the decision 
makers’ responses prior to compliance, namely: (1) their interpretation of the 
constituents’ demands (2) the complexity conditions they faced and (3) their 
normative orientation toward the practice. 
6.2 Contributions to Institutional Theory 
Multiple logics and field evolution 
Based on the findings of Chapter 2, we believe that we have contributed to 
a more dynamic and nuanced understanding of how the interplay among 
multiple logics can shape the evolution of a field. Most studies have focused 
on two logics and the competitive relationship which exists between them 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Goodrick & Reay, 2011). In Chapter 2, we found how 
multiple logics can interact in dynamic ways and how the relationships among 
logics may vary between competitive and cooperative relationships over time. 
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Depending on the specific combination of logics and the relationships between 
them, the emergence and development of a field can be either blocked or 
boosted. A more detailed understanding of a field’s trajectory and the plural 
logics which simultaneously operate within that field, requires scholars to take 
a longitudinal approach and to acknowledge that the degree of incompatibility 
between logics appears to be largely time and context-bound (cf., Greenwood et 
al., 2010; 2011; Van Gestel & Hillebrand). 
Responding to institutional complexity 
A central premise of the institutional theory concerns the notion that 
organizations comply (at least in appearance) with external pressures in their 
environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Nonetheless, 
recent literature on institutional complexity has pointed out that compliance 
may not always be possible if demands are largely incompatible (Pache & Santos, 
2010; Greenwood et al., 2011); for instance, by adopting a particular new practice 
or policy an organization may signal a favorable message to one constituent, 
while at the same time it may defy the demand of another constituent (Heimer, 
1999: 18). Such ambiguous and conflicting situations create opportunities for 
heterogeneity to occur in organizational responses (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2005; 
Lounsbury, 2007). 
In this dissertation we have shown how organizations can deploy a variety 
of responses in complex institutional situations. In the various chapters, several 
responses have been put forward, such as: attempts to balance divergent demands, 
influence constituents, challenge the source of the pressure or manipulate it, 
exit the institutional domain when complexity seems irresolvable, wait for 
legitimacy to recover naturally, accommodate new demands, experiment with 
new practices, neutralize ‘opposing’ pressures, and partial compliance. Contrary 
to traditional expectations of compliant responses, we have empirically shown 
the variety of responses organizations can deploy when faced with situations 
of institutional complexity. Hence, our study underscores that organizations 
are not passive recipients of institutional pressures or that they always comply 
with institutional prescriptions. Moreover, we have shown how an organization 
might decide to adopt more than one response that is subsequently directed 
at multiple targets (Tilcsik, 2010). Thereby, we can contribute to a research 
agenda that has been opened up by Oliver (1991) and extended by Pache and 
Santos (2010), who conceptually applied Oliver’s multiple response categories 
to situations of institutional complexity. 
Furthermore, as we have shown in Chapter 5, even in the case of coercive 
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pressures for practice adoption, organizations may resort to using a certain 
discretion in compliance, at least in the timing thereof and the responses they 
choose prior to compliance. However, in previous studies ‘time’ has not been 
taken into account in the context of institutional complexity. In situations 
that are rife with conflicting demands, delaying compliance might eventually 
create possibilities for multiple response strategies. In particular, as long as 
key constituents do not support a new practice or there is a chance that the 
(coercive) pressure might change altogether, postponing could perhaps ‘pay off’ 
in the end. This contradicts two notions inherent to institutional theory; first, 
our results stress that organizations can use the time prior to compliance very 
actively (such as lobbying the government or adapting their practice to balance 
the opponents’ interests) in their attempts to resolve complexity. Nevertheless, 
this does not fit with the prevailing picture of late adopters who are regarded 
as ‘passive’ actors, a notion that has remained dominant in institutional 
theorizing (e.g., Lounsbury, 2007: 289; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). Second, and 
contrary to previous research, our results point out that even in the face of 
institutional pressures featuring force and coercion (Oliver, 1991; Lawrence et 
al., 2001; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), an organization may delay compliance if it 
faces conflicting demands from other important constituents. 
A micro-level understanding 
In presenting these studies that are included in this dissertation, we believe 
we have also contributed to a recent appeal that has been made requesting 
that more research be focused on the individual level of analysis (e.g., Powell 
& DiMaggio, 2008; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). As pointed out earlier by 
Suddaby (2010: 17), “institutions operate through the influence and agency 
of individuals”. Although for quite some time these individuals have largely 
disappeared from the macro institutional agenda (Zucker, 1991; Barley, 2008). 
However, institutions need to be enacted, understood, interpreted and assessed 
by individuals in concrete social situations (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). In Chapters 
3, 4 and 5 we have referred the vital role of individual decision makers who 
experience and interpret institutional pressures and events, and who envision 
their consequences and assess which strategies to use (George et al., 2006; 
Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). In Chapter 3 we evaluated how childcare managers 
experienced a catastrophic event in their field and how they gauged the loss of 
legitimacy for both the sector and their organization. In Chapter 4 we have seen 
how decision makers interpret the misalignment between new requirements 
and the existing organizational situation on both material and ideational 
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aspects. Then finally in Chapter 5 we have shown how decision makers interpret 
complex institutional situations which arise when a powerful actor (the state) 
mandates a new practice whereas other constituents do (not) interpret that 
practice as legitimate. Even in cases involving coercive institutional pressures, 
the interpretations of a constituents’ importance were not ‘all or nothing’, 
directing actors simply to comply with the most powerful. 
Generally speaking, by directing attention to this micro-level of analysis, 
important insights can be gained concerning the manner in which institutional 
complexity is experienced and understood. 
6.3 Generalizability and Limitations 
As we have explained above, we believe this dissertation contributes to our 
knowledge of institutional complexity in several different ways. At the same 
time however, we are well aware that the research we have presented has 
several limitations as well. In addition to the specific limitations we already 
discussed in each of the chapters, we have outlined two general limitations 
below. 
In the first place, all of the chapters focus upon the Dutch childcare 
industry. In doing so we have responded to calls for institutional studies in 
contexts found outside of North America (see Scott, 2005; Greenwood et al. 
2010). Moreover, because our research context is rife with strong and divergent 
normative beliefs and regulatory forces, it proved to be valuable in particular 
for studying institutional complexity. Nonetheless, there is a need to explore 
the generalizability of our results to other fields: First, the majority of childcare 
organizations consist of relatively small firms and the decisions made by the 
childcare manager subsequently shape organizational behavior to a great extent. 
In this respect, our results may lack applicability in contexts where multiple 
decision makers in large organizations have to interpret and collectively make 
sense of their complex institutional environment (cf. Lepoutre & Valente, 2012). 
Secondly, the particular characteristics of the childcare field may limit the 
generalizability of our findings. For instance, this field is characterized by strong 
regulatory pressures. In less regulated fields, or in fields where organizations are 
more powerful, external pressures may safely be ignored, reducing the degree 
to which actors are confronted with institutional complexity (Dhalla & Oliver, 
forthcoming; Quirke, forthcoming). Some organizations may even be able to 
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‘detach’ themselves from their institutional setting (Greenwood et al., 2011: 
349). For instance, Kraatz and Block (2008: 251) theorized that organizations 
“may forge durable identities of their own” and hence, become “institutions in 
their own right”, thereby immunizing the organization against multiple external 
pressures. Future research is required to identify the range of contingencies that 
affect the responses to institutional pressures under conditions of complexity. 
A second boundary condition of this study is that we have mainly focused 
on the manner in which actors are affected by institutional pressures, how they 
develop a local understanding and how they render a response. Although we 
believe that we have given a valuable account of the manners in which macro 
demands are ‘pulled down’ to the micro-level of organizations and individual 
decision makers who are faced with incompatible demands from their different 
constituents, we have not focused upon the manner in which organizational 
actions ‘ratchet upwards’ and how they subsequently affect field dynamics 
(Powell & Colyvas, 2008: 278). In this respect, we have only focused on one part of 
Coleman’s (1990) bath-tub model, running from the macro to the micro. A more 
full-fledged understanding of institutional dynamics should attend to both sets 
of linkages, yet this would require a multi-level account. A good example can 
be found in a recent paper written by Smets et al. (2012), in which the authors 
show how institutional change, which originates in the improvisations made 
during one’s daily work, can radiate to the level of the field. 
Finally, in this thesis we have, for the most part, restricted our attention 
so that it includes only one focal actor, namely the decision maker. We have 
shown how decision makers factor institutional complexity into their decisions 
concerning when and how they should deal with institutional demands. 
Therefore, we have relied on their individual accounts of what they did or 
what they planned to do. We did not trace how the meanings of pressures or 
events are constructed among multiple actors inside the organization or how 
managers handle the tension when different groups inside the organization 
are attached to different logics. Valuable insights are likely to be gained if we 
can obtain a better understanding of how different and competing interests 
inside organizations shape the enactment of pressures and drive organizations’ 
responses (cf., Pache & Santos, 2010; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996). We return to this issue in the following section below. 
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6.4 Directions for Future Research 
Although empirical research that has examined institutional complexity is still 
in its early stages, we believe that a better understanding of both its antecedents 
and its consequences for individuals, organizations and fields is of importance. 
As we reach the end of this dissertation, we would like to address a number of 
other ideas for future research in institutional theory, besides those that we 
have identified thus far. 
Sources of complexity 
Previous research has indicated that institutional complexity arises from 
conflicting logics, conflicting constituent’s demands, or misaligned means and 
ends in the demands (Pache & Santos, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2010; 2011). As we 
explained in Chapter 3, field-wide disruptive events, especially in cases when 
regulatory measures to resolve complexity have not (yet) been implemented 
(cf. Nigam & Ocasio, 2010) may constitute another valuable future research site 
for studies on institutional complexity, particularly due to the complex and 
ambiguous institutional pressures they initiate. Particularly during times of 
disruption and stress, when the taken for granted social order is inverted, the 
differences in demands may all of a sudden become highly salient (Barley, 1986; 
Suddaby, 2010). 
 Moreover, in Chapters 4 and 5 we have shown how the normative/pedagogical 
beliefs of the childcare managers greatly influenced the degree of institutional 
contradictions that they experienced and the responses they generated. While 
we manipulated the conflicting constituents’ demands that decision makers 
faced in Chapter 5, another source of complexity that we observed in that 
study came from the decision makers’ own normative orientation toward the 
practice, which is something we did not manipulate in the vignettes. In both 
Chapters 4 and 5 we found that the greater the misfit between the decision 
makers’ normative beliefs and a new institutional pressure, the more likely that 
the decision makers showed resistant responses, ceteris paribus. As we have 
indicated in Chapter 5, this normative misfit was so strong for some managers 
that it seemed to cause an overriding effect towards delay or even produced exit 
strategies, by arguing for example, “I won’t sell a service that I don’t believe in”. 
Future research could further explore the relationship between personal beliefs 
and responses to institutional complexity as well as its boundary conditions. 
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Consequences of response strategies
In this dissertation we have focused on the way in which decision makers 
interpret situations of institutional complexity and how they subsequently 
generate organizational responses to deal with the complexity in their 
environment. We did not focus upon the consequences of such organizational 
strategies, such as which responses would be more effective or which would 
endure in the long term? For instance, in handling the tensions which arise from 
disruptive events (Chapter 3), Desai (2011: 265) has pointed to the possibility that 
active attempts to manage the perceptions/impressions of constituents could 
potentially backfire if the constituents interpret this attempt as being superficial 
or directly manipulative. In situations such as these, an organization may have 
been better off if it had tried to avoid all the attention. Moreover, ceremonial 
responses can backfire as well, whenever constituents become aware of the 
fact that conformity is not ‘real’. For example, when institutional pressures 
directly affect the material aspects of the organization (see Chapter 4), non-
conformity can become clearly visible, which makes this a risky strategy. An 
implicit assumption in institutional theory is, however, that external referents 
would not be aware of the misalignment “between the walk and the talk”. Yet, 
organizations may not always be able to avoid the scrutiny of external referents 
(Pache & Santos, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2011: 351). 
Especially when organizations are exposed to competing institutional logics 
over a very long time, which is sometimes also referred to as hybrid organizations, 
it is worth investigating when they do well (cf., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Tracey 
et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2013). Under which conditions can two conflicting 
logics effectively and durably be reconciled within organizations? Differences 
in the effectiveness of particular response strategies are to be expected. For 
instance, Battilana and Dorado (2010) studied two pioneering commercial 
microfinance organizations, which had to combine a development and a 
banking logic. However, these two organizations differed greatly in their success 
in building and maintaining their hybridity and handling the tension between 
logics. Whereas one organization (relying on an ‘apprenticeship’ hiring and 
socialization approach) was able to grow, the other (relaying on an ‘integration’ 
hiring and socialization approach) was not due to the identity conflicts which 
had emerged within the organization. Similarly Tracey et al. (2011) showed 
how two institutional entrepreneurs in the U.K. created a new organizational 
form by bridging two conflicting logics: the logic of for-profit retail and the logic 
of non-profit homelessness support. This was done by founding a household 
catalogue business that employed homeless people in the U.K. Even though 
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they were very successful in the beginning, the new organization collapsed a 
few years later, after it had scaled its operations nationally. 
We believe it is important for future studies to take a step further rather than 
noting which responses are used and why they have been used. Future studies 
could also address the effectiveness of strategies for managing complexity, both 
within and outside the organization, and these studies could subsequently 
delineate the boundaries of such strategies. 
New tools to do the job 
As a final note we would like to call attention to the use of experimental research 
in institutional theory, especially for its value in discovering some of institutional 
theory’s micro-foundations. Institutional theory has come under increased 
criticism that the empirical demonstration of higher order effects alone cannot 
be taken as evidence of particular institutional processes. Furthermore, the 
central focus on the field-level in research designs has obscured the puzzle of 
when and how particular institutional mechanisms operate (e.g., Schneiberg 
& Clemens, 2006). This critique centers on the institutional diffusion studies 
that relied on archival records and counted the number of organizations that 
have come to share a particular structural feature over time (e.g., Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1983; Fligstein, 1985; Haveman, 1993; Westphal et al., 1997). Although 
these adoption studies revealed important insights into the patterns of 
diffusion of organizational structures and forms at the field level, partly as a 
results of the use of ‘distant proxies’ they could not capture the underlying 
processes and motivations of adoption (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005; Kennedy & 
Fiss, 2009; Suddaby, 2010). Moreover, by relying on a correlation between the 
changes in the institutional environment and the act of (non)adoption - while 
at the same timeneglecting potentially important intervening variables - the 
inferred causality in these studies has been questioned (Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2009). The increased use of qualitative methods among institutional scholars in 
the mid-1990s addressed some of the methodological problems in these early 
diffusion studies (Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006; David & Bitektine, 2009; Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2009). Besides, this qualitative focus enabled institutional 
scholars to study complex processes such as institutional change and diversity, 
which in the past had been difficult to quantify (e.g., Greenwood, Suddaby & 
Hinings, 2002; Townley, 2002; Reay & Hinings, 2005). These context-rich field 
studies provided detailed insights into how institutional fields change. However, 
due to the complex nature of these processes and the limited number of cases 
that could be selected, it was difficult to discern patterns, to isolate and to test 
relationships causally, or to generalize the findings (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). 
Furthermore, while relying on historical or interpretive methods, motives for 
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adoption have been reconstructed retrospectively. 
We believe there is potential value in using experimental approaches in 
institutional theory as a means for complementing existing (quantitative and 
qualitative) research methodologies and as a way to overcome some of its main 
problems. Obviously, not all research issues can be traced using experimental 
approaches and we are not suggesting that they should. Nevertheless, currently 
many of the theoretical insights of institutional theory are not being tested and 
researchers are warning that the theory might lose its coherence due to an 
increased ambiguity in meaning. Some have even stressed the need to return to 
a few of the core theoretical accounts and proposed relationships (e.g., Zucker, 
1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; 
David & Bitektine, 2009; Suddaby, 2010). When seen in this light, we feel that 
one of the key advantages of experimental approaches is that they allow us to 
actually test previously posited relationships and to extend our understanding of 
important underlying mechanisms that are at work. In this way, we could study 
the micro-foundations of institutions instead of treating institutionalization as 
a ‘black box’ at the organizational level (Zucker, 1991: 105). 
In order to gain an understanding of how macro-institutional pressures 
‘work through’ and are enacted by individuals in concrete social situations – we 
believe that experimental approaches hold great promise. If designed properly, 
experimental designs can effectively confirm (or disconfirm) the cause and 
effect relationships that are often suggested, but difficult to isolate in context-
rich case studies (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009: 38; David & Bitektine, 2009: 171). In doing 
so, one can increase the internal validity of the outcomes and simultaneously 
the problems of retrospection could be avoided. Hence, experimental work 
could deepen our understanding of the links between cognition, motivation and 
organizational decision-making (George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009: 914). 
6.5 Practical Implications
In this dissertation we have shown that Dutch childcare organizations face 
multiple demands, which often are not in sync with one another, or create a 
misalignment with organizational goals or professional beliefs. Part of this 
complexity resides in the fact that childcare organizations are supposed to 
integrate a societal function with a (potentially conflicting) regular market 
position, while operating in a strong normative context. At the same time, they 
are subject to a very high degree of government regulation and control. This 
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is not only exercised via a strict regulatory framework concerning children’s 
safety, health and well-being, but also via taxation measures which largely 
influence the demand for childcare services. Recently, this has become clearly 
visible, as the government has largely economized on its childcare spending 
and the demand for childcare services has rapidly declined. 
The level of institutional complexity childcare organizations face is defined 
by a wide array of actors, such as the government, inspection agencies and 
parents. The government can play a crucial role in clearing or reducing the 
amount of complexity organizations experience. For instance, in starting with 
the development of a broader and more coherent long-term policy framework 
about how it wants to raise, guide and educate young children, and the formal 
role of childcare therein. Moreover, with the extensive amount of bureaucratic 
control characterizing the sector and the high number of complicated and 
conflicting rules, complexity could be reduced by emphasizing practical 
applicability of regulatory demands.
Critically, the government retains a large degree of control over organizational 
practices and activities. Yet, as we have shown in this study, organizations 
do have room to maneuver in this complex environment. Hence, childcare 
organizations can pursue a more proactive role in decreasing their level of 
political dependency than is now seized. In the last two decades the childcare 
sector was able to grow extensively, spurred by the government’s policy to 
enhance the labor market participation of women. However, this sole focus 
on the labor market function of childcare has also induced a limit on the role 
childcare organizations see for themselves. With a government that primarily 
regards childcare as a labor-market instrument and the ideal of self-care still 
largely embedded in Dutch culture, organizations must critically prove their 
value over and beyond the possibility to combine work and family and recognize 
and capitalize on the broader role they can occupy. Instead of solely framing 
childcare as a way for parents to earn a dual income, childcare organizations 
can create mutual value by repositioning themselves and stressing a clear 
societal function; for instance as a partner to parents in raising their children 
and as contributors to the developmental opportunities of children. Apparently, 
now subsidies are being economized on, the gap between cost and value is not 
bridged by the type and level of service organizations are providing. Therefore, 
in addition to care provided by parents at home, childcare organizations should 
demonstrate the value they offer as complementary to the self-care parents 
provide. Simply put, what’s a parent more likely to do - save on the cost of 
childcare or save on their children’s future? Being more explicit on the long-
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term value childcare creates, might make legitimacy a less volatile issue within 
this field.
While reducing the degree of complexity would yield wider benefit, 
complexity in itself is perhaps not necessarily a problem or a bad thing. Conflicts 
among demands make actors reflective of their core values and main goals that 
are perhaps forgotten in the day-to-day business. As such, conflicts can be a 
potential source of innovation – and hence may become a blessing more than a 
curse. Given the challenging market conditions organizations currently face, the 
urgency to innovate has grown. This places a call on organizations to develop 
(strategic) capabilities that equip them to respond better to changes in their 
environment. Here, interest groups (such as Brancheorganisatie Kinderopvang 
and Waarborgfonds Kinderopvang) can play an important role by stimulating 
organizations to develop these innovative capabilities, for instance by providing 
a platform for innovation. 
6.6 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the various 
ways in which organizations deal with situations that are rife with multiple, 
strong and conflicting institutions and the underlying dynamics that drive such 
responses. In closing, I believe, and would argue that many others would tend 
to agree, that proper and reliable childcare provision is essential in a day and 
age where it is a necessity for both parents to have jobs. Nonetheless, there 
is not always agreement as to which form this provision should take, where 
it should be provided, by whom and for how long. Despite the salient sources 
of complexity in its environment, the Dutch childcare sector has flourished 
during the past two decades. Yet, in the face of economic downturn, strict 
governmental cutbacks and as we witness the aftereffects of the Amsterdam 
crisis still looming large, we are once more confronted with how vulnerable the 
childcare field really is. 
However, I believe we should continue to bear in mind the important task 
that childcare organizations face each and every day. That is why I only have 
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Childcare organizations fulfill a very important and responsible task in a 
tremendously complex environment. These organizations must run their 
businesses in an environment that is rife with strong norms, values and 
beliefs, which concern what is ‘good’ and ‘responsible’ childcare. Furthermore, 
childcare organizations are subject to strict regulatory pressures in regard to 
children’s safety, health and well-being. The demands stemming from divergent 
constituents are often not aligned. Hence, childcare organizations find 
themselves thrust upon a battlefield with multiple and conflicting prescriptions 
as to what constitutes ‘appropriate’ organizational conduct; a situation which 
has been referred to in this dissertation as institutional complexity (Greenwood 
et al., 2011). 
Faced with multiple prescriptions for ‘the proper thing to do’, organizations 
are likely to experience tension, conflict or confusion, subsequently creating 
circumstances for heterogeneous responses. However, on the basis of previous 
research, we do not fully understand how organizations respond to situations 
of institutional complexity, nor which micro-level factors might explain the 
variation in these responses. That is why we have focused on the key role 
played by individual decision makers who must interpret and assess the 
various demands made by those in their environment. After all, decision 
makers are focal actors who need to factor institutional complexity in their 
decisions about when and how to respond. By making “decisions as to what 
demand to prioritize, satisfy, alter or neglect in order to secure support and 
ensure survival”, childcare decision makers need to navigate their organization 
through the complex institutional environment39 (Pache & Santos, 2010: 462; 
George et al., 2006). 
In Chapter 2 we began by tracing the sources of institutional complexity in 
the Dutch childcare field. For this purpose we conducted a historical narrative 
on the issue of childcare in the Netherlands (starting in the late 19th century, 
up to and including the first decade of the 21st century). We traced the roots 
of Dutch childcare as a contested practice, clamped within multiple societal 
level logics. Even though the Netherlands has a reputation for being liberal 
and generally progressive in its social organization, institutionalized childcare 
emerged relatively late compared to other Western welfare states. For a long 
39  Whenever we refer to childcare managers in this dissertation, we are referring to the key decision maker in 
the childcare organization (hence, top-level management). In the Netherlands, these childcare managers are 
often referred to as childcare directors (kinderopvang directeur/bestuurder in Dutch). 
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time, the traditional family logic, where the mother takes full responsibility 
for non-paid labor, while the father earns the family income, was strongly 
propagated by the state and entwined with the teachings of the church. We 
demonstrate how the evolution of the family logic in the Netherlands evolved 
by those changes that occurred in (the shape and salience of) other societal level 
logics. The care for children outside the home could only become a legitimate 
‘solution’ because changes unfolded within multiple logics: the family logic 
changed, the influence of the religious logic in society waned, while at the same 
time the government changed its position regarding families and childcare, and 
the market logic began to dominate many sectors in Dutch society. By revealing 
the legacy of multiple logics that has shaped the emergence and growth of the 
Dutch childcare field, we can better understand the nature and consequences 
of these incompatible pressures upon organizations. In the remaining chapters 
we subsequently traced how childcare organizations experience and respond to 
various situations of institutional complexity. 
Chapter 3 revolved around a disruptive event that shocked the Dutch 
childcare field in December 2010. The sexual abuse of children in a childcare 
center in Amsterdam challenged the institutional beliefs and expectations that 
children are safe when placed in childcare, and it damaged the whole field as 
media scrutiny diffused broadly. We know that due to a process of generalization 
– in which audiences incorporate the possibility of an event into their general 
knowledge of a group of organizations - legitimacy losses can ‘spill over’ (Jonsson 
et al., 2009). Yet, we have only limited understanding of how organizations deal 
with such legitimacy threatening events in their field (Desai, 2011). We depicted 
a short narrative of the case and the responses it had triggered among various 
constituents (i.e., parents, politicians, childcare professionals and the wider 
public). We show how complex this event has been as childcare organizations 
(i) suffered from an event they were not directly involved in, and (ii) were 
confronted with mixed and opposing demands concerning the appropriate way 
to act. Even though this event was highly salient for the overall childcare field, 
the salience of this event for individual decision makers varied and triggered 
different organizational responses in turn. We conducted a survey-study among 
childcare managers (one year after the event) to shed light on the underlying 
micro-variables that drive variation in how they responded to the event. The 
results revealed that decision makers’ level of field identification positively 
influenced organizational responsiveness. This relationship was partially 
mediated by the decision makers’ negative emotions and their legitimacy 
loss perceptions. In particular, the decision makers’ perceptions regarding 
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the extent to which their own organization had lost legitimacy, turned out to 
be consequential in terms of the frequency of organizational responses. We 
discussed that external shocks in themselves may not be sufficient to trigger 
institutional change in a field. Whether field-wide legitimacy threatening events 
can raise actors’ reflexivity and create possibilities for institutional change 
to occur is partially answered at the micro-level of analysis. The role of such 
micro-level factors may be particularly influential as long as there is field-wide 
uncertainty regarding appropriate organizational responses to the event.
In Chapter 4 we have presented an explorative study for which we 
conducted interviews with childcare managers. In this chapter we have 
focused on the institutional tensions and contradictions which might arise 
when a new institutional demand (in this study: The Childcare Act 2005) 
creates a misalignment for decision makers with ideational and/or material 
organizing aspects. The aim of this paper was to delineate how material objects 
- besides the symbolic aspects which have been predominantly emphasized in 
institutional theory - shape the responses to new institutional pressures. We 
have shown how decision makers’ interpretations of the new requirements 
being formulated concerning children’s safety, health and well-being, reflect 
both material as well as ideational considerations. Moreover, these are often 
heavily intertwined. Once established, both the material aspects (such as 
playgrounds, toys, and buildings in our particular context) and ideational 
aspects (such beliefs of what constitutes ‘good’ childcare or ideas about how 
children learn, play and grow) act to filter or translate institutional pressures 
that flow from the governmental level. We have shown how decision makers 
grapple with the institutional complexities that new demands might elicit. 
This is especially true when decision makers have experienced a misalignment 
regarding both material and ideational aspects, so that conformity becomes 
less likely and more resistant responses are triggered. 
In Chapter 5 we presented a vignette experiment with follow-up interviews. 
In this chapter we experimentally manipulated various levels of institutional 
complexity by following a new coercive pressure in the field. In doing so, we 
focused on the complex institutional situation which arises when a powerful 
actor (such as the state) mandates organizations to adopt a new practice, while 
at the same time other important constituents (parents and/or employees) do 
not support this practice. We confronted childcare managers with a hypothetical 
law which would go into effect in exactly 5 years and we manipulated the 
responses of parents and employees (yielding four experimental conditions 
in total). We asked the childcare managers when they would comply with the 
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coercive demand (Study 1) and how they would respond to pressures from their 
constituents prior to compliance (Study 2). Our results revealed that the decision 
makers varied in the timing of compliance with coercive pressures depending 
on the level of institutional complexity they faced. We found that institutional 
complexity leads decision makers to delay compliance, but this is usually not 
in the passive sense; decision makers used the period before compliance in an 
effort to reduce institutional complexity by neutralizing the opposing pressures, 
challenging the coercive pressure, adapting the practice to suit opponents 
and their own normative orientation (partial compliance), and/or waiting to 
see how the situation might unfold as multiple parties had influence on one 
another. We believe this study contributes to institutional theory by opening 
the ‘black box’ of decision makers’ interpretations of institutional complexity, 
by first identifying the effect of complexity on the timing of adoption, and 
subsequently its effect on the range of strategies that were directed at various 
targets in order to resolve the complexity. 
In Chapter 6 we presented our general discussion and conclusion. We 
discussed the theoretical and practical implications of this dissertation, 
addressed its limitations and discussed avenues for pursuing future research. 
In the institutionally complex research setting of the Dutch childcare field, we 
have traced the sources of institutional complexity and investigated its effects 
on individual decision makers and the organizational responses they choose. 
Hence, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of various ways in 
which organizations respond to situations that are rife with multiple, strong 
and conflicting institutional demands and the underlying micro-dynamics that 







Organisaties in de kinderopvang hebben een hele belangrijke en verantwoor-
delijke taak in een extreem complexe omgeving. Zij moeten hun organisatie 
draaiende houden in een omgeving die vol is van sterke normen, waarden en 
overtuigingen over wat ‘goede’ en ‘verantwoorde’ kinderopvang nu eigenlijk 
inhoudt. Bovendien hebben deze organisaties te maken met sterke druk, die 
o.m. veroorzaakt wordt door strenge regulatieve eisen aangaande de veiligheid, 
de gezondheid en het welzijn van kinderen. De eisen van verschillende 
belanghebbenden liggen niet altijd op één lijn. Als gevolg hiervan bevinden 
kinderopvangorganisaties zich op een strijdtoneel van meervoudige en 
conflicterende eisen over wat nu ‘goed’ organisatiegedrag inhoudt: een situatie 
die we in dit proefschrift institutionele complexiteit noemen (Greenwood et al., 
2011). 
Geconfronteerd met meervoudige eisen over wat nu ‘het juiste’ is om 
in een bepaalde situatie te doen, zullen deze organisaties waarschijnlijk 
spanning, conflict en verwarring ervaren. Dit creëert de mogelijkheid voor een 
verscheidenheid aan reacties. Echter, op basis van eerder onderzoek weten 
we niet precies hoe organisaties reageren op situaties van institutionele 
complexiteit. Ook weten we onvoldoende welke onderliggende variabelen de 
verschillen in deze reacties verklaren. Daarom hebben wij ons in dit onderzoek 
gericht op de belangrijke rol van de individuele beslisser, die belast is met de taak 
om de verschillende eisen in zijn/haar organisatieomgeving te interpreteren, 
te beoordelen en te wegen. Per slot van rekening moeten zij institutionele 
complexiteit meenemen in hun beslissingen over wanneer en hoe te reageren.
Met deze beslissingen over “welke eisen voorrang krijgen, welke zij 
moeten inwilligen, veranderen of negeren om sociale steun te krijgen en het 
voortbestaan van hun organisatie veilig te stellen” (Pache & Santos, 2010: 462; 
George et al., 2006), loodsen managers in de kinderopvang40 hun organisaties 
door de complexe institutionele omgeving. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 zijn we op zoek gegaan naar de oorsprong van de institutionele 
complexiteit in de Nederlandse kinderopvang. Voor dit doel hebben we een 
historische analyse gemaakt van kinderopvang in Nederland (van eind 19e eeuw 
tot en met het eerste decennium van de 21ste eeuw). We hebben de roots van 
kinderopvang nagetrokken; dat voor lange tijd een omstreden issue in Nederland 
40  Wanneer we in dit proefschrift  verwijzen naar ‘managers’, bedoelen we de belangrijkste beslissers in 
kinderopvangorganisaties (dus top-level management). In Nederland worden deze managers meestal 
aangeduid als directeur/bestuurder, en soms tevens ondernemer. 
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is geweest en sterk verweven is met diverse maatschappelijke logica’s. Ondanks 
de liberale en progressieve reputatie van Nederland als het gaat om sociale 
voorzieningen, ontstond formele kinderopvang pas relatief laat, zeker als we 
dit vergelijken met andere Westerse welvaartsstaten. Gedurende een lange 
periode werd het traditionele gezinsbeeld (we praten over de ‘familielogica’ 
in dit verband), waarin vader voor het inkomen zorgt en moeder de volledige 
verantwoordelijkheid draagt voor niet-betaalde arbeid, sterk gedomineerd en 
gepropageerd door de staat en de kerk. In dit hoofdstuk laten we zien dat de 
veranderingen binnen het gezin zich hebben afgespeeld tegen een decor van 
veranderingen in (de vorm en belang van) andere maatschappelijke logica’s - 
zoals de logica van religie, de staat en de markt.
De zorg voor kinderen buiten de familiesfeer kon pas legitiem worden door 
gelijktijdige veranderprocessen in andere logica’s: gezinnen veranderden, 
de invloed van de kerk op de maatschappij nam af, de overheid veranderde 
haar houding ten opzichte van gezin en kinderopvang, en het marktdenken 
begon verschillende sectoren van de Nederlandse maatschappij te domineren. 
Door de erfenissen uit het verleden bloot te leggen en te laten zien dat de 
ontstaansgeschiedenis en groei van Nederlandse kinderopvang omringd is 
door verschillende (en soms conflicterende) logica’s, kunnen we de oorzaken en 
gevolgen van tegenstrijdige druk in deze sector beter begrijpen. In de volgende 
hoofdstukken hebben we onderzocht hoe kinderopvangorganisaties met 
verschillende situaties van institutionele complexiteit omgaan. 
In hoofdstuk 3 kijken we naar een gebeurtenis in december 2010 die een 
schok teweegbracht in de Nederlandse kinderopvang. Het seksuele misbruik van 
jonge kinderen op een kinderdagverblijf in Amsterdam heeft de institutionele 
verwachting dat kinderen veilig zijn in de kinderopvang aan het wankelen 
gebracht. Met de grootschalige media-aandacht die hierop volgde, werd de 
gehele sector geraakt. 
Het legitimiteitsverlies bleef niet beperkt tot de organisatie waar de crisis zich 
voordeed, maar door een proces van generalisatie werd de legitimiteit van de hele 
sector aangetast: mensen nemen de kans op zo’n gebeurtenis mee in hun kennis 
en oordeel over de gehele groep van organisaties (Jonsson et al., 2009). Echter, we 
hebben maar beperkte wetenschappelijke kennis over hoe organisaties omgaan 
met een gebeurtenis die de legitimiteit van een hele sector bedreigt. In hoofdstuk 
3 hebben we een kort overzicht gegeven van de ‘Amsterdamse zedenzaak’ en 
de reacties die dit heeft ontlokt bij verschillende belanghebbenden (ouders, 
politici, professionals in de kinderopvang en het bredere publiek). Hieruit blijkt 
hoe complex deze crisis voor kinderopvangorganisaties is geweest: (i) zij werden 
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aangetast door een gebeurtenis waarin zij geen direct aandeel hebben gehad 
en (ii) geconfronteerd met tegenstrijdige eisen aangaande de ‘juiste’ manier om 
hiermee om te gaan.
Ondanks de grote impact van deze gebeurtenis voor de gehele sector, zijn 
managers hier verschillend mee omgegaan. Eén jaar na de gebeurtenis hebben 
we een vragenlijst uitgezet onder managers in de kinderopvang om zicht te 
krijgen op de onderliggende micro variabelen die de verschillen in reacties 
kunnen verklaren. De resultaten laten zien dat de mate waarin managers zich 
identificeren met de sector van invloed is op de mate waarin hun organisatie 
heeft gereageerd. Dit werd deels gemedieerd door negatieve emoties van 
beslissers en de perceptie van legitimiteitsverlies volgend op de gebeurtenis. Met 
name de mate waarin managers in de kinderopvang ervaren dat ook hun eigen 
organisatie legitimiteit had verloren, bleek de frequentie van organisatiereacties 
op de gebeurtenis te beïnvloeden. In de discussie van dit hoofdstuk hebben 
we besproken dat externe schokken op zichzelf niet per definitie genoeg zijn 
om veranderingen teweeg te brengen in het bredere organisatieveld. Of en hoe 
legitimiteits-bedreigende gebeurtenissen in een veld leiden tot institutionele 
verandering, wordt gedeeltelijk beantwoord op het niveau van individuele 
beslissers (het microniveau van analyse). 
In hoofdstuk 4 presenteren we een exploratieve studie, die gebaseerd is 
op interviews met managers in de kinderopvang. In dit hoofdstuk hebben we 
gekeken naar de spanning die ontstaat als beslissers geconfronteerd worden 
met nieuwe institutionele eisen, die moeilijk te verenigen zijn met ideële of 
materiële organisatieaspecten. Er is onderzocht hoe materiële objecten – naast 
de symbolische aspecten die vaak benadrukt worden in de institutionele theorie 
– de reacties op institutionele druk verklaren. We laten zien hoe beslissers 
de eisen (die voortvloeien uit de Wet Kinderopvang) rondom veiligheid, 
gezondheid en welzijn van kinderen interpreteren en daarin zowel materiële 
als ideële overwegingen meenemen. Bovendien zijn beide aspecten vaak sterk 
met elkaar verweven. De materiële aspecten van kinderopvangorganisaties 
(zoals de buitenplaats, het speelgoed en het gebouw) en de ideële aspecten 
(zoals opvattingen over goede kinderopvang en pedagogische ideeën over hoe 
kinderen leren, spelen en opgroeien) beïnvloeden hoe managers overheidseisen 
interpreteren. We hebben laten zien hoe managers kunnen worstelen met 
regels rondom veiligheid en hygiëne, bijvoorbeeld eisen aan ruimtes of de 
speelplaats, en de manier waarop toegezien wordt op naleving daarvan. Zeker 
als nieuwe regels op gespannen voet staan met pedagogische opvattingen, zien 
we dat conformeren minder vanzelfsprekend is en er actiever weerstand tegen 
283Samenvatting
bepaalde regels wordt geboden. 
In hoofdstuk 5 presenteren we een vignette experiment gevolgd door 
interviews. We hebben gekeken naar de institutioneel complexe situatie, die 
kan ontstaan wanneer een machtige actor (zoals de overheid) een nieuwe eis 
oplegt, terwijl andere belanghebbenden (zoals ouders en werknemers) deze 
nieuwe eis niet ondersteunen. Middels een scenario tekst hebben we managers 
een hypothetische ‘nieuwe wet’ , die na exact vijf jaar zou ingaan, voorgelegd. 
De reacties van ouders en werknemers die volgden op de aankondiging van 
deze nieuwe wet hebben we gemanipuleerd (over 4 experimentele condities). 
We vroegen de kinderopvangmanagers wanneer zij zouden conformeren 
aan de nieuwe eisen (studie 1) en hoe zij om zouden gaan met de reacties 
van ouders en werknemers vóór dat moment. Onze resultaten laten zien dat 
beslissers variëren in de tijd die zij nemen om te conformeren en dat deze tijd 
afhankelijk is van het niveau van complexiteit dat zij ervaren. Meer complexe 
situaties leiden dus tot uitstel van conformeren, maar vaak niet op een passieve 
manier. Beslissers gebruiken de periode in hun pogingen om complexiteit te 
reduceren door bijvoorbeeld weerstand te neutraliseren, de nieuwe eisen te 
betwisten, een manier van werken te vinden die past bij hun eigen overtuiging 
of die tegemoetkomt aan de weerstand van anderen (gedeeltelijk conformeren) 
en/of te wachten hoe de situatie zich zal ontvouwen als andere partijen elkaar 
gaan beïnvloeden. 
We geloven dat deze studie ons inzicht geeft in het interne, veelal onzichtbare 
en onbegrepen, proces van interpretatie van institutionele complexiteit door 
beslissers. We hebben daarvoor gekeken welk effect complexiteit heeft op het 
moment van conformeren en wat het effect is van verschillende strategieën, 
die gericht zijn op het reduceren en/of wegnemen van dergelijke complexiteit.  
Ten slotte hebben we in hoofdstuk 6 een algehele conclusie en discussie 
gegeven. We hebben de theoretische en praktische implicaties besproken, 
aandachtspunten van de studie geadresseerd en suggesties voor toekomstig 
onderzoek gegeven. In de Nederlandse kinderopvang, hebben we onderzocht 
wat de effecten van institutionele complexiteit zijn op beslissers en welke 
reacties zij kiezen. Dit proefschrift levert daarmee een bijdrage aan de kennis 
over de wijze waarop organisaties reageren op  situaties die doorregen zijn van 
sterke en tegenstrijdige institutionele eisen en aan de onderliggende dynamiek 







Aan het begin van de reis lijkt de bestemming altijd zo ver weg. Toch is mijn 
proefschrift nu dan eindelijk af! Maar deze reis heb ik niet alleen gemaakt. Veel 
mensen hebben mij de afgelopen jaren op verschillende manieren geholpen en 
gesteund. Nu ik op het eindstation ben aanbeland en deze reis er (bijna) op zit, 
is het tijd geworden om jullie te bedanken. 
Allereest wil ik mijn promotoren, Marius Meeus en Patrick Vermeulen, 
bedanken. Jullie goede begeleiding, kritische blikken en vertrouwen in een goede 
afloop hebben tot dit resultaat geleid. Als we even niet op hetzelfde spoor zaten, 
kwamen we met levendige, leerzame discussies en de nodige grappen, vaak 
weer ‘right on track’. Marius, bedankt voor je enthousiasme en gedrevenheid. 
Patrick bedankt dat je altijd bereikbaar was voor welke vraag dan ook.
Graag bedank ik ook de leden van de promotiecommissie, te weten prof. dr. 
Yvonne Benschop, prof. dr. Nicolette van Gestel, prof. dr. Royston Greenwood, 
prof. dr. Pursey Heugens en prof. dr. Leon Oerlemens voor de tijd die jullie hebben 
besteed aan het lezen van mijn proefschrift en de constructieve feedback. 
Royston, thank you so much for the two fabulous visits to Edmonton. Both have 
been tremendously valuable to me, both as a person and as an academic. 
I also would like to thank Charlene Zietsma. Working with you on the paper 
in chapter 5 learned me a great deal. I admire your dedication, theoretical 
insights and enthusiasm. 
Heel veel dank ben ik verschuldigd aan de kinderopvangsector. Vanaf 
mijn eerste aanraking met deze sector – gedurende mijn onderzoeksmaster 
in Tilburg – heeft de kinderopvang mijn hart gestolen. Ik raakte gefascineerd 
door het hybride karakter van deze sector, die laveert tussen markt, overheid 
en maatschappij. Ik wil alle directeuren, die ik heb mogen interviewen, 
bedanken voor hun tijd en de goede gesprekken die we hebben gehad. Door 
jullie vertrouwen en eerlijkheid kon ik beter begrijpen hoe jullie navigeren in 
het complexe, fragiele en soms onvoorspelbare land van de kinderopvang. Op 
dit moment lijkt soms te worden vergeten hoe belangrijk deze taak eigenlijk 
is en hoe lastig het is een trein te besturen nu het niet altijd duidelijk is welke 
kant het spoor opgaat. 
Bovenal wil ik het Waarborgfonds Kinderopvang bedanken voor de hulp bij 
de totstandkoming van mijn onderzoek. Jullie hebben mij toegang verleend 
tot de sector en vormden voor mij de (spoor)brug tussen de wetenschap en de 
praktijk. John Ringens, dankjewel voor het vertrouwen dat je in mij hebt gesteld 
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en de waardevolle feedback die jij als directeur van het Waarborgfonds op mijn 
onderzoek hebt gegeven. Judith de Jonge Baars, dankjewel voor onze goede 
gesprekken en brainstromsessies. Ik heb er veel van geleerd. Daarnaast wil ik 
jullie fantastische secretariaat en alle andere medewerkers bedanken voor de 
hulp bij het uitzetten van de vragenlijst voor hoofdstuk 3. 
Uiteraard wil ik ook al mijn collega’s uit Tilburg bedanken bij wie ik mij 
vier jaar lang zo thuis heb gevoeld. Een paar collega’s wil ik specifiek noemen. 
Bijzonder dankbaar ben ik Gertjan, mijn kantoorgenootje. Wij hebben vier jaar 
lang zowel de ballast als de geneugten van het proefschriftleven mogen delen. 
Dankjewel voor alle vragen die ik je mocht stellen, voor alle artikelen over 
de kinderopvang die je altijd zo trouw voor mij meebracht en dat we zoveel 
gelachen hebben. Ook Rob, Jeroen en Maryse wil ik bedanken voor het goede 
voorbeeld dat jullie mij gaven als young academics. Ik heb veel van jullie geleerd 
en veel lol met jullie gehad. Met als hoogtepunt toch wel ons bezoek aan de 
Jostiband. Bart, wat vond ik het jammer dat jij halverwege mijn promotietraject 
Tilburg hebt verlaten. Door het Belgische bloed in mij (37,5% om precies te zijn) 
hadden wij direct een band. Ik moest er altijd hard om lachen als jij al mijn 
goede eigenschappen weer eens toeschreef aan mijn Belgische kant. Als je het 
niet met mij eens was, kreeg ik steevast te horen: ‘dat is zeker d’n Hollander 
in jou’. Joris, bedankt voor al je scheve grappen gedurende de jaren maar ook 
bedankt dat je - nu als Nijmeegse collega - af en toe komt checken hoe het met 
me gaat. Helen en Smaranda, ik wil jullie bedanken voor de fijne gesprekken die 
ik met jullie beiden heb gehad. Ik waardeer jullie gevoel voor humor en cynisme 
enorm. Helen, tevens bedankt voor de hulp bij hoofdstuk 5. Joerg, dank je wel 
voor de altijd oprechte aandacht voor mij en mijn proefschrift. Samen met 
Patrick heb jij mij gedurende de master overtuigd dat de academische wereld 
bij mij paste. Peter, met jou smaakt de koffie altijd beter. Ik hoop dat er nog veel 
bakjes zullen volgen en we onze ervaringen kunnen blijven delen. Auke, als ik 
dan toch met iemand verward moet worden, dan graag met jou. Je bent een 
schat. Ook jij kunt het, dat weet ik zeker.
Ook mijn nieuwe collega’s in Nijmegen wil ik bedanken voor hun medeleven 
in het afgelopen jaar en de ruimte die jullie mij gaven om dit proefschrift af te 
maken en mijn ervaringen met jullie te delen. 
Tom en Svevo, dank dat dit boekje er nu zo gaaf uitziet. Zelf kom ik niet veel 
verder dan Word en Powerpoint (en zelfs dat gaat niet altijd zoals…) 
Lieve vrienden en familie, ik heb jullie de afgelopen jaren minder vaak gezien 
dan ik zou willen. Ik wil jullie bedanken voor de nodige uren ontspanning en 
welkome afleiding en alle lieve kaartjes, berichtjes, mailtjes, app-jes, sms-jes, 
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koffie en avondjes, die dat extra steuntje in de rug geven. 
Jos, wij grapten weleens dat ‘wij tegelijk in de kinderopvang zijn begonnen’. 
Jij bent voor mij een onschatbare bron van informatie geweest. Dankjewel voor 
alle vragen die ik over de kinderopvang mocht stellen en het kijkje in de keuken 
dat je mij hebt gegeven in jouw rol als bestuurder. Daarnaast wil ik jou en Riky 
natuurlijk ook bedanken voor alle lieve steun gedurende de afgelopen jaren. 
Riky, wat heb jij een kaarsjes aan mij versleten :-) . 
Hendrik, wij zijn tegelijk aan het proefschriftavontuur begonnen. Natuurlijk 
wil ik je bedanken voor alle avonden waarop je mij hebt willen helpen met 
statistische vragen, maar bovenal wil ik je bedanken voor je onvoorwaardelijke 
vriendschap. Ik ben blij dat jij op de dag van mijn verdediging achter mij zal 
staan.  
Nienke, een beter zusje is er niet. Toen ik dit voorjaar op een woensdagmiddag 
weer eens druk bezig was met mijn proefschrift, ging opeens de bel. Met positieve 
spirit en Parijse bollen stond jij voor mijn deur. En toen ik zo dom was om mijn 
auto – nota bene in mijn eigen straat - in de prak te rijden, kwam jij mij binnen 
vijf minuten helpen…. met je pyjama nog aan ;-) Dat is zo leuk aan jou! Ik ben 
blij dat jij als paranimf, mij op het laatste stukje van deze reis wil bijstaan. 
Lieve papa en mama, ik wil jullie veel meer zeggen dan ik in dit stukje tekst 
kwijt zal kunnen. Dankjewel dat jullie er altijd voor mij waren als ik weer eens 
vergat te eten, vergat te ontspannen of als ik gewoon twee mensen nodig had 
die altijd in mij geloven. Dank jullie wel voor alle zorg en liefde die jullie ons 
geven, dat jullie ons altijd stimuleren en het beste voorbeeld zijn dat wij ons 
kunnen wensen. Voor jullie is niets teveel.
En tot slot wil ik jou bedanken lieve Pim. Vanaf het moment dat wij elkaar 
leerden kennen zijn wij een team. Als de inspiratie even op was of de moed me 
in de schoenen was gezakt was je er altijd om mij op te beuren. Alhoewel geduld 
misschien niet jouw allersterkte kant is, heb je jezelf meer dan overtroffen 
schat. Wat heb jij een geduld met mij, en dit proefschrift gehad. Je houdt mij 
met beide benen op de grond, geeft als dat nodig is flink tegengas, komt de 
wissels ontdooien als ik me klem heb gereden, maar bovenal zorg je voor de 
meest fantastische momenten. Met jou is geen enkele dag saai. Dankjewel voor 
al die fijne momenten. Ik hoop dat er nog veel meer volgen nu de rust weer een 
beetje is teruggekeerd.   
Tilburg, oktober 2013
Aafke
“It always seems impossible until it’s done”
 
(Nelson Mandela)

